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Abstract

Transmedia storytelling scholarship has been progressing rapidly over recent decades.
Yet, a question that remains open is the lack of analysis of political transmedia
campaigns. This political communication thesis contributes to filling that gap. Its goal is
to develop a flexible and locally-specific approach to analysing transmedia political
campaigning. To understand the context that affects the destinies of transmedia
grassroots campaigns, the study turns to social movement and grassroots activism
scholarships. In particular, it employs the idea of political opportunity structures to
conceptualise those external opportunities and threats that affects transmedia campaigns
in politics. To mitigate the negative aspects of a political climate, reduce the costs of
political participation for active citizens and make their political change efforts more
efficient, political organisers can mobilise valuable resources through transmedia
campaigning, the thesis argues. Thus, the thesis incorporates the analysis of opportunity
structures and mobilising resources to propose a new analytical approach to the study of
political transmedia campaigns. Because this analytical approach reinterprets transmedia
strategies through the lens of opportunity structures and resource mobilisation, I will
refer to it in the thesis as the opportunity structures and mobilising resources (OSMR)
analytical approach. The thesis tests it with the case study of Alexey Navalny's 2013
mayoral campaign for Moscow. The case study outlines the opportunity structures of
modern Russia and discusses the transmedia strategies Navalny’s campaign used to
overcome some of their negative aspects. In doing so, the thesis enriches transmedia
storytelling scholarship with insights from other disciplines and offers a flexible and
locally specific approach to analysing political transmedia campaigns.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Problem statement
Transmedia storytelling is the art of building a storyworld which ‘unfolds across
multiple media platforms with each new text making a distinctive and valuable
contribution to the whole’ (Jenkins, 2006, pp.95-96). Transmedia projects make use of
multiple online and offline means of communication offering a great deal of
participation opportunities to the audience. This allows transmedia producers to improve
the levels of engagement and stay connected with the audience over time. Because
transmedia projects are multiplatform and participation-friendly, it made them popular
in the entertainment industry, marketing and indeed politics.
The theory of transmedia storytelling is a relatively new but timely discipline
which has been progressing rapidly over recent decades. The theoretical interpretations
of the transmedia phenomenon include many classifications pertaining to different
aspects of transmedia projects and campaigns. For instance, Jenkins (2010) proposed
seven core concepts which could help examine transmedia projects. He highlighted such
aspects of transmedia storytelling as spreadability vs. drillability, continuity vs.
multiplicity, immersion vs. extractability, worldbuilding, seriality and performance. In
her study, Iva Nedelcheva (2016, pp.3691-3692) uses Jenkins’ characteristics of
transmedia projects to examine the transmedia experience of Pokémon GO mobile game,
for instance.
There are other insightful classifications that make it easier to interpret
transmedia projects. The taxonomies of transmedia users by Robert Pratten (2015) and
Janet Murray (1997) are based on users’ psychographics and consumption strategies and
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are helpful to understand transmedia projects from the viewpoint of user experience. On
the matter of participation levels, Darren Lilleker (2014, p.153) distinguishes
involvement as ‘cognitive awareness and perceived personal relevance’, engagement as
‘deeper cognition and so drawn to seek further information’ and participation as
‘mobilisation as a result of information seeking’. Ross Mayfield (2006) has developed a
classification of different types of participation depending on its intensity. From less to
more intense, those types suggest that a media user would read, favorite, tag, comment,
subscribe, share, network, write, refactor, collaborate, moderate or lead in the process of
media consumption or creation.
Arguably the most thorough analytical approach to interpret transmedia projects
to date is Renira Gambarato’s analytical model (Gambarato, 2013). The author of this
thesis has published a book chapter analysing Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign
for Moscow with the model. In the piece, the campaign is discussed from a wide range
of its aspects such as the campaign’s premise and purpose, narrative, worldbuilding,
characters, extensions, media platforms and genres, audience and market, engagement,
structure and aesthetics (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b). This analytical model is
designed to give a very complete account of whatever transmedia campaign is under
consideration.
As the above examples illustrate, transmedia storytelling scholarship tends to
prioritise the roles of media, users and participation practices in the interpretation of
transmedia campaigns. Yet, it is still a question how to examine those transmedia
campaigns that unfold in the realm of politics. The existing analytical models and
classifications may overlook the complexity of the political realm transmedia campaigns
interact with. They are exposed to many political risks and opportunities beyond the
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media space. There are multiple political actors whose agency can alter the destinies of
political change initiatives.
The main research problem of this political communication thesis is to fill this
gap in transmedia scholarship and develop an analytical approach to examining political
transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. It will take local political contexts into
account and reinterpret transmedia strategies as the means of addressing the negative
and positive aspects of those contexts.
The contention of this thesis is that transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics
are context-dependent. To better understand the contextual factors that affect the
progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics, the thesis will develop an
analytical approach which investigates the scholarship on political opportunity structures
(POS) (Eisinger, 1973, p.25). In doing so, this analytical approach will be able to
provide valuable insights about the external opportunities and threats that could make a
difference for the campaign and acknowledge that political campaigns are
context-dependent. Also this analytical approach will make use of the theory of resource
mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1214). In particular, it will be reinterpreting
transmedia strategies to see if they can morph into practical political resources, reduce
the cost of political participation and react to the opportunities and threats of the local
political space. The result will be a new analytical approach to studying transmedia
grassroots campaigns, the opportunity structures and mobilising resources (OSMR)
analytical approach, which will incorporate the analysis of the opportunity structures of
a particular society and resource mobilisation practices of a given political transmedia
campaign.
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1.2 Theoretical foundation
The theoretical foundation of this political communication thesis is transmedia
storytelling scholarship. The study will present a discussion on the key facets of
transmedia storytelling and their relevance to the realm of political campaigning. In that
discussion, the thesis will showcase and interpret key findings from transmedia
storytelling scholars such as Henry Jenkins (2006; 2009; 2010), Carlos Scolari (2009;
2014), Renira Gambarato (2013; 2020), Jeoffrey Long (2007), Cristy Dena (2009),
Robert Pratten (2015), Marc Ruppel (2012), Lina Srivastava (2009) and Burghardt
Tenderich (2014).
Transmedia theory is a relatively new discipline and building connections with
more fundamental and elaborated fields of academic knowledge would be beneficial for
it. As part of the work to develop a locally-specific approach to analysing transmedia
campaigns in politics, the thesis will draw on the theories of grassroots politics, political
opportunity structures and resource mobilisation. Regarding the theory of grassroots
movements and campaigning, there is a great deal of intersection between transmedia
mode of messaging and grassroots politics based on the importance of civic participation
to both of them. To discuss the facets of grassroots activism and ground game politics,
the thesis will bring in the studies by Rasmus K. Nielsen (2012), Darren G. Lilleker
(2006; 2014), Rachel K. Gibson (2009), Doug McAdam (1982), Tracy Osborn (2010),
Seth Masket (2009), Betsy Sinclair (2013), Joshua P. Darr (2014) and others. In
particular, the thesis will discuss practices related to grassroots politics: from protest
manifestations to door-to-door canvassing to the facilitating role of big data.
To conceptualise the local factors that can impact transmedia grassroots
campaigns, the thesis will conduct the analysis of political opportunity structures. In its
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discussion on POS, the study will draw upon the ideas by Peter Eisinger (1973), Sarah
A. Soule and Susan Olzak (2004), Bart Cammaerts (2012), Lisa Vanhala (2012), David
S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff (2004), Ellen A. Andersen (2009) and other researchers
who studied the aspects of the mediation, legal and other types of opportunity structures.
In doing so, the thesis will provide the analytical approach it is developing with
important insights about those political contexts that political transmedia campaigns
interact with.
The thesis argues that transmedia storytelling is capable of mitigating some of
the negative aspects of political opportunity structures in place. To draw insights about
the mechanics of that process, the thesis will take stock of transmedia storytelling as a
resource mobilisation tool. The resource mobilisation theory will be discussed in the
thesis based on the key readings by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo Freeman (1975), John
D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (1977), Sidney Tarrow (1994), Bob Edwards and John
D. McCarthy (2007), and Michael Ganz (2009; 2011). Among other things, the analysis
of political transmedia campaigns will include various taxonomies and classifications of
mobilising resources outlined in those texts.
Building connections between the theory of transmedia storytelling and the
broader scholarship on political communication will serve to expand transmedia
storytelling scholarship in general. In particular, this will equip the analytical approach
this thesis is developing with the concepts helpful to take stock of political transmedia
campaigns as locally-specific. The result will be the opportunity structures and
mobilising resources (OSMR) analytical approach which will incorporate the analysis of
opportunity structures and mobilising resources.
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1.3 Case study
This thesis will develop a new approach to studying political transmedia campaigns, the
OSMR analytical approach, and test it with a case study. The case study will be to show
if this analytical approach can provide valuable insights about the case study subject,
identify its strengths and possible deficiencies and instruct on how to apply it. For all of
those purposes, the thesis will conduct a holistic single case study (Yin, 2014, p.55). Its
subject will be the 2013 transmedia grassroots campaign of Alexey (Alexei) Navalny,
the leader of Russia’s democratic opposition.
Alexey Navalny is a Russian politician and the founder of the Anti-Corruption
Foundation. A successful lawyer, his political career Alexey Navalny began in one of
Russia’s liberal parties in 2001. This, he said, was an act of a protest against the
authoritarian tendencies in the country (Gerasimenko, 2010). The young politician was
active as a party activist, engaged with local communities and organised street protests
against illegal construction in Moscow. In 2007, Navalny organised a series of public
debates between the leaders of public opinion in Moscow cafes. Political debates in the
informal setting of public spaces were a novelty to the Russian political culture and they
gave Navalny more publicity (Gerasimenko, 2010). Soon Navalny started building his
own platform and an independent political brand.
The proliferation of the Internet in the country and the surging popularity of
networking platforms were essential to the progress of Alexey Navalny’s political
career. In 2010, he launched the anti-corruption website RosPil ( ‘RosPil’ is an acronym
in Russian. It can be translated as ‘embezzlement in Russia’) and soon gained a
reputation as an opposition blogger. In 2011, he created the Anti-Corruption Foundation
which would eventually grow into one of the most politically influential NGOs in the
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country. In his blog, on the website, and in social media, Navalny published
well-documented investigations exposing corruption in the higher echelons of the
Russian political elite and state-controlled corporations (“Alexey Navalny,” 2010). In
particular, his foundation put the undeclared real estate and business assets of Vladimir
Putin’s inner circle in Europe and the US into the public domain. As a result of the
investigations, Navalny’s referring to Putin’s United Russia party as the “party of crooks
and thieves” went viral.
Navalny’s reliance on online means of communication and his popularity among
the protest movement of 2011-2012 in Moscow allowed him to run a grassroots election
campaign in 2013 which was transmedia in its nature. The thesis will argue that the
campaign originated from a greater protest movement of 2011-2012. It will also show
there was a diffusion of political resources between the movement and the mayoral
campaign of Alexey Navalny. With the analysis of the 2013 mayoral campaign of the
opposition candidate, the study will illustrate the proposition that transmedia grassroots
campaigns are context-dependent. The case study of this campaign will discuss Russian
opportunity structures and will interpret Navalny's campaign through that local context
to see how political opportunities and threats affected the transmedia practices of that
grassroots campaign. In particular, the case study will bring in the discussion of such
Russia’s opportunity structures as mediation and legal ones, the state of democratic
institutions and grassroots traditions in the country and the role of the Russian capital
where the 2013 campaign of Alexey Navalny took place.
The case of Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign goes back to 2013 but stays
highly relevant in the context of Russian politics. As disturbing as it was, the
assassination attempt Alexey Navalny survived in 2020 only solidified his position as
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the leader of Russian opposition and turned him into an internationally recognised
politician. His return to Russia in 2021 and quick imprisonment added to his reputation
of a brave advocate for political change in the county. The developments of 2020-2021
made the 2013 campaign of Alexey Navalny an even more interesting case as it was the
first grassroots campaign of such a magnitude in Russian history and it paved the way
for Navalny and his team to become the driving force of Russian opposition movement.

1.4 Historical significance of the case study subject
The case of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign in Moscow is historically
important. Opportunity structures do not exist as snapshots. They do not arise
spontaneously but are laid down over time. The transmedia strategies Alexey Navalny
applied in his campaign opposed the deep patterns of Russian opportunity structures.
The historical lack of accountability of Russian political elites as well as the poor
tradition of political cooperation between people on the grassroots level have been the
historical factors of the Russian political life and they manifested themselves in
restrictive opportunity structures evident in modern Russia. They affected the political
context of Navalny’s campaign and put a mark on the opposition candidate’s political
platform and communication practices.
As David Rowley of University of Wisconsin-Platteville notes, the Russian
imperial state actively suppressed any intellectual influences that would imply that ‘the
purpose of the autocracy might be to serve the interests of Russia – rather than the other
way around’ (Rowley, 2000, p.26). The noble people of the autocratic Russian Empire
enjoyed a great deal of cultural and economic integration into Europe but the society at
large stayed underdeveloped both economically and politically. According to Smith, the
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ultimate reason for the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 was its ‘failure to modernise’
(Smith, 2017).
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the state stayed true to its imperialist
tradition of focusing on international affairs at the expense of national interests. For
instance, as Latynina notes (2015), great resources were spent on promoting socialist
revolutions around the world and the militarisation of the economy. When the
expansionist project of the world revolution ultimately failed, the soviet establishment
barricaded themselves inside the socialist camp and created preferential treatment for
themselves inside the Soviet planned economy.
It adds to the discussion why Alexey Navalny’s message of political
accountability and civic cooperation faced fierce resistance from the state and different
parts of its elites. Akin to the Imperial period, the very same members of the elite who
spread anti-Western propaganda inside the country were happy to integrate themselves
into the Western life. Alexey Navalny and his Foundation exposed their double lives
with many notable investigations into Tuscany vineyards, Miami Beach real estate and
the European citizenships of the Russian political and media establishment (“Alexey
Navalny,” 2017).
The sanctions imposed on prominent members of the Russian political class in
2014 blocked their assets in the EU and the US. Some high-profile establishment figures
were denied physical access to those countries (“Ukraine crisis,” 2014). Similar to the
Soviet system, the elites were forced to seek refuge in their luxurious ghettos in Russia
perpetuating the ‘besieged fortress’ ideology through state-controlled media (Lipman,
2015).
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Navalny’s platform challenged the imperial orientation of the Russian political
elites. In 2013, Navalny’s campaign tried to bring the focus back on the domestic issues
and restore the accountability of political elites through active citizenship by means of
transmedia participation. Navalny campaigned for vesting the citizens with more control
over the matters pertaining to their local communities, increasing the accountability of
elites and putting the economic interests of the nation at the forefront of domestic and
foreign politics.
At the same time, Navalny’s transmedia tactics of active citizenship conflicted
with the historical patterns of political escapism. There has been a historical lack of
grassroots tradition of political cooperation, the poor tradition of public gatherings and
overall political apathy in Russian society (Medvedev, 2018). It explains the difficulties
the campaign faced when trying to run a transmedia grassroots campaign in the context
of politically inert Russian society. Energising a lot of people around a common cause,
making them believe that their collective actions could make a difference and engaging
them with the campaign as volunteers by means of transmedia platforms were a very
new thing for the Russian electoral tradition and required an innovative approach
Navalny’s campaign tried to come up with.
Historically complicated opportunity structures on the one hand and the lack of
political participation experience among citizens on the other could promise a ‘perfect
storm’ for any grassroots campaign. Yet, Navalny’s campaign of 2013 managed to
achieve a lot with its transmedia campaign strategies. This makes this case highly
interesting to analyse with the opportunity structures and mobilising resources analytical
approach.
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1.5 Thesis structure
This thesis contains seven chapters. It starts with an introductory chapter to tell the
reader about the primary research problem of the thesis, its theoretical foundation and
the case study as a way to try the new methodological approach to analysing political
transmedia campaigns this thesis is developing.
Chapter 2 will take stock of the theory of transmedia storytelling. To immerse
the reader into the complex phenomenon of transmedia storytelling, the chapter will talk
about the origins and definitions of the term, the role of a ‘canon’ in transmedia projects,
participation and user generated content (UGC), transmedia economics, structures of
transmedia projects, transmedia user classifications and transmedia storytelling in
marketing, among other things. Importantly, the chapter will discuss the application of
transmedia storytelling in politics, including transmedia activism and fandom, the role of
storytelling in politics, the use of microtargeting and Big Data for canvassing,
transmedia crowdfunding.
Chapter 3 brings in the theories of grassroots politics and mobilisation that the
thesis is going to make part of its context-dependent analysis of political transmedia
campaigns. First, the chapter will discuss citizens’ political agency and the role political
organisers play to empower grassroots enthusiasts with necessary political resources
reducing costs of participation for them and making their political actions more efficient.
The chapter will classify the types of political resources social movement organisations
(SMOs) and political campaign organisers operate with, which will become part of a
new approach to the analysis of transmedia campaigns in politics, the OSMR analytical
approach. Aside from the discussion on resource mobilisation, the chapter will draw
insights about the role of political decision makers and political opportunity structures
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that can make life harder for grassroots initiatives, especially in the context of illiberal
democracies like Russia. This chapter constitutes a theoretical basis for the OSMR
analytical approach to the study of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics.
Chapter 4 is a methodological chapter. It will outline the chosen case study
design and provide a rationale for making this choice. It will also introduce the subject
of the case study and will explain why Navalny's campaign of 2013 is a highly relevant
case to test the OSMR analytical approach. The matters of generalisation and
contribution to knowledge will be brought up in this chapter. Another part of this
chapter will be a discussion on the use and scrutiny of resources referenced in the case
study. Importantly, the chapter will also give an account of possible limitations of this
thesis.
Chapter 5 will have the case study analysis of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral
campaign for Moscow. In the case study, the OSMR analytical approach will be tried.
Since the state of political space is essential for the analysis of transmedia grassroots
campaigns, Chapter 5 will give a detailed account of Russian opportunity structures. In
particular, the chapter will discuss such factors of political opportunity as the situation
with the institutions of representative democracy, the traditions of grassroots politics in
the country, the role of Moscow as a political and economic centre, the state of legal and
mediation opportunity structures. With this analysis, the chapter will outline the context
of political opportunities Navalny’s grassroots campaign had to deal with trying to
reduce the costs of participation for its supporters with the means of transmedia
storytelling.
The second part of the case study will examine the campaign’s message and the
methods of resource mobilisation the campaign used to empower its supporters. On the
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topic of storytelling, the chapter will talk about the consistency of the message which is
essential to call a campaign transmedia. It will also show how the platform and
communications of the campaign incorporated the message of active citizenship. Then
the case study will examine the methods of resource mobilisation the campaign used to
confront the political opportunity structures of modern Russia. Among other things,
there will be a discussion on how the campaign recruited and empowered volunteers,
dealt with the mediation opportunity structure, made use of its technical expertise,
designed online platforms to make the campaign easy to navigate for its supporters,
employed the elements of gamification and became the biggest crowdfunding
phenomenon in the history of Russian politics among other aspects.
The thesis culminates in Chapter 6 which will discuss the OSMR analytical
approach apart from the case study of Alexey Navalny's campaign. In particular, the
chapter will give theoretical instructions about how to apply this analytical approach. It
will include multiple diagrams with taxonomies identified in previous chapters and
schemas outlining essential elements of the OSMR analytical approach. Once more, the
chapter will take stock of the key parts of the OSMR analytical approach, i.e. transmedia
scholarship, resource mobilisations and opportunity structure theories, to highlight their
role in the analysis of political transmedia campaigns.
The conclusion chapter will be a place to reflect on the job done in this thesis. In
a succinct manner, it will articulate the primary findings of the study and how it
contributes to the progress of transmedia scholarship in general. The chapter will also
talk about possible further developments of this thesis which would be another step
towards a better understanding of the transmedia phenomenon and its political
implications.
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Chapter 2. Transmedia Storytelling and Politics

2.1 Introduction
Transmedia storytelling is central to the theoretical framework of this political
communication thesis. Developing a feasible analytical approach to studying political
transmedia campaigns and applying it both require understanding the principles of
transmedia storytelling. This chapter will discuss transmedia theory which the OSMR
analytical approach is centred around. Starting with the definition, the chapter will
introduce the reader to such ideas as transmedia canon, the role of participation in
transmedia

projects,

transmedia

audiences

and

economics,

taxonomies

and

classifications which could find application in the analytical approach this thesis is
developing, the usage of transmedia storytelling in marketing, entertainment and
politics: from transmedia activism to the growing application of big data for
microtargeting and more. In doing so, the chapter will lay the foundation of a new
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns this thesis is developing.

2.2 Conceptualising transmedia storytelling
2.2.1 Origins and definitions
Transmedia storytelling is about telling different parts of a story across multiple online
and offline extensions, for instance multimedia websites, YouTube videos, outdoor
events, video games, and so on. This concept reflects on many of the most recent
changes in the practices of media production and consumption. That includes the
increasingly important role of the Internet, social media and mobile technologies in
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everyday life, digitalisation in media production, multi-screen media consumption, and
other media phenomena.
Today the transmedia approach to messaging has become commonplace in the
entertainment industry. Many popular fictional worlds seem to expand forever to keep
the fans busy – like the Harry Potter franchise with its Pottermore o nline extensions and
theme parks (Brummitt, 2016), or the iconic Why So Serious? transmedia campaign
designed to promote Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight movie (Gambarato, 2013).
Other talked-about transmedia projects are Hunger Games, Prometheus, Bachelorette,
Despicable Me 2, Food, Inc., Breaking Bad, House of Cards, Downton Abbey, Game of
Thrones, Top Chef, Pokemon, Biosphere Infinite, Minecraft, LEGO Marvel Super
Heroes, and Halo 4 (Zeiser, 2015).
The term transmedia w
 as coined by Marsha Kinder in 1991 with regard to the
things unrelated to political communication. In Playing with Power in Movies,
Television, and Video Games: From Muppet Babies to Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles
(1991), she took stock of how Muppet Babies and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles
projects went beyond TV and movie genres to other mediated forms as an example of
transmediation. In the book, Kinder conceptualised ‘the intertextual relations across
different narrative media’ (1991, p.2) and ‘transmedia intertextuality among television,
movies, and toys’ (1991, p.40) in the U.S. media production.
Henry Jenkins (2006, pp.95-96) defined transmedia storytelling as the art of
building a storyworld which ‘unfolds across multiple media platforms with each new
text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole’. The definition
highlighted the importance of textual diversity and the cross-platform dissemination of
content in transmedia projects. Von Stackelberg and Jones gave a similar definition to
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transmedia storytelling. According to them, a transmedia project must include ‘one or
more stories set in a single ‘storyworld’ and told using at least two different forms of
media, with the story elements in each form of media making their own distinctive
contributions to the audience’s understanding of the storyworld’ (von Stackelberg and
Jones, 2014, p.61). The Producers Guild of America defines a transmedia project as ‘one
that consists of three (or more) narrative storylines existing within the same fictional
universe on any of the following platforms: Film, Television, Short Film, Broadband,
Publishing, Comics, Animation, Mobile, Special Venues, DVD/Blu-ray/CD-ROM,
Narrative Commercial and Marketing rollouts, and other technologies that may or may
not currently exist’ (“PGA Board of Directors,” 2010). In a similar way, Jeff Gomez,
CEO of Starlight Runner Entertainment that provided brands, such as Avatar, Pirates of
the Caribbean, Sony and Coca-Cola, with transmedia services, defines transmedia
storytelling as ‘the process of conveying messages, themes or story lines to a mass
audience through the artful and well planned use of multiple media platforms. It is a
philosophy of communications and brand extension that broadens the life cycle of
creative content’ (JumpwireMedia, 2010).
All the listed definitions share a similar idea that can be distilled down to a
simple formula proposed by Carlos Scolari, Paolo Bertetti and Matthew Freeman:
Narrative Expansion + Media Expansion = Transmedia Storytelling (Scolari et al., 2014,
p.4). Broadly speaking, transmedia storytelling is a specific mode of messaging. The
message is communicated to the audience through multiple online and offline platforms
and the audience is mobilised around the message through digital and other means of
engagement.
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2.2.2 Canon
Platforms, stories, messages, projects, means of communication, engagement – there are
many words we use to grasp the complex idea of transmedia storytelling. The story itself
and opportunities for engagement are among the most important aspects of transmedia
storytelling. Following this, Carlos Scolari (2009, p.587) defines transmedia storytelling
as first of all a structured story, ‘a particular narrative structure that expands through
both different languages (verbal, iconic, etc.) and media’. Engagement is part of the
story as both the industry and the fandom contribute to the creation of a transmedia text
(Scolari et al., 2014, p.3). Scolari, Bertetti and Freeman portray transmedia storytelling
as a sum of ‘canon’ which is produced by both the media industry and the fandom under
collaborative culture. Carlos Scolari’s transtextual typology that includes both the canon
and user generated content, plus the ‘grey zone’, reflects on this idea (Scolari, 2014).
Thus, participation is integral to transmedia production. It is one of the means of text
expansion in transmedia projects along with an official canon.
The consistency of a canon is necessary to hold a transmedia storyworld together
– giving the complexity of its narrative structure. Because different parts of a transmedia
storyworld are distributed through different platforms, that threatens to break the
storyworld into a number of unrelated textual ‘units’ (Dena, 2009, p.167). Narrative
consistency becomes vital as a transmedia narrative accumulates a growing number of
texts. Split into the units of content, a transmedia project must remain to represent a
coherent storyworld, the universe of common places, aesthetics, characters, ideas and
other elements that constitute it. With this regard, Jeoffrey Long notes that ‘an
extension’s value is often directly proportionate to how well it adds to the story – the
encyclopedia of the world – that audiences are building in their heads’ (2007, p.164).

26

2.2.3 Participation and UGC
Aside from the canon, there is a space for user generated content and other forms of
participation in transmedia projects. Robert Pratten (2015, p.2) highlights the importance
of participation in his definition of transmedia storytelling as ‘telling a story across
multiple platforms, preferably allowing audience participation, such that each successive
platform heightens the audience’s enjoyment’.
According to Scolari, Bertetti and Freeman, there is a hierarchy of transmedia
users with regard to the depth of participation: the consumers of a ‘single media
product’, the consumers of ‘different media products’, fans who share contents online
and actively participate ‘in the conversations around the narrative world’, and prosumers
on top of the hierarchy. A portmanteau, the term prosumer was coined from a
combination of the words producer a nd consumer. A prosumer is the fan ‘who produces
new contents and expands the narrative world’ which represents ‘one of the highest
levels of transmedia engagement’ (Scolari et al., 2014, p.3).
The given hierarchy of transmedia use is akin to a ‘sales pipeline’ for transmedia
campaigns and projects. In political campaigning, it is the job of political organisers to
turn individuals with weak desire to get involved into those who are actively involved in
the campaign. With that being said, it is important to keep in mind that not every user is
ready to invest a lot of their time, emotions and so on in any given campaign or project.
But the number of such ‘lazy’ users is always bigger than the number of dedicated fans.
Therefore, there is always a trade-off between investing in a casual majority and a
dedicated minority – as Alexey Navalny’s campaign manager Leonid Volkov (2013)
stressed.
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More opportunities to perform and self-actualise in the mediated context have
turned the Internet into a massive creative market. The market encourages participation
and creates a so-called participatory culture. According to Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7),
participatory culture concerns to: 1. Relatively low barriers to artistic expression and
civic engagement; 2. Strong support for creating and sharing creations with others; 3.
Some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is
passed along to novices; 4. Members who believe that their contributions matter; 5.
Members who feel some degree of social connection with one another. Participatory
culture can be a factor of a political engagement as it mobilises users and encourages
participation.
The new mediated context in which the Internet could be a place for creativity,
debate and learning, provoked a conversation on what we should call those who
voluntarily produce content on the Internet as a part of their media consumption. The
terms media consumer and user seem to overlook the activities those individuals carry
out online. In 1980, Alvin Toffler (1980) came up with the word prosumer. He
envisioned a new era when companies will start producing highly customised goods.
That would require collaboration with consumers, he believed. Today the term can serve
to reflect on the ambivalent nature of online media activities people participate in, i.e.
production and consumption. Produser, a term coined by Axel Bruns (2008), is another
way to describe an active Internet user of today.

2.2.4 Transmedia economics
People spend increasingly more time on online platforms and leave traces in the form of
valuable content on Internet platforms. Many, perhaps most of those platforms are
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commercial enterprises – like social media. The business models of those websites
suggest that their revenues depend heavily on how actively their users like, post, share
and comment there. The economics of online platforms favour participation because the
depth of engagement and user participation are among their performance indicators: the
more people react or make additions to a story, the more valuable the story becomes in a
utilitarian sense of selling advertisers access to their target audiences. Digital platforms
therefore are interested in keeping consumers engaged. Concomitantly, the more people
interact with a story the more visible it becomes in terms of other people’s ability to
come across with it – because of the various algorithms that social media use like
‘trends’ and ‘tops’, for instance. Interaction entails more interaction. Transmedia
storytelling satisfies this need of online platforms as it keeps users busy interacting with
a story and producing new content for a virtually boundless storyworld.
At the same time, it is quite rare that an average user gets paid for the value he
produces – though popular users can monetise their presence on those platforms in many
ways – from using built-in monetisation tools to getting paid by brands for product
placement. Still the vast majority of users do not profit financially from their online
activities. That made Tiziana Terranova (2000, p.36), for instance, say that ‘the
provision of “free labor” (...) is a fundamental moment in the creation of value in the
digital economies’.
Aside from using online platforms for the purposes of direct advertising, online
marketing efforts of a campaign are effective as long as they can attract what sometimes
is referred to as free labour. The concept of free labour on the Internet suggests that
users engage in different kinds of activities online that potentially bring profit to online
platforms but do not get paid by the latter. Free labour as a form of human resource is
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important to transmedia campaigns. It saves another resource, money, brings in creative
talents of enthusiasts from outside, and demonstrates public support for the campaign’s
cause.
At the same time, transmedia producers cannot afford thinking of the audience as
free labour. Though most active users may not get paid money, the fact that they still
find it meaningful to invest their time in online activities suggests that they do benefit
from that in some other form. As per Uses and Gratifications theory, people satisfy
practical and psychological needs with media consumption (Katz et al., 1973). In the
interactive environment of online communication and especially fandoms active users
are motivated by their self-actualisation in the process of voluntary creation of new
content, by earning social capital in the scope of their online habitat, by the recognition
they get from other members of the fandom, and so on. For instance, Axel Bruns (2016,
p.3) notices that ‘produsage participants gain status within the community on the basis
of their contributions’. A status within an online community can certainly have a value
for many users. Thus, one could say that media usage is about consuming what is
valuable to you, while produsage i s about becoming valuable by creating something that
is valued by others. It is a social practice that is capable of reproducing hierarchical
structures in the mediated context. Your place in that hierarchy will depend on the level
of your expertise, the exclusivity of the content you produce, what you do in real life,
and so on. The job of transmedia producers is to make sure their projects can provide
those intangible values to the users (Zeiser, 2015, p.82).
Because users differ in their willingness to engage with transmedia projects, it
affects transmedia business logic and how transmedia platforms unfold in time. One of
the audience-centred transmedia business models by Robert Pratten (2015, p.154) relies
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heavily on the opportunities the participatory culture created. Its first step is to attract as
much of the audience as possible, therefore the opening part of the story must be free
and the intensity of participation should be rather low. The goal is to introduce people to
the story and get them interested first. Then the project must offer more advanced
opportunities for participation and more interactive experience which is necessary to
turn some of the users into fans. Fandom, in its turn, has a power to disseminate the
story and willingness to create their one user generated content. As the audience grows,
monetisation becomes possible.
The idea behind that model is similar to that of the purchase funnel in marketing
and sales (Pratten, 2015, p.183): as the depth of participation gets greater and an average
contribution of a single user grows, the overall audience may shrink and their combined
contribution may even drop. It is a trade-off between the quantity and quality of
participation. The same is valid for political participation: it also can vary from
supporting a candidate, to voting for the candidate in an election, to occasionally
volunteering for the candidate, to being ready to work for the campaign 24/7.

2.2.5 Structure of transmedia projects
Pratten’s example of a transmedia business model highlights the important role vertical
mobility (from low to high engagement) plays in transmedia projects. But let us not
forget about horizontal mobility. In practice, transmedia projects can be more like
networks than linear vertical pipelines. Under those circumstances, smooth migration
between platforms of a project becomes a major issue. The Fraction of Selection by
Wilbur Schramm (1954, p.19) explains why people use one media outlet with higher
frequency than another. It says that the frequency of use is positively associated with the
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expected reward from the consumption of a product and negatively associated with the
efforts required to get and consume it: Frequency of activity = Expectations of reward /
Effort required. Interestingly, the Pratten’s model is an unintended replica of the Return
on Investment business formula: ROI = Return (Benefit) / Investment (Cost) ( Pulliam
Phillips and Phillips, 2005).
User gains and pains depend on the structure of a transmedia project. To ensure
there is a smooth movement of the audience through media platforms, transmedia
projects can create negative capabilities (Long, 2007, pp.53-60) and migratory cues o r
links (Ruppel, 2012, p.47). The former is a gap in a story that leaves the audience in
anticipation. The latter is a signal towards another medium or ‘any sign in a transmedia
fiction that assists an audience in making correspondences and connections between
sites’ (Ruppel, 2012, p.62). Intrigued by a negative capability, the audience uses a
migratory cue to find a way to another platform where the mystery is expected to be
solved. That is why Ruppel (2012, p.67) calls such an end point platform a ‘completion
point’. For instance, a letter in the Matrix franchise is an example of a migratory cue
which is ‘used as a hint for viewers to look for more information on the letter in The
Animatrix and Enter the Matrix’ (Bry, 2009):
This letter, which tells of an upcoming attack by the machines on the
human city of Zion, makes its debut in The Animatrix “The Final Flight
of the Osiris”, in which “the protagonist, Jue, gives her life trying to get
[the] message into the hands of the Nebuchadnezzar crew” (Jenkins 102).
The letter then serves as what Alfred Hitchcock would call the key
MacGuffin in the video game Enter The Matrix, which begins with a
mission to fetch the letter from a guarded post office inside the Matrix.
The Matrix Reloaded begins with the characters having received the
letter and discussing “the last transmissions of the Osiris” (Long, 2007,
pp.41-42).

32

On the opposite side, negative forces or ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost,
additional keystrokes, diverted attention, low bandwidth’ (Pratten, 2015, p.152), are
impediments to a smooth migration of users within a transmedia project. They tend to
break a transmedia structure into discrete platforms and prevent users from experiencing
the synergy effect of consuming the story as a whole. A paywall can be one of the
constraints, for instance. That is why it is important for transmedia producers to
understand the segments of their audience, who are ready to pay and for what, to
manage platforms and audiences in a smart way.
Regarding connections between platforms inside transmedia campaigns, there
are three types of transmedia project structures according to Robert Pratten (2015,
pp.15-17). Transmedia franchise has multiple entry-points and does not require
exploring all parts of a transmedia structure to have meaningful experience (Jenkins,
2006, p.96). As Long (2007, p.15) notes on a transmedia franchise, ‘while each
[extension] could be experienced separately and still be enjoyable, each component
became part of a single unified storytelling experience’. Another type of transmedia
structures is portmanteau. A portmanteau project has a single story, a unique experience
spread over multiple platforms. The third type, portmanteau franchise i ncludes
portmanteau structure as one of its extensions.

2.2.6 User classifications
It is possible to stratify the interactive society of Web 2.0 using other characteristics.
Classifying users by their needs, Robert Pratten (2015) clustered transmedia users into
the following four psychographic types: 1. Killers, 2. Achievers, 3. Socialisers, 4.
Explorers. The first type gravitates towards such content as competitions, online games
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and alternate reality games (ARGs ) as their primary motive is to prevail in competition
with others. Achievers enjoy levelling up and gaining points through solving puzzles
and mysteries. Socializers make up a great portion of those who spend a considerable
amount of time on online forums, comment or participate in cosplays which gives them
an opportunity to hang out with others. Explorers like discovering new parts of the
storyworld, learning more in spin-offs, uncovering hidden meanings within stories, and
so on (Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79).
There are other possible classifications of transmedia users. For instance, Murray
(1997, pp.236-237) breaks a transmedia audience into the categories of real-time
viewers who look for suspense and satisfaction in each single episode, reflective
long-term audience who enjoy following coherent patterns in the story as a whole, and
navigational viewers who take pleasure in following connections between different parts
of the story. Demographics are also very much relevant for clustering transmedia users.
Such characteristics as age or sex can give statistically significant information to predict
the interests or behaviour of a user.

2.2.7 Transmedia storytelling in marketing
Marketing, particularly branding, makes use of transmedia storytelling quite extensively.
This application of transmedia storytelling brings us closer to our core topic, namely
political campaigning and political marketing. Branding is about cultivating a unique
identity of a product as perceived by its target audience. To create a brand personality,
marketing people vest a brand with distinctive human traits. Usually, successful brands
can be described in terms of human personality traits they represent. For instance,

ARG (alternate reality game) is a ‘form of narrative often involving multiple media and gaming
elements to tell a story that might be affected by participants’ actions’ (Connolly et al., 2011, p.1389).
1
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hundreds of advertising campaigns have been run to associate the Marlboro brand with
the image of a cowboy, ‘an ideal symbol of rugged masculinity, freedom, escapism,
adventure, independence, simple pleasures, and heroism’ (“The role of the media,”
2008, p.67).
A brand identity is elusive in the sense that it comes into existence only when
communicated to the audience and more importantly – when believed by the audience.
That is why people working in marketing make sure they channel a consistent
personality of their brands through the means of communication available to them:
corporate and package designs, retail spaces, PR, sponsorship initiatives, advertising
campaigns, and so on. The result is that transmedia storytelling in branding becomes the
art of constructing a brandworld with a number of stories personalizing a brand as their
main character, rather than building a storyworld w
 ith a number of characters
personalizing the story – like in entertainment, for instance. The process of creating a
transmedia storyworld of a brand is the art of disseminating a solid brand identity
through multiple online and offline platforms, rather than a single story. This key
distinction is helpful in explaining why a transmedia brandworld can be designed
without merging its building blocks into a solid narrative and still provide its audience
with a solid experience (Medvedev, 2015).
Brand is a protagonist of its transmedia world. Its consistent identity unites
individual stories into a single storyworld portraying the brand and declaring what the
brand stands for. As Carlos Scolari (2009, p.600) writes, in transmedia storytelling ‘the
brand is expressed by the characters, topics, and aesthetic style of the fictional world.
This set of distinctive attributes can be translated into different languages and media: It
is a ‘moveable’ set of properties that can be applied to different forms of expression’. On
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the same note, Tenderich (2014, p.28) argues that ‘individuals themselves can turn into
transmedia brands, and arguably Barack Obama serves as [an] example’.
Participation is a driving force of transmedia ‘brandtelling’. It makes the
audience believe in a brand personality by turning the brand’s values into consumers’
experience. Rather than bombarding audiences with unwanted and redundant brand
messages, now brands try to engage audiences in compelling conversations.
Participation can take different forms: aside from direct interaction with the brand,
audiences can get involved in content creation, communicate with other audience
members, or even become part of the story. As Bonnie Buckner and Pamela Rutledge
(2011) put it, ‘a transmedia story model positions a brand as a co-participant and
collaborator by inviting each member of the audience to participate personally in the
story world. Connecting with a brand through story shifts consumer perception and
allows consumers to create their own understanding of the brand’.
To sum up key advantages of a transmedia approach to branding: 1. It opens a
dialogue between consumers and brands; 2. Audience is active and can choose their own
path of engagement; 3. Each media platform makes a unique contribution to brand
identity and expands narrative; 4. Audiences do not simply consume the story, they
collaborate in story development; 5. Audience participation expands the life cycle of
advertising campaigns and event creates opportunities for monetization; 6. Participation
reinforces brand identity and creates customer loyalty (Buckner and Rutledge, 2011).
Developed by Simmons (2007), i-branding is a concept closely related to the
idea of transmedia branding. According to Simmons, there are ‘four pillars’ of
i-branding, i.e. understanding customers, content, marketing communication and
interactivity (2007, p.545). As Ridge-Newman and Mitchell unfold it, the key
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characteristics of i-branding include 1. ‘harvesting visitor data to understand target
audiences online’, 2. ‘targeting online audiences with highly personalized messages’, 3.
‘two-way and one-way interactions between and with the audience’ and 4. ‘producing
engaging, shareable content’ (2016, p.100). Lilleker (2014, p.21) claims that the
adoption of an i-branding approach to political marketing had ‘a positive impact upon
electoral outcomes’ in the context of the UK party-politics.

2.3 Transmedia storytelling in politics
2.3.1 Background
Transmedia storytelling is a specific way of messaging where multiple means of
communication are brought together to serve one purpose. To provoke political
mobilisation and collective action, transmedia campaigns use mobile applications, social
media including targeted advertising on social media and search engines, websites of
different functionalities, interactive maps, blogs, printed newspapers and leaflets, online
petitions, offline rallies, hashtag campaigns, crowdfunding platforms and e-wallets,
merchandise, door-to-door and phone canvassing, themed video games and TV
advertising among other means.
In 2011, a group of enthusiasts launched a campaign which became known as
The Great British Property Scandal. The campaign reflected on a long-standing housing
crisis in the UK. One of the campaign leaders George Clarke estimated there were one
million empty houses in the UK amidst a shortage of affordable offers on the market
(“Channel 4,” n.d.). The project was designed to ‘force the issue on the government
agenda, fighting for effective policy amendment and, consequently, promoting the
revitalization of abandoned properties’ (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2017, p.35). The
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campaign created a mobile application Empty Homes Spotter for the public to take
photos of abandoned houses and report them to the authorities. It also launched an
online petition to push the government to create a new loan fund that would help
individuals renovate their abandoned real estate and bring it back to the market. Other
extensions of the campaign included TV series on Channel 4, the official website, the
Facebook and Twitter accounts, the YouTube channel with additional videos. By the end
of the campaign, over 118,200 people signed the petition, 10,000 abandoned homes
were reported and £17 million was allocated for the new low-cost loan fund in the UK
(Gambarato and Medvedev, 2017, p.36).
The Fish Fight o f 2010-2013 was a campaign to draw public attention to the
practice of the wasteful discarding of edible fish at sea under the EU fishing quotas and
to amend the EU fishing policies. The campaign spread its message with more than a
dozen extensions including television series, the website, YouTube videos, an
educational online quiz about fish species, social media accounts and a mobile app. The
mobile app for iOS encouraged users to consume sustainable fish by displaying statistics
on the populations of different fish species, suggesting recipes with sustainable fish
choices and mapping restaurants committed to sustainability (Gambarato and Medvedev,
2015a, p.51).
Barack Obama, the first US President of the social media era, was described by
some, including Henry Jenkins, as a transmedia phenomenon. The Obama for President
campaign of 2008, Jenkins argued, included both ‘radical intertextuality and
multimodality’ (2011) and was ‘the biggest non-fiction success of transmedia
storytelling’ (2009).
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2.3.2 Storytelling in politics
The use of transmedia storytelling in politics is close to that in branding. Storytelling in
politics is a powerful way to convey meanings and connect with the people in a popular
manner. However, on a larger scale, a political campaign constitutes itself a storyworld
which is more complex than just stories that politicians tell to make a human case for
their policies. The stories politicians tell, policies they propose, commentary they offer
and the style of communication they practice are there to support their vision about the
current state of politics. In Mark McKinnon’s words, ‘[w]inning campaigns create a
narrative architecture that ties it all together into something meaningful and coherent’
(McKinnon, 2016). In a similar way, Ernest Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory
suggests that shared stories create a common cultural field for those who relate to them,
‘shared emotions and motives’, ‘common heroes and villains’, and so on (Bormann,
1982; Olufowote, 2006). In their turn, multiple platforms of transmedia projects equip
users with opportunities for engagement and collective actions based on that ‘culture’.
Stories give cohesion to shared beliefs (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.14) and allow
citizens to reinforce their ‘general worldview’ (Mayer, 2014, p.71). A particular story
may attract people of one opinion about social injustice and leave the others
unconvinced and unimpressed. The reason for that is what Herman and Vervaeck (2013)
call ‘ideology’ of a narrative which is ‘the frame of values’ in a text that reflects
‘hierarchical relationships between pairs of oppositional terms such as real vs false,
good vs bad and beautiful vs ugly’. Stories ‘moralize reality’ (Gudmundsdottir, 1995),
interpret it from an ethical standpoint. Michael Ganz (2009, p.5) for instance praised
Barack Obama’s ‘mastery of public narrative [which] energized his audience around
core values...: equality, community, interdependence, and dignity’. Thus, stories convey
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a peculiar perspective on the questions that are a matter of concern for political
campaigns such as the origins of a social injustice or possible remedies for social
grievances. Political organisers can use them to convey their answers to those questions.

2.3.3 Transmedia activism and fandom
Grassroots election campaigns and social movements employ such features of
transmedia storytelling as an expanding storyworld, cross-platform messaging and
participation. With the latter in mind, Srivastava came up with the term transmedia
activism i n 2009. Transmedia activism connects citizens to a cause by ‘exposing them to
a variety of media properties over various distribution channels … and then working
with the most creative and engaged audience segment to facilitate the creation of their
own content that further explains the cause and inspires action around it’ (Srivastava,
2009).
Jenkins et al. (2013, p.168) draw attention to an intersection between fictional
texts and civic discourse which ‘drives active community discussion and debate –
conversations that might lead to community activism or social change’. In their study of
fan activism, Kligler-Vilenchik et al. (2012) conclude that ‘shared media experiences, a
sense of community, and the wish to help’ are the factors that unite a fandom and give
its members an aspiration for social and political change. For instance, a debate over
racial politics intensified within the Harry Potter fandom when it was revealed that the
character of Hermione Granger in Harry Potter And The Cursed Child stage play will be
performed by an English actress Noma Dumezweni who happened to be black.
In another instance of that intersection, the President of the Magical Congress of
the United States was portrayed as a woman of colour in Fantastic Beasts and Where to
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Find Them fantasy film of the Harry Potter storyworld (Medvedev and Pronkina, 2019,
p.74-75). The movie hit the cinema screens across the US in November 2016, the month
when the country held presidential elections.
As collective behaviour theory suggests, shared grievances are an important but
not sufficient factor for a political action to happen (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.250). If
mobilised, however, concerned citizens become one of the most valuable resources a
social movement can have. To a great extent, the number of people who back a political
campaign makes a difference with regard to how power holders react to their demands.
Transmedia stories are instrumental in agglomerating the people of shared grievances
and turning some of them into the active participants of a campaign. In 2016, the Harry
Potter

fandom

reacted

to

the

US

Presidential

election

cycle

with

the

#ReadyForHermione campaign. In an imaginary Presidential election, the all-witch
(read as all-women) ticket of Hermione Granger and Luna Lovegood ran on a platform
focused on better access to education, cooperation between magical and non-magical
communities, environmental issues, and ending institutionalised discrimination against
transgender and non-binary people. The official campaign slogan ‘I'm With Herm’
clearly referred to Hillary Clinton’s ‘I'm With Her’ campaign slogan. As the campaign’s
press release put it, ‘the two candidates solidified their feminist base and made headlines
with their progressive policy proposals’. The Granger campaign said she wanted to show
that ‘politics can serve a greater purpose beyond just the cultivation of political careers
and

consolidation

of power

among the

well-monied and

influential few’

(“Granger/Lovegood,” 2016).
The Trump campaign was portrayed through the ticket of the two adverse
characters of the Harry Potter series Vincent Crabbe and Gregory Goyle. They had a
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slogan ‘Make Hogwarts Great Again’ and a pledge to build a wall around Hogsmeade
village to ensure that the last purely wizarding village remains muggle-free. According
to the press release of the Granger/Lovegood campaign, ‘Vincent Crabbe and Gregory
Goyle have captured the attention of the magical community’s remaining Voldemort
apologists and blood purists’ (“Granger/Lovegood,” 2016).
About 1,500 online users raised $52,000 for the get-out-the-vote effort of Wizard
Rock the Vote 2016 campaign of the Harry Potter Alliance on a crowdfunding website
(“Wizard Rock,” 2016). The Granger Leadership Academy hosted 150 Potter fans in
October 2016 to teach them how to be leaders in fan activism. After the US Presidential
election of 2016, the fandom launched #Nevillefightsback campaign in a bid to swing the
Electoral College vote after Donald Trump’s victory (“Neville Fights Back,” n.d.). To
sum up, transmedia campaigns with their many platforms and a focus on participation
can be instrumental in agglomerating human resources. They unite people of shared
perspectives on social injustice around a storyworld, use the people’s creative potential
to promote the campaign and run a political change campaign on a variety of online and
offline platforms so that citizens can contribute to the movement in the form most
suitable to them: from canvassing around their neighbourhoods to posting hashtags on
Twitter.

2.3.4 Canvassing with Big Data
On the technological side, big data starts to make a big difference for political
campaigns. The ability to collect and crunch big data paves a way for more personalised,
targeted and effective communication between campaigns and citizens. Campaigns
analyse data and make predictions to their advantage both in the online sphere and in
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their ground game politics. This underlines the cross-platform nature of modern
technologies of social mobilisation. Machine learning algorithms gave birth to new
forms of personalised political communication in the online sphere and also facilitated
traditional door-to-door canvassing and phone banking based on data science. The ‘air
game’ (the use of media) changed the ‘ground game’ (outdoor campaigning) because of
the capability of online platforms to generate big data. Overall, these changes gave
grassroots volunteers more opportunities for fruitful participation in political campaigns
and made their work easier in many ways. For instance, with regard to grassroots
operations of election campaigns, big data analytics brought the old practice of putting
citizens into electoral boxes to a new level. Nielsen recalls the times when they used to
sort ‘index cards’ with voter information, printed walk sheets for a canvass. It was not a
match to modern days ‘detailed Web-accessible voter files, synchronize personal digital
assistants, and print turf maps’ (Nielsen, 2012, p.6).
In 2015 and 2018, the ICT department of Alexey Navalny's Foundation
introduced new applications for more efficient data harvesting called Zhnets
(‘Harvester’) and Zhnets-2018 respectively. The former was designed to help volunteers
work in the field. For instance, the app broke down the city of Novosibirsk with the
population of over 1,5 million into 250 routes for efficient canvassing, guided volunteers
from door to door, counted all the collected data and crunched it using preselected
parameters (Navalny, 2015). Zhnets-2018 was even more technologically sophisticated
as it automatically verified scanned documents, was programmed to send SMS and
email notifications to voters and served as a pipeline that provided the campaign and its
regional managers with relevant data on voters for advanced analytics (Zhyzhylkin,
2018).
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2.3.5 Microtargeting
Big data created new and better ways for transmedia projects to communicate with the
audience. Developments in machine learning, and deep learning in particular, made it
possible to predict voter preferences and behaviour with workable accuracy.
Microtargeting is among the most important of the approaches based on the predictive
power of machine learning. Political campaigns use microtargeting to better align the
content they share with tastes of their target audiences. In 2016, Ted Cruz's Presidential
campaign used microtargeting to boost the chances of the Republican senator from
Texas. They took advantage of machine learning algorithms to predict likely Republican
voters. To find probable Republican voters, the app analysed data from a broad range of
sources. Naturally, it looked into previous political activities of the voters like
participation in GOP caucuses. But it also used consumer data. On the last point, the
campaign tried to find correlation between consumer habits and their political affiliation.
For instance, it was found that those who buy rucola salad tend to vote Democrats while
those who prefer iceberg lettuce are more likely to be Republicans. Similarly, those who
drive pickups tend to be Republicans while Democrats prefer Volvo (Wilson and
Polyansky, 2018). That saved time and money the campaign spent for its
get-out-the-vote effort.
That data was used for online promotion of the candidate. For instance, the
campaign could use the microtargeting tools of social media to target the consumers of
specific brands. The app allowed users to find likely Ted Cruz supporters among their
friends on Facebook and send them a personalised message asking to support the
candidate (Cohen and Duner, 2016). The feature was designed to promote the candidate
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on social media with more efficiency since normally we trust our friends and the people
we know personally more than the advertising on the media. Gamification was also part
of how the Ted Cruz app encouraged volunteers to perform. There were daily quests for
volunteers and a rank system was organised. The latter allowed volunteers to stand out
among the other ‘ground fighters’.
Also the Cruz campaign did personality modelling and created a set of different
posts for different categories of users (Detrow, 2016). For instance, if the output of
clustering algorithms said that a Facebook user is an extrovert, the campaign showed
them ads in a more extraverted reddish colour, while those who demonstrated
introverted behaviour on Facebook were targeted with ads of a more placid blue colour.
Also the personality modelling predicted what issues different users care more about to
target them with the messages most relevant to them.
It is likely that Boris Johnson’s campaign of 2019 attempted to do the same with
their Facebook advertising posts. Facebook Ads Library shows that in July 2019, the
very next day Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, the Facebook page of the
Conservative Party launched a campaign of dozens of very similar paid promotion posts
that used the same range of pictures and slogans in different combinations, in colour and
black and white (Bedingfield, 2019).
Another common application of microtargeting is in the advertising tools of
major social media platforms and search engines. Facebook Ads, Google Search
Network, Google Display Network, YouTube TrueView Ads, Facebook Lead Ads are
among the most popular advertising tools built upon microtargeting algorithms.
Facebook equips campaigns with mechanics to target narrow audiences. That allows
campaigns to broadcast different messages to different audiences and get maximum
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response from different groups of voters (Barbu, 2014, pp.45-46). Microtargeting saves
budgets because it makes sure a campaign does not pay to deliver messages to irrelevant
users. It also makes it possible to create campaigns for different purposes. For instance,
a campaign can target likely supporters with get-out-the-vote messages to increase voter
turnout among them on an election day or mobilise people for a rally. They can also run
a voter suppression campaign to frustrate turnout among those who support other
candidates.
Moderates who are more likely to stay undecided can become the target of a
persuasion campaign. The study by Liberini et al. (2020, p.25) shows that exposure to
Facebook ads during the 2016 Presidential race in the United States had relatively high
effect on moderate voters. That was of special importance because there are more
undecided or moderate voters in so-called swing states that decide the outcome of
elections in the US.
Among the categories that a political campaigner can use for targeting, there are
some basic parameters like age, sex, location, occupation and so on. Importantly, the
instruments of microtargeting allows advertising campaigns to target specific groups of
voters – depending on what pages, groups and communities they have liked on a social
media platform. If one wanted to target likely Democratic voters, they would probably
choose their ads to be shown to the readers of left-leaning media like The HuffPost,
CNN, Washington Post, or to those who liked pro-choice-related pages, for instance. The
process of microtargeting is managed by keywords that a campaign manager has to
suggest from their general knowledge about the people they want to communicate with.
They can also use the data available on the market. There is also software developed
specifically for finding keywords like SEMrush o r Google Adwords.
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2.3.6 Crowdfunding
The Internet made it easier to run crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding is a specific
instance of crowdsourcing. It is instrumental for collecting money from the public and
depends on online promotion and how motivated potential supporters are (Brabham,
2012). Since transmedia storytelling projects rely heavily on online platforms and their
participatory capacities, it makes it easier for them to do crowdfunding. In
Crowdfunding and Transmedia Storytelling, Carlos Scolari and Antoni Roig Telo (2015)
give examples of The Cosmonaut and Panzer Chocolate as transmedia initiatives that
incorporated crowdfunding into their business strategies. In his ‘Getting Started with
Transmedia Storytelling’ practical guide, Robert Pratten (2015, p.191) cites
crowdfunding as one of the logical ways to finance transmedia projects.
In December 2011, for the first time crowdfunding and online payment tools
were used in Russia to organise a protest rally. For that purpose, Olga Romanova who is
a renowned Russian journalist, a former editor-in-chief of Russian Forbes and now the
head of Russia Behind Bars prisoner rights NGO, created an account on Yandex.Money
electronic payment service. It became known then as Olga Romanova’s wallet. Russian
citizens donated an equivalent of $114,000 to the wallet to organize a protest
manifestation on Sakharov Avenue (Smirnova and Surnacheva, 2012).

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the concept of transmedia storytelling which will be central
to the analytical approach this thesis is developing. Transmedia mode of messaging
implies multiple extensions hosting a single storyworld. Canon, or consistency of the
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message, holds the storyworld of a transmedia project together. On the opposite side,
negative forces or ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost, additional keystrokes, diverted
attention, low bandwidth’ (Pratten, 2015, p.152) tend to break a transmedia structure
into discrete extension and prevent users from experiencing the synergy effect of
consuming the story as a whole.
Participation is integral to transmedia campaigns. Transmedia projects often
encourage their audience to generate content (UGC), apply crowdfunding strategies, add
interactivity to their extensions and so on. The emergence of participatory culture
(Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7) and produsers ( Bruns, 2008) in particular made such strategies
not only possible but desirable to many audiences. With that being said, there are users
who are more inclined to participate than the others. Also, the higher the intensity of
participation, the fewer people would go along (Clow, 2013).
Politics is one of the areas where transmedia storytelling found application.
Henry Jenkins called the first presidential campaign of Barack Obama ‘the biggest
non-fiction success of transmedia storytelling’ (2009). Some other examples include The
Fish Fight and The Great British Property Scandal social campaigns in the UK, Alexey
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow in Russia. Those campaigns used
transmedia strategies to generate buzz around the issues of concern and ultimately
advance their social or political causes.
There are many classifications and taxonomies that help make sense of political
transmedia campaigns, their audiences, structure, revenue models and so on. They do a
great job describing different aspects of transmedia projects but lack a wider perspective
which would take the external political space into account. The analytical approach this
thesis is developing suggests that the destinies of political transmedia campaigns are
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context-dependent. The question is how to conceptualise those external factors that form
dynamic relationships with transmedia strategies of advancing a political cause. The
next chapter will bring in the theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity
structures. It will help reinterpret transmedia strategies as a mechanism to agglomerate
valuable political resources and confront possible restraints of a given political space.
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Chapter 3. Resource Mobilisation and Opportunity Structures

3.1 Introduction
The thesis argues that the analysis of transmedia campaigns in politics requires a foray
into the scholarship on political mobilisation to better understand what the progress of
grassroots campaigns depend on. The existing analytical approaches and classifications
to analyse transmedia projects may overlook the complexity of the political context
transmedia grassroots campaigns have to deal with. Transmedia campaigns do not
unfold in a vacuum. There are multiple political actors whose agency can alter the
destinies of political change initiatives. To deliver a more nuanced analytical approach
to the study of political transmedia campaigns, this chapter will present a discussion on
the role of active citizens, political organisers and political elites in how transmedia
campaigns originate, progress and achieve their objectives.
This chapter suggests that part of political agency to bring about political change
belongs to the groups of organized citizens. They seek to influence political
decision-making and promote political change by manifesting their grievances through
various forms of grassroots activities, deliberation and protest. Transmedia storytelling
can support those efforts. At the same time, political elites as political actors put their
mark on the destinies of transmedia political change initiatives too. They are in a
position to influence the political climate that grassroots campaigns and movements
have to deal with. Between active citizens and in-polity actors, there are political
organisers whose role is to facilitate citizens’ ability to bring about change, with
Navalny's grassroots campaign being an example of such a political organisation.
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This thesis also argues that transmedia storytelling as a method of organising
grassroots campaigns exhibits some qualities that make political change action more
probable. Within the analytical framework that I am outlining here, this means that
transmedia storytelling can 1. help a campaign deal with external threats and generate
external opportunities in accordance with the theory of political opportunity structure
(Eisinger, 1973), and 2. increase the campaign’s capacity for accumulating valuable
resources in the paradigm of resource mobilisation theory (Edwards and McCarthy,
2007). This will constitute the theoretical foundation of the OSMR analytical approach
which includes the analysis of both opportunity structures and mobilising resources.
With this, the thesis will offer a locally-specific approach to the analysis of transmedia
campaigns in politics as its contribution to transmedia storytelling scholarship.

3.2 Citizens’ agency
3.2.1 Movement and campaign-style grassroots initiatives
Active citizens are the primary agents of any grassroots political change initiative. By
the very definition of grassroots, it requires active citizenship. In Staples’ words,
grassroots movements and campaigns are a ‘collective action by community members
drawing on the strength of numbers, participatory processes, and indigenous leadership
to decrease power disparities and achieve shared goals for social change’ (2004, pp.1-2).
According to Kerstin Jacobsson (2015, pp. 171-172), grassroots can take the
form of a campaign or a broader movement. Sunflower Student Movement in Taiwan
(Ho, 2018), the Tea Party Movement (Riordan, 2018) and Hong Kong’s Umbrella
Movement (Tin-bor Hui, 2015) are among the most prominent examples of grassroots
movements of the recent decade. Historically, there were social movements whose
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reverberations keep on affecting the politics of today, like the American civil rights
movement to end racial discrimination in the US. Spanned over many decades, it was a
‘coalition of thousands of local efforts nationwide … hundreds of discrete groups, and
all manner of strategies and tactics’ (McAdam, 2012).
The way those movements tried to achieve their goals through grassroots
participation supports the point by Doug McAdam (1982, p.26) who claimed that social
movements have the power to challenge the ‘established structure of polity membership’
by their willingness to ‘bypass institutionalized political channels’. As opposed to
various sorts of political associations that long to achieve their goals through
conventional mechanisms of representative democracy, social movements are capable of
disrupting the polity by making political claims in circumvention of the established
structures of decision-making.
These days political campaigns rely heavily on grassroots enthusiasm (Osborn et
al., 2010; Masket, 2009). Dubbed as a transmedia phenomenon, one of the most
talked-about campaign-style grassroots endeavours was the 2008 presidential campaign
of Barack Obama. The Obama campaign designed ‘MyBO’ space as a part of the
official website. A self-management tool for volunteers, it empowered the candidate's
supporters to create a ‘fundraising page, start a campaign blog, set up a political group
and recruit members or simply email a prepared message out to their online social
networks to advertise Obama’s policy positions’ (Gibson, 2009, p.292).
Gibson also argues that campaign-related citizen activism has been on the rise in
UK politics of the recent decades (Gibson, 2009, p.296). For instance, Cameron’s
Conservatives and the Internet: Change, Culture and Cyber Toryism by Anthony
Ridge-Newman (2014) takes stock of ‘Cyber Toryism’ and the evolution the
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Conservatives came through in their adoption of online technologies. It started with
WebCameron the Tory Leader’s video blog, MyConservatives and MERLIN (Managing
Elector Relationships through Local Information Networks) centralised applications
(2014, p.10). By 2010, the paradigm had changed as the use of Facebook ‘helped to
make participation in Conservative activism a more fluid and decentralized process’
(2014, p.53).
The 2016 presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders is another example of this
shift towards grassroots participation. Particularly popular among the younger
generation, the United States Senator from Vermont capitalised on his base being active
social media users. While Sanders’ organization built applications to transform
supporters into a distribution network for his social media messaging, it was also
‘complemented by “unofficial” grassroots networks that circulated more informal and
culturally oriented appeals’, in Penney’s words (2017, p.1).
As those and many other grassroots campaigns have demonstrated, grassroots
activities can include campaigning in the street, door-to-door canvassing, phone
banking, gathering signatures for petitions, raising money from small donors for
political advertising or campaigns, organizing large demonstrations, asking individuals
to submit opinions to media outlets and government officials, get-out-the-vote activities
which includes the ‘practices of reminding people to vote and/or transporting them to
polling places’ (Poggi, n.d.).
Although such activities do not necessarily apply transmedia messaging, all of
them require a great deal of citizen participation. This focus on participation creates a
big overlap between grassroots politics and the way transmedia campaigns in politics
unfold. A transmedia campaign tends to create a network of media platforms with
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opportunities for people to interact with it and act within it. Therefore, grassroots
movements and campaigns that mobilise people for social action can benefit from using
the transmedia mode of messaging to facilitate their efforts. Navalny's campaign of 2013
was an example of this transmedia approach which helped the candidate and his team
use the power of a collective action in a more efficient manner.

3.2.2 Grassroots political campaigns
In the realm of institutional politics, grassroots campaigns mobilise individuals to turn
out to vote (get-out-the-vote campaigning) or to vote a certain way (persuasion
campaigning) in an election. The statistical analysis by Sinclair, McConnell and
Michelson concluded that face-to-face get-out-the-vote visits by canvassers living in a
voter’s local neighbourhood were more effective than visits by canvassers from other
neighbourhoods in the US general election of 2006 (Sinclair et al., 2013). Nickerson and
Feller (2008) argue that volunteers prefer to campaign in their own local communities,
and voters are more likely to be influenced by campaigners from their communities also.
In the 2004 presidential race, the Republican National Committee (RNC)
organised what became known as the 72-Hour Task Force to work with grassroots
supporters of Bush-Cheney’04 ticket (Osborn et al., 2010). The results showed that
‘knocking on doors, instead of merely leaving fliers, could be worth 2 to 3 percentage
points in a tight election’ and also local volunteers managed to bring ‘almost 5 percent
more people to the polls’ than professional telemarketing canvassers (Franke-Ruta,
2004).
The notion of ground game is closely related to grassroots political participation.
The ground game paradigm suggests that political campaigns create networks of local

54

offices to mobilise supporters to canvas on behalf of the campaign. For instance,
Democrat voter databases were ‘opened up to registered supporters to download
coordinates for local area canvassing’ in 2008 (Gibson, 2009, p.292). In relation to the
2008 Obama presidential bid, Seth Masket (2009, p.1023) concluded that ‘those counties
in which the Obama campaign had established field offices during the general election
saw a disproportionate increase in the Democratic vote share’. It even helped flip three
battleground states to the Democrat candidate.
On the other hand, during the 2016 election campaign, Donald Trump was
widely criticised for the lack of proper ground game in contrast to Hillary Clinton who
ran conventional ground game operations (Bump, 2016). The result of those elections
might demonstrate that the ground game is not a panacea and there are other factors of
mobilisation, for instance storytelling, ‘a good message and a great messenger’
(“Conway on clash,” 2016), which will be discussed later.

3.2.3 Role of Big Data
When coupled with emerging political software solutions, web applications,
multiplatform transmedia storytelling and social media, citizens’ agency becomes even
more powerful in the scope of political campaigns. For instance, citizens’ political
agency benefits from new developments in machine learning and recommendation
systems in particular which has turned every Internet user into an influencer. Less
sophisticated content-based recommendation engines are built around the attributes of
given objects (genre, topic, language, length, any other hand-assigned or objective
attributes). On the other hand, the machine-learning algorithms of collaborative
recommender systems make suggestions looking at users with similar patterns of online
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behaviour (Schafer et al., 2007). That means that with collaborative filtering, not only
fans or volunteers but virtually every user becomes an unintentional ambassador of what
they watch, play or like on the Internet.
Collaborative recommendation engines also allow campaigns to target users with
bespoke content without the need to categorise units of content by hand, saving time and
money. They collect data on users’ preferences based on their behaviour on websites,
use dimensionality reduction algorithms like alternate least squares to reduce the number
of variables (Liao, 2018), make recommendations and analyse the users’ response to see
if those recommendations work (Medvedev, 2019). The result is more personalised
communication, customisation and cost-effectiveness for those who run political
campaigns which brings us to the next topic – the function of political organisers in
empowering grassroots supporters.

3.3 Resource mobilisation
3.3.1 Why mobilise resources?
To support a political cause, citizens can invest their time, money, ‘moral and cultural
resources’ (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.124). But they do not tend to do it without
weighing costs and benefits. At least that is what Mancur Olson's (1965) theory of
rational choice on collective action suggests. This is especially relevant to the situation
when a group member anticipates possible repercussions as a result of his or her political
actions – which is surely the case with authoritarian regimes like Russia. Under those
circumstances, the role of political organisers – like it was in the case of Navalny's
transmedia campaign – is to mobilise resources and reduce the costs of political
participation for the citizens (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1214). The analysis of
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resource mobilisation practices of a transmedia grassroots campaign will constitute one
of the integral parts of the OSMR analytical approach this thesis outlines.
Resource mobilisation theory suggests that social ‘grievances are relatively
constant and pervasive’ among citizens (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.266). Therefore,
social discontent cannot fairly justify why political change initiatives find great support
on the ground at some point. According to this approach, what makes a difference is ‘the
amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it
possible to launch an organized demand for change’ (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977, p.250).
Thus, resource mobilisation theory states that the emergence and the destinies of
political change initiatives have a lot to do with the organisational capacities and
resources available to them (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.116).
Indeed, modern political campaigning experiences two tendencies which may
seem contradictory on the surface but in fact complement each other very nicely. On the
one hand, grassroots participation and self-initiative of local supporters have become an
integral part of political campaigns nowadays. On the other hand, there is the process
going on which Lilleker called the ‘professionalisation of party campaigning’ (2006,
p.42) as political campaigns become more data-driven and centralised. For instance,
Ridge-Newman concludes that by 2015 the organic use of Facebook by the Conservative
Party’s young grassroots supporters had become less important in the UK context (2020,
p.13). He relates this shift to the adoption of a ‘newly professionalised approach’ to
campaigning by the Tories (Ridge-Newman, 2020, p.14) which falls in line with
Lillaker’s observation about the ongoing professionalisation of political campaigning.
The resource mobilisation theory brings the tendencies of grassroots mobilisation
and professionalisation together and gives an explanation. McCarthy and Zald (1977)
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suggest that the role of political organisers is to accumulate resources of different nature:
money, labour, creative ideas, media attention, allies within elites and so on, and provide
grassroots enthusiasts with those resources for more effective campaigning. For
instance, the American civil rights movement benefited from the organizational
capacities of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress
of Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), among
others (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p.1219). In the same manner, the Moscow grassroots
campaign of 2013 benefited from a well-structured organisation provided by Navalny's
team. The campaign had internal capacities to empower grassroots enthusiasts with
means of political participation, something that the movement lacked in the period of
mass protests.
It is also important to stipulate that there is a fine line between grassroots
mobilisation and empowerment on the one hand, and astroturfing on the other.
Astroturfed political actions ‘masquerade as grassroots efforts’ (Lee, 2010, p.73).
According to Jacobs (2012, p.567), astroturfing suggests the ‘artificial advocacy of a
product, service or political viewpoint, to give the appearance of a “grassroots”
movement’. On the other hand, grassroots mobilisation provides the actual supporters on
the ground with various resources that make their political participation easier, safer or
more efficient.

3.3.2 Classifying resources of mobilisation
The typology of social mobilisation resources by Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126)
specifies the resources of five types. Among them, there are moral resources
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(legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity), cultural resources
(conceptual tools, specialized knowledge, tactical repertoires, organisational templates,
technical or strategic know-how including both mobilisation and production
technologies about effective social action), and social-organisational resources
(intentional social organisation that advance social movement goals and other
organisational capacities that are created for non-movement purposes but open political
actors access to other types of resources through it). Talking about organisational
capacities, Osborn, McClurg and Knoll say that, for instance, the ‘Obama organization
… created a national phone bank, stimulated local meet-ups, had an unprecedented
individual level fundraising effort, and had an extensive ground organization for
personal contacts’ (Osborn et al., 2010, p.212).
Other resources of political mobilisation may include material (monetary
resources, property, office space, equipment and supplies), and human ones (labour,
experience, skills and expertise) (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.126). McCarthy and
Zald (1977, p.1220) specify such resources of mobilisation as money, facilities, labour
and legitimacy, while Tilly (1977a, pp.1-12) distinguishes land, labour, capital and
technical expertise a s the main resources of social mobilisation. Charles Tilly also
argued that social movements make ‘collective claims to power holders in the name of a
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated
public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness’ (2008,
p.257), where numbers, commitment, unity and worthiness (WUNC) are among key
resources defining social movements (Tilly, 2004, p.4).
Jo Freeman (n.d.) places social mobilisation resources in two columns: tangible
and intangible. The tangible resources are money, space and publicity. They can be
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converted to each other so that the lack in one can be compensated by the others. Human
resources and different kinds of labour that political organisers depend on are the
primary intangible resources. People help a movement with their specialised skills, time
and commitment. Money is the most liquid of the resources that political organisers and
SMOs operate with: it can be relatively easy to convert it into other resources, such as
media attention, practical knowledge, some types of human resources, space and so on.
In another taxonomy of mobilising resources, Charles Tilly distinguishes internal
capacities of a social group from external opportunities. Among internal capacities he
highlights the following: interests (‘the shared advantages or disadvantages’);
organization (‘the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the set of
people’) and mobilisation (‘the extent of resources under the collective control of the set
of people’). The three factors are interrelated so that ‘shared interests promote
organization, higher levels of organization promote increased mobilization, and
mobilization facilitates collective action, but each element also varies in part
independently of the others’ (Tilly, 1977b, p.12).

3.3.3 Repertoire of contention
Along with a message, the instruments of conveying the message, or the ‘means of
publicizing the movement's existence and ideas’ in Jo Freeman’s words (n.d.), are a
principal resource of social mobilisation. Social movements publicise their claims
through what Charles Tilly (2004) coined as a social movement repertoire, various
forms of public display. Repertoire is also referred to as one of the resources of political
mobilisation because they are not simply a means of promotion, a means of conveying
messages to the public top down. They also are a means of bottom-up social action, a

60

self-sufficient element of active repertoire. Political organisers can launch online
campaigns without bringing people out to the streets, urge people to sign online petitions
to affect decision-making processes or launch a mobile app to simplify participation.
Previously political campaigns used legacy media to convince people to act elsewhere
offline in the streets. Now their supporters can act on the platforms of interactive media.
According to Edwards and McCarthy, cultural resources of a political campaign
or a social movement are the practical knowledge of the variety of forms of social action
that they can use: from public rallies to different kinds of social media initiatives. They
include Charles Tilly’s tactical repertoires, plus ‘technical or strategic know-how
encompassing both mobilization and production technologies about effective social
action’ (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007, p.126). The variety and also the efficient use of
those technologies are pivotal as they are a practical means of mobilising supporters and
making a political claim. For instance, Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign for
Moscow included 32 extensions overall (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b, p.176). A
great share of them were Internet-based and provided sympathisers with handy tools to
participate in the campaign in different roles and different ways. Chapter 2 gave an
account of some emerging technologies that transmedia campaigns in politics benefit
from: microtargeting, machine learning and so on. If the role of political organisers is to
reduce the cost of participation for their supporters, this ‘technical expertise’ as a
mobilisation resource (Tilly, 1977a, pp.1-12) can make a difference.
The resource of mobilisation and production technologies generates what Jo
Freeman calls publicity of a social movement. The ability to spread a message about a
political cause among potential supporters is crucial to increase the base behind a
grassroots initiative. Freeman examines the progress of the younger branch of the
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women’s movement and comes to the conclusion that the access to the network of
underground newspapers and New Left conferences was responsible for its rapid
growth. The road would be much harder to walk ‘had this branch of the movement
emerged five years earlier (or later), when such resources were minimal’ (Freeman,
n.d.).
Concerning technical expertise as a way to expand the repertoire of contention,
the Ted Cruz for President campaign, for instance, came up with a mobile application
for grassroots volunteers to make their canvassing efforts more efficient. The volunteers
could log into the app and – with a script and a customised survey displayed on the
screen – start calling contacts from the preloaded base of voters – right from their
mobile phone wherever they were. The tablet version of the app was instrumental in
door-to-door canvassing. It implemented conditional logic: when the interviewee
answered a question, the app interpreted his answer in real time and displayed the next
appropriate question for the volunteer to ask the interviewee. In the cases of both the
mobile and the tablet apps, the volunteers returned responses back to the database
instantaneously for future use by the campaign (Wilson and Polyansky, 2018). On the
same point of technical expertise, in their canvassing operations the 2008 presidential
campaign of Barack Obama ‘directed local staff to reach out to interested volunteers,
test their capabilities, train them to use campaign software, and appoint them as
“neighborhood team leaders”’ (Darr and Levendusky, 2014, p.542).
Spatial resources of political mobilisation are also of importance for outdoor
campaigning. In the systems that are based on the rule of law and liberal market, space is
a commodity and a subject to selling, letting, renting and purchasing. It is not always the
case with illiberal democracies. The freedom to use public and even private spaces for

62

political purposes is a part of the opportunity structure that can be managed through state
institutions. Restrictive political space limits the ability of citizens and political
organisers to use public and private spaces for peaceful political gatherings.
In the 2018 Russian presidential election, real estate owners in more than a dozen
Russian provinces terminated their contracts with Alexey Navalny or refused to let the
properties after agreeing initially. They did it under pressure from local authorities, the
campaign claimed (Volkov, 2018). The solution was found in using private lands which
were not regulated by the state acts on public gatherings. In Izhevsk city, people voted to
give Navalny the surroundings of their apartment building for a rally. In Tambov, a rally
was organized in the car park of a shopping mall (Feldman, 2017b). In Irkutsk city,
Navalny held a rally on the territory of a furniture factory provided by a local
businessman (Feldman, 2017a). In those examples, people’s agency and an innovative
approach helped mitigate the negative attributes of the Russian political space.

3.3.4 Storytelling as mobilisation resource
The ability of transmedia campaigns to stick with their canon and produce a coherent
storyworld of events, aesthetics, values and ideas through storytelling makes it
instrumental in articulating social grievances, giving a particular perspective on social
injustice and stimulating the emergence of political change initiatives. The architect of
Barack Obama's grassroots campaign of 2008 Michael Ganz suggests that storytelling as
a leadership strategy is also a resource of political mobilisation and a very important one
– in the context of today’s grassroots politics. He elaborates saying that ‘movements do
emerge from the efforts of purposeful actors (individuals, organizations) to assert new
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public values, form relationships rooted in those values, and mobilize political,
economic, and cultural power to translate these values into action’ (Ganz, 2009, p.4).
Michael Ganz (2011, p.273) argues that social mobilisation does not happen
simply as a result of the ‘convergence of resources and opportunities’. He suggests
instead that storytelling as an instrument of leadership is a key to installing enthusiasm
in potential supporters and activists of grassroots campaigns. From his experience of
working for the Obama campaign of 2008, ‘[p]ublic narrative is a leadership practice of
translating values into action’ (Ganz, 2011, p.274). The values are experienced
emotionally and become ‘sources of ends worthy of action and the capacity for action.
Narrative is the discursive means we use to access values that equip us with the courage
to make choices under conditions of uncertainty, to exercise agency’ (Ganz, 2011,
p.274). In the same manner, Zeiser (2015, p.357) suggests that ‘the key to transmedia
social impact campaigns is to harness the power of media narratives to activate the
audience's passion to act’.
The Moscow protests of 2011-2012 demonstrate how a strong sense of injustice
may provoke collective actions as an attempt to fix it. On that point, McCarthy and Zald
(1977, p.1214) made a case for shared grievances and generalized beliefs as ‘important
preconditions for the emergence of a social movement’. On the same point, Snow (2013,
p.1) suggests that ‘mobilizing grievances … provide the primary motivational impetus
for organizing social movement campaigns and for engaging in social movement
activities’.
While social grievances indicate the level of aggravation, generalized beliefs
formulate the ideas of possible causes and means of ameliorating the grievances. Based
on shared grievances, political change campaigns push a specific agenda on how to
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reduce their grievances. McCarthy and Zald (1977, pp.1217-1218) emphasise the
significance of generalized beliefs about political change as ‘a set of opinions and
beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the
social structure and/or reward distribution of a society’. Along with other scholars, Della
Porta and Diani (2006) also highlight shared beliefs as one of the defining characteristics
of social movements. That makes transmedia storytelling as a way to channel shared
grievances and generalized beliefs through consistent messages an effective mobilising
mechanism in the sense of resource mobilisation theory.

3.3.5 Monetary resources
Fundraising is another means of resource mobilisation that a transmedia approach can
help with. The history of transmedia studies goes back to Marsha Kinder’s book on how
merchandise production became an expansion strategy for some popular fictional stories
(1991). While in politics merchandise helps campaigns promote their cause or
candidacies, it also can generate a cash flow to the campaign. For instance, about three
quarters of the funds Donald Trump for President campaign had raised by the end of
2015 came from the sales of merchandise like ‘Make America Great Again’ hats
(“Almost all the money,” 2016).
The state, various kinds of organisations and citizens are engaged in the process
of redistributing resources to social movements. The state can provide ‘monetary
resources and technical assistance’ directly to organizations that meet specific criteria
and agree to operate within government guidelines (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007,
p.121). McAdams pinpoints that, for instance, ‘elite funding sources (foundations,
government agencies, etc.) are willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency’
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for the better or worse (1982, p.25) so that opportunities and costs are ‘structured by
groups external to the movement’ in large measure (1982, p.23). For instance, in Russia
officially registered political parties are eligible for getting state-sponsored funds, while
under the circumstances the regime operates, it is virtually impossible for a political
party to get an official status without consent from the government.
At the same time, the opposition in Russia found grassroots support using online
‘wallets’ as an anonymous way for the citizens to donate money to organise mass protest
manifestations in 2011-2012 in Moscow. In the campaign of 2013, Navalny used the
fundraising power of transmedia storytelling even more extensively, which made the
campaign the biggest fundraising political event in Russian history to date (“Alexey
Navalny,” 2013, p.71).

3.4 Political elites and political change
3.4.1 Definition of political elites
The analytical approach of this thesis has incorporated the study of external political
factors to put transmedia grassroots campaigns into perspective and expand transmedia
storytelling scholarship with a more nuanced approach to the analysis of the use of
transmedia storytelling in politics. In this part of the thesis, I will discuss how influential
political actors can affect the destinies of transmedia grassroots campaigns through their
political agency and the political climate they can shape.
Robert Dahl (1961, p.90) defines elites as a ‘small stratum of individuals much
more highly involved in political thought, discussion, and action than the rest of the
population’. In the same manner, Robert Putnam (1971, p.651) says that elites are ‘those
who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated)

66

dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics’. In Broadbent’s words,
the elite part of society is ‘the polity’ which is conceived of ‘all those organizations
which have routine, low-cost access to decision-making and its benefits’ (1985, p.5).
John Higley (2010, p.163) defines elites as the ‘persons who, by virtue of their strategic
locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect
political outcomes regularly and substantially’. They are ‘principal decision makers in
the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military,
professional, communications, and cultural organisations and movements in society’
(Burton et al., 1992, p.8). In their definition, Burton, Gunther and Higley stipulate that
elites do not necessarily have to be institutionalized and embedded in the government
because the leaders of various kinds of influential collectives and movements can also
be part of elites. The term elite c an be ascribed to counter-elites and the head of protest
movements as well, as Wasilewski (2010) suggests with the example of the Solidarity
movement in communist Poland, for instance. The principal characteristic of elites,
therefore, is their ability to exercise influence over various aspects of social life,
including the realm of institutional politics.

3.4.2 In-polity decision-makers and political change
In 2013, Alexey Navalny took on democracy and active citizenship as both the key
message of his campaign and the means of achieving them. Transmedia storytelling was
instrumental in facilitating active citizenship through a network of media platforms with
opportunities for participation. The declared objective of the campaign was to increase
citizens’ role in political decision-making and liberalise Russian political life in general.
Some studies of elites suggest, however, that the enthusiasm of grassroots supporters is
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not always sufficient to bring about political change. As the authors of the World
Development Report underpin, ‘important changes in history have been driven by
coalitions between reforming elites and organized citizens that support reform initiatives
and overcome the opposition of other elites’ (“Citizens as Agents,” 2017, p.225). The
study highlights that although the game rules are negotiated within elites mainly,
‘certain accountability institutions can perform new functions and create an enabling
environment for citizen agency’ (“Citizens as Agents,” 2017, p.225).
There are other voices supporting the proposition that the agency of political
elites affects the destinies of grassroots initiatives. In his book Political Process and the
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Doug McAdam examined the American
Civil Rights Movement. He underlined the importance of ‘expanding political
opportunities’ for ‘the emergence of widespread protest activity’ (McAdam, 1982, p.2).
In Civil Rights Crossroads: Nation, Community, and the Black Freedom Struggle, a
historian Steven F. Lawson argues that the success of the Civil Rights Movement was
due to national political developments in forms of legislation, lobbying and litigation. In
particular, he says that combining “mass action, litigation, and lobbying, African
Americans were defining their goals, mobilizing their communities around them, and
drawing in national allies on their side” (Lawson, 2009, p.136). Jo Freeman illustrates
the point with President Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women and the Equal
Pay Act of 1963. She says that the commission ‘laid the groundwork for the future
movement’ [for expanding and protecting women’s rights in the US] (Freeman, 1975,
p.52).
The influence can occur in the opposite direction as well: from grassroots
activists to policymakers. For instance, Lee Ann Banaszak (2005, p.150) traces the

68

premises of the Women’s Bureau under President Kennedy back to the activist
Women’s Trade Union League, which means the Bureau was ‘not just a political
opening created by a separate state and distinct political allies external to the movement,
but an outcome of the movement moulding its own opportunities as well’. On the same
note, Keck (1992, p.58) stressed that a strong grassroots base is critical for political
institutions to be fundamentally transformed.
Broadbent (1985, p.2) channels a similar approach saying that ‘tracing the course
of interaction between elites and social movements ... would provide a better
understanding of how dominant structures reproduce themselves and change’. He
describes elites and social movements as a dynamic system, ‘a pattern of influence
relationships in dynamic interaction over time’ (Broadbent, 1985, p.2). If this
interpretation is correct, a discussion about the relationships between grassroots
initiatives and opportunity structures is essential to perform a more insightful analysis of
political transmedia campaigns.
It is even more important to consider the role of elites in grassroots campaigns
because decision-makers can participate in them directly. In The Web of Power: Elites,
Social Movements, and Structural Change, Jeffrey P. Broadbent (1985, p.2) laments that
‘dominant institutions and the movements are implicitly portrayed as the two extremes
of a spectrum of institutionalization’ while this is not necessarily the case and social
movements can have some presence in the polity, he argues. Soule and Olzak (2004,
p.480) suggested that social groups can benefit from having elite allies saying that ‘the
presence of influential allies encourages challengers to act collectively, as allies signal
that repression may be unlikely or, at the very least, that there are “friends in court’’’. As
an example, Navalny’s campaign faced resistance from the Kremlin but the overall role
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of political elites in this campaign was ambivalent. When Mayor Sobyanin called the
snap elections, some interpreted it as an attempt to ‘tap into legitimacy a s the new basis
for political agency and self-promotion’ (Waller, 2013, p.6). In support of the
explanation that the Mayor wanted to prop up his weakened legitimacy holding
relatively fair elections says that the Moscow administration provided Alexey Navalny
with formal approval of his candidacy from municipal legislators of Sobyanin’s party
(Zheleznova and Raybman, 2013). As the government official party United Russia
occupied the vast majority of the seats in local councils, it was arithmetically impossible
for Navalny to get registered. The necessary number of city-council representatives from
United Russia provided Navalny with their formal approval and thus walked him
through the so-called ‘municipal filter’, a necessary formality to be registered as a
candidate. It gave Navalny a chance to get registered as a candidate as the administration
thought it was in the interest of the acting Mayor. On that matter, Sobyanin said: ‘We
did all we could to have him [Navalny] registered so that Moscow citizens could make a
choice among a greater number of candidates’ (Kochetkova, 2013).
On a slightly more radical note, elite theory suggests that elite actions have a
critical effect on ‘regime change, liberalization, stateness, secularization and many other
political phenomena’ (Lopex, 2013, p.1). Under such circumstances, political change
becomes primarily a top-down process. Arnold Toynbee explained this through his
concept of mimesis. Mimesis, or imitation, occurs when the majority follows the
examples of elites as a civilizational vanguard of society. According to Toynbee (1987,
p.579), mimesis is the prime mechanism for civilizations to evolve and ‘the only way in
which the uncreative majority can follow the leadership of the creative leaders’. Social
development stems from the majority learning the best-practice of those who have
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achieved progress and higher status. The societal institutions such as schools,
universities, law enforcement and so on are not deemed to be the battlefield of opposing
classes and interests, but the instrument of cultural learning and vertical mobility. Thus,
the role of elites cannot be diminished to merely representing and implementing the will
of the people, the theory suggests. They are the trailblazers, or ‘pioneers’ (Toynbee,
1988, p.85), with whom new ideas, practices and technologies begin. If accepted, this
proposition is another reason why the discussion of Navalny's campaign in Moscow
must take the agency of elites and opportunity structures into account.

3.4.3 Historical evidence of elite-led political change
‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ slogan of Alexey Navalny suggested that the
campaign was part of a greater endeavour to change the political regime in the country.
But from the perspective of elite theory, it is political elites not citizens who might play
a critical role in the evolution of political regimes and overall democratisation. For
instance, Jacek Wasilewski (2010, p.272) suggests the importance of elites in the
process of democratisation as he vests them with the status of ‘the main factor that
decides the nature of a political regime’. According to elite theory, so-called ‘elite
settlement’ or ‘elite pact’ is one of the mechanisms how a deliberated democratic system
is established. During that process, competing elites come to an agreement on
government institutions and ‘the codes and rules of political competition’ (Higley and
Burton, 2006, p.98). John Higley traces the first instance of an elite settlement as far
back as to England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, with the events of 1809 in
Sweden that led to the adoption of The Instrument of Government as another example. In
the case of Sweden, the document established a separation of powers and served as the
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Constitution up until 1974. The Swiss Constitution of 1848 was adopted through
settlement as well (Higley, n.d.). Thus, elite theory argues that such pro-democratic
campaigns as the one of Alexey Navalny have their limitations and are only part of the
story.
The idea of political elites being the driving force of political change finds
support in the history of communist regimes which was part of Russian experience in the
20th century. In the Soviet Union, after Stalin’s detrimental reign that saw not only
millions of ordinary people but also many elite members systematically annihilated in
internal power struggles, elites introduced somewhat democratic changes – like in post
Mao Zedong China as well – to protect themselves from coming through that dreadful
experience again. Those acts of liberalisation happened without any vocal demand from
the general population. Describing the democratic transition in post-communist
Hungary, Wasilewski (2010, p.276) makes a point that the nature of elites defined that
process, while the masses ‘remained immobilized, except for sporadic rallies and
anti-government manifestations in Budapest’ during that period. As another example,
Diana Janušauskienė (2011, p.7) emphasises that ‘political elites and their decisions
were of key importance for the direction and content of the Lithuanian transformation’
in the late-Soviet period and after the country restored its independence. Regime change
through elite settlement also happened in Poland where ‘the reform-minded part of the
communist elite were (together with the oppositional elite) the leading actors of regime
change’ (Wasilewski, 2010, p.283). In such countries of the Soviet bloc as Bulgaria,
Romania and Ukraine, ‘the nomenclature, divided into factions from liberal factions to
orthodox ones, was the only real political force’ that secured democratic transition
(Wasilewski, 2010, p.284). In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the
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country, started the so-called Perestroika (‘rebuilding’) which triggered massive
changes in the political regime (Tarrow, 1994, p.157). Thus, elite theory does have some
historical evidence to show in support of its proposition that under certain circumstances
political elites can be the critical force that introduces political change top-down.

3.4.4 Role of media
Arnold Toynbee (1987, p.579) argued that cultural learning is one of the primary
mechanisms of social change. Mohan Dutta gives the media the status of the primary
means of social learning within what he calls ‘development approach’ to social change.
This approach originates with Albert Bandura (1977, p.39) whose social learning theory
(“Cinema of Change,” 2017) emphasizes the influential role the mass media can play in
‘shaping behavior and social attitudes’. In development campaigns, people are targeted
by elites individually to change their ‘knowledge, attitude and behavior’ (Dutta, 2011,
p.33). That seems to pertain to the situation in Russia where mass media are largely
controlled by the government, which allows the latter to use the media as their
messenger. One of the ways to describe how the state and its powerful actors can
exercise control over the flows of information is through the concept of mediation
opportunity structure (Cammaerts, 2012; McCammon, 2013). Mediation opportunity
structure is one of the opportunity structures the next part of this chapter will discuss.

3.5 Political opportunity structures
3.5.1 Introducing political opportunity structures
The OSMR analytical approach takes stock of the opportunity structures of a given
society. Our analysis of Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow will discuss
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those external political factors because they could cut or increase the cost associated
with people’s participation in the campaign. The cost can be a crucial factor for those
who make a decision whether they are ready to take a political action. This can take a
special turn in the context of illiberal political regimes like Russia. Those political
systems have more freedom to affect a political space, ‘the avenues, opportunities and
entry points available for citizens to express their voice and influence political processes
and outcomes’ (“A Matter of Political Space,” 2016), in a way that it becomes punitive
for outside-of-the-polity political actors.
In 1973, Peter Eisinger (1973, p.25) coined the term ‘political opportunity
structure’ which he defined as ‘the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain
access to power and to manipulate the political system’. Soule and Olzak (2004) use the
term ‘political climate’ as interchangeable with POS. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
interpret political opportunity structures as ‘features of regimes that affect the likely
outcomes of actors’ possible claims’ (McAdam et al., 2009, p.263). Sarah Soule (2009,
p.44) also highlights the role of elites in shaping political opportunity structures linking
social movement mobilisation to the ‘level of elite receptivity to protesters, changes in
elite ability and willingness to repress movements, and the presence of elite allies’.
The configuration of a POS in a given society can help us understand the
circumstances grassroots political campaigns operate under. Those ‘circumstances’ can
be of very different nature. For instance, McCarthy and Zald (1977, p.1217) refer to
POS as ‘infrastructure’ that include ‘communication media and expense, levels of
affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, pre-existing networks, and
occupational structure and growth’. According to McAdam et al. (2009, p.263), POS is
defined by: 1. the multiplicity of independent centres of power within the regime; 2. the
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regime’s openness to new actors; 3. instability of current political alignments; 4.
availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; 5. the extent to which the
regime represses or facilitates collective claim making. Sidney Tarrow’s list of the most
important political opportunities includes the opening of access to participation for new
actors, evidence of political realignment within the polity, availability of influential
allies and emerging splits within the elite (Tarrow, 1994, pp.164-165). Based on the
study of the civil rights movement by McAdam et al. (1996), Goodwin (2002) identifies
the four factors of political opportunity: 1. increasing popular access to the political
system, 2. divisions within the elite, 3. the availability of elite allies, and 4. diminishing
state repression. Van Dyke (2003) also regarded collective grievances as another
element of political opportunity structures.
Political space or POS affect the cost associated with political participation of
citizens. In his interpretation of political opportunity structure as the ‘consistent – but
not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations for success or failure’, Tarrow (1994, p.85) refers to rational choice theory.
In particular, he links political climate to the personal interpretations of the costs and
benefits associated with making a political claim. McCarthy and Zald (1977, p.1216)
echo this idea suggesting that ‘there is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and
rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement
activity. Costs and rewards are centrally affected by the structure of society and the
activities of authorities’. Charles Tilly’s classification of social mobilisation also
highlights the role of inside-of-the-polity actors in creating external opportunities and
threats (Tilly, 1977b) or ‘opportunities and costs’ in McAdam’s words (McAdam,
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1982). The opportunities and threats can be encapsulated in terms of facilitation as ‘an
action which lowers the group's cost of collective action’ and repression by which Tilly
(1977a, p.81) understands ‘any action by another group which raises the contender's cost
of collective action’. In Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization, John
S. Dryzek (1996, p.482) says that, for example, an actively exclusive state ‘attacks and
undermines the conditions for public association in civil society’. Because of that, POS
becomes a factor affecting grassroots enthusiasm and can be part of the analysis of
transmedia campaigns in politics.
POSs also affect those who organise grassroots movements and campaigns, the
role that Navalny's campaign took on in 2013. According to Meyer and Minkoff (2004),
political opportunities have an impact on protest mobilisation, organizational formation,
and policy change. Those three processes can be associated with citizens, political
organisers and the state respectively. Thus, POSs put an impact on both the access of
political organisers to resources and citizens’ decisions about participation.
The political opportunity structure concept also suggests that it is more
cost-effective for the state to manage political opportunities than to suppress every given
manifestation of an unauthorised opinion. In Tilly’s words, ‘the anti-mobilization
strategy neutralizes the actor as well as the action’ (Tilly, 1977a, p.4). The methods of
affecting political opportunities can vary: complicating mobilisation process through the
system of punitive legal acts and executive orders, spreading propaganda or imposing
media blackouts against political opponents, putting pressure upon challengers through
the social institutions that the political decision-makers have direct or indirect control of
such as schools, universities, churches and workplaces, exclusion from the labour
market. Under such rules, the lack of grassroots enthusiasm may be an indicator of a

76

POS that incites fear and political apathy.

3.5.2 Mediation opportunity structure
Mediation opportunity structure (MOS) is a concept that refers to three aspects of
communication practices of social movements and campaigns: ‘media opportunity
structure’ which is ‘mainstream media representations of protest and movements’
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.117), ‘discursive opportunities’ produced through the movement’s
own media and designed to make its story more resonating with the audience
(McCammon, 2013), and ‘networked opportunities’ facilitated by social media
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.122). The definition suggests that grassroots initiatives can find
themselves on both receiving and dispensing ends of MOS: they can become a target of
the structure but also can use it as a political resource. Thus, MOS captures the access of
grassroots initiatives to the media as a means of campaigning and the representation of
out-of-the-polity actors in the mediated sphere.
One of the mechanisms available to the state in the scope of the media
opportunity structure is to affect the public perception of grassroots movements and
campaigns. Turner (1964) proposed a taxonomy of different perceptions of social
movements. In particular, he describes the movements that are actively deprived by the
state. They are deemed to be threatening and anti-social and therefore can recruit from
alienated have-nothing-to-lose populations only. By marginalizing and stigmatizing
unauthorised opinions, the state can infuse apathy into potential challengers and prevent
them from expressing their opinions. Peculiar movements, another type of social
movements, are perceived as deviant but not threatening. They are granted ‘limited
access to legitimate means, and opposed only by ridicule’ (Turner, 1964, p.126).
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Those two forms of perception are both negative but lead to different ‘costs for
expression of preferences for movement leaders and followers’ (McCarthy and Zald,
1977, 1218). As an example, Sean Roberts (2017) recalls the infamous Anatomy of a
protest documentary aired on Russian NTV channel during the 2012 protests. It accused
Navalny and other opposition figures of instigating mass disorder. With this regard, it is
important that in authoritarian regimes, state propaganda and other mechanisms of social
control can be used to craft and channel the negative image of challenging political
actors. Arguably, the Russian regime perpetuates the second image of the opposition in
Russia. Repressions against public manifestations of unauthorised views tend to be
selective while the suppression of opposition organisations is systematic. This also
suggests that the Russian regime believes in the power of organised opposition.

3.5.3 Opportunity structures and transmedia campaigning
The theories of POS, resource mobilisation and transmedia storytelling form the
theoretical framework of this thesis. The following diagram shows the relations between
the key theories behind the analytical approach this thesis is developing:

Illustration 1. A graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach.
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The OSMR analytical approach suggests looking for the ways transmedia
strategies of political campaigns serve to mobilise valuable resources or become
political resources themselves reducing the costs of civic participation for supporters.
Also such an approach allows bringing in those contextual factors that make difference
for transmedia campaigns in the realm of politics. In doing so, the approach departs from
the practice of analysing the transmedia aspects of political campaigns in isolation from
the goals of the latter. On the one hand, a campaign and its transmedia practices can feel
pressure from or find opportunities in the external political space. On the other hand, the
campaign can make use of transmedia strategies when it wants to mitigate some
negative aspects of the political space or exploit its opportunities. Those dynamic
relationships between transmedia strategies of the campaign, the mobilising resources
the campaign converts its transmedia strategies into and the opportunity structures of a
given society are central to understanding the political potential of transmedia
storytelling.

3.6 Conclusion
Political opportunity structures describe a set of formal and informal arrangements in the
state that shape the ability of the people to demand political change. While those
arrangements are a part of every state, authoritarian regimes tend to manage their
political space in a way that would allow elites to stay largely unaccountable to civil
society. Under those circumstances, the people have to look for ways to overcome the
punitive political opportunity structure.
Political organisers can find better ways of dealing with opportunity structures
when using transmedia strategies. The latter can be helpful for agglomerating valuable
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political resources and facilitating civic participation. Storytelling, crowdfunding,
interactive web applications, technical expertise and other aspects of transmedia projects
make them well-equipped to accommodate the needs of grassroots movements and
campaigns. Thus, transmedia mode of messaging can reduce the costs of political action
for grassroots enthusiasts which is of importance especially in the context of
authoritarian regimes like Russia.
Together, the resource mobilisation theory and the theory of opportunity
structures will form the theoretical foundation of the OSMR analytical approach this
thesis is developing. The classifications of mobilising resources and opportunity
structures this chapter presented are a good starting point to analyse the role of
transmedia strategies in political grassroots campaigns.
The next chapter will expand on the methodological aspects of this thesis. That
includes a discussion about the case study design this thesis will follow to try the OSMR
analytical approach. The chapter will also provide a rationale for Alexey Navalny’s
2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow as the case study subject, talk about the use and
scrutiny of sources and the limitations of the study.
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Chapter 4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction
The primary research problem of this political communication thesis is to develop an
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. In the
primary analysis, the thesis outlined the key parts of that approach. In particular, it
proposed using the theories of political opportunity and resource mobilisation to
interpret respectively the external and internal factors that affect the destinies of
transmedia political campaigns. The thesis has also identified the key taxonomies of
opportunity structures and mobilising resources to make use of them in the analytical
approach the thesis has called the OSMR approach.
As part of the process of developing a new analytical approach, the thesis will
test it with a case study. This chapter will discuss the methodological aspects of case
study: a rationale for using case study for the purposes of this thesis, the case study
design this thesis will be following, the key sources of information to be used in the case
study, the treatment of those sources and the role of the author as the key interpreter of
the data. The chapter will also introduce the political campaign elected to be at the
centre of the case study in the thesis and provide a rationale for making that choice.

4.2 Case study design and rationale
A case study is an empirical inquiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the
“case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident’, according to Robert Yin
(2014, p.16). Helen Simons proposes a similar definition saying that case study is ‘an
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in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a
particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a “real life” context’ (2009,
p.21). Following Yin’s definition, Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe
also highlight the importance of contextual factors in case study research. In their words,
there are three critical characteristics of case study as a research strategy: 1. ‘a focus on
the interrelationships that constitute the context of a specific entity’, 2. ‘analysis of the
relationship between the contextual factors and the entity being studied’, and 3. ‘the
explicit purpose of using those insights (of the interactions between contextual
relationships and the entity in question) to generate theory and/or contribute to extant
theory’ (Mills et al., 2010, p.xxxii).
The listed definitions suggest taking stock of external factors when writing a case
study. Interestingly, the analysis of ‘real-world’ contexts is also a crucial aspect of the
OSMR analytical approach this thesis has been developing. The analysis of opportunity
structures as external factors will provide a real-world context for the case study. The
case study will also discuss the internal attributes of the campaign, i.e. how the
campaign used transmedia strategies to navigate through the political space.
There is no single approach to conducting a case study. A case study can be done
in many ways following very different research designs. This thesis adopts a holistic
single case study design (Yin, 2014, p.55). There are two parts to that definition that
require some explanation. A single case study design suggests there is one case at the
centre of the analysis – as opposed to a multiple-case study. Following this design
pattern, the thesis will elect one highly relevant case for the purpose of testing the new
analytical approach it has been developing in the previous chapters. Holistic case studies
‘investigate a unit as a single global phenomenon’ (DePoy and Gitlin, 2016, p.175). In
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line with the holistic approach to studying cases, the transmedia theory itself considers
transmedia campaigns to be more than just a sum of its parts. According to Jeoffrey
Long, there is a synergy effect that gives transmedia users a single unified experience
(2007, p.15). That is in contrast with an ‘embedded’ case study that extracts subunits of
the case and analyses them individually. An example of an embedded design can be ‘an
evaluation of a program consisting of multiple projects’ which may include ‘project
characteristics as a subunit of analysis’ (Yin, 2014, p.55).
In this thesis, the case study will be examined from a non-positivist perspective
(Stahl, 2007, pp.115-142). The case study will draw upon qualitative data primarily
which it will use to describe and give critical interpretation of the transmedia aspects of
a political campaign. In particular, the case study will make use of the OSMR analytical
approach to discuss how the transmedia strategies empowered the campaign to
agglomerate resources against the opportunity structures the campaign had to deal with.
Since the role of the case study in this thesis is to test the new analytical approach, there
is also no need to quantify its results to address the primary research problem of this
thesis.
According to Yin, a single case study can ‘represent a significant contribution to
knowledge and theory building by confirming, challenging, or extending the theory’
(2014, p.51). In the scope of this thesis, the case study will be a chance to test the OSMR
analytical approach and see if this approach provides valuable insights into the
mobilising potential of transmedia strategies in political campaigning. On the higher
theoretical level, the case study will synthesise the transmedia theory and the political
studies scholarship for this political communication thesis.
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In this thesis, the case study will produce the knowledge that will form the basis
for what Payne and Williams (2005) call ‘moderatum generalization’. Moderatum
generalisation is based on ‘testable propositions that might be confirmed or refuted
through further evidence’ (Payne and Williams, 2005, p.297). The thesis suggests it will
be possible to apply the OSMR analytical approach to other instances of political
transmedia campaigns. Those campaigns would have to 1. Be transmedia, 2. Actively try
to achieve a political goal, 3. Be embedded in some political space. The analytical
approach this thesis has been developing seeks to explore relationships between those
three characteristics. The case study that will be conducted in this thesis will exemplify
how that exploration can be done. The reason why the results should be generalised
moderately in the scope of this thesis is that there are still some important limitations
that should be considered while applying the OSMR analytical approach to other cases.
This chapter will discuss those limitations at a later stage.

4.3 Choice of a case and rationale
To try the new analytical approach as outlined in the primary analysis and see its strong
aspects as well as possible deficiencies, the thesis will write a case study of Alexey
Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow. The case study will discuss how
Navalny’s campaign was affected by the Russian structures of political opportunity and
utilised the transmedia mode of messaging to overcome the negative aspects of the
Russian political space, agglomerate valuable political resources and reduce the cost of
participation for citizens.
Gary Thomas of University of Birmingham distinguishes between the subject
and the object of the case study. According to his approach, the subject of the case study
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is the case itself and the object is ‘the analytical frame or theory through which the
subject is viewed and which the subject explicates’ (2011, p.511). Following this
interpretation, Navalny’s campaign will be the subject of the case study in this thesis and
the object will be the OSMR analytical approach. The latter will be used to interpret the
subject.
This thesis chose Alexey Navalny mayoral campaign, 2013, to exemplify the
application of the OSMR analytical approach for a number of reasons. First and
foremost, Navalny’s campaign was a good fit for the thesis because of its transmedia
nature. As Gambarato and Medvedev (2015b) argue, Alexey Navalny’s mayoral bid of
2013 was an example of a transmedia approach to spreading the message and engaging
with the audience in politics. The campaign developed an extensive network of web
applications and websites to facilitate civic participation among Navalny’s supporters,
recruit volunteers and spread the word about the candidate on the Internet and offline.
The case study will examine how Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign used the
approach which was transmedia in nature to agglomerate political resources and resist
the negative aspects of Russian opportunity structures. Second, Navalny’s campaign in
Moscow faced significant resistance from the Russian political space. As the repressive
potential of Russian opportunity structures was on display during the elections, it will be
possible to collect valuable information about Russian opportunity structures and feed it
to the OSMR analytical approach. Finally, Alexey Navalny as the leader of Russian
opposition exercises a great influence over the destinies of the Russian democratic
movement. Considering that Navalny’s role in Russian politics has only increased since
2013, his mayoral campaign of 2013 becomes of even greater interest as a case study
subject.
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As Yin theorises, there can be at least five rationales for the choice of a case for a
single case study research design. The elected case must be either ‘critical, unusual,
common, revelatory, or longitudinal’ (Yin, 2014, p.51). A critical case must be of
crucial importance to the underlying theory or theoretical propositions. With that regard,
Yin says that ‘the single case then can be used to determine whether the propositions are
correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant’ (2014,
p.51). The second rationale suggests that the chosen case ‘represents an extreme case or
an unusual case, deviating from theoretical norms or even everyday occurrences’ (Yin,
2014, p.52). ‘Unusual’ cases can be of use to such a discipline as clinical psychology for
instance. In contrast, a common case can make a good object of a case study because it
is considered to be rather typical for a group of potentially relevant cases and therefore
can provide lessons ‘about the social processes related to some theoretical interest’ (Yin,
2014, p.52). A case can be called ‘revelatory’ when a researcher ‘has an opportunity to
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry’
(Yin, 2014, p.52). Then, a ‘longitudinal’ case study analyses ‘the same single case at
two or more different points in time’ (Yin, 2014, p.53).
From the perspective of the analytical approach being tested, Alexey Navalny's
2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow can be described as ‘common’. In this case, to be
common means to represent an instance of a political campaign which 1. applied
canonical transmedia strategies to mobilise resources and simplify civic participation
and 2. operated within opportunity structures that affected its resource mobilisation
strategies.
Alexey Navalny did use canonical transmedia methods of campaigning in
Moscow, 2013. The idea that Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign of 2013 belongs to
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the realm of transmedia campaigning was proposed by Gambarato and Medvedev
(2015b, pp.165-192), for instance. The theory of transmedia storytelling has developed a
number of taxonomies and characteristics to identify a campaign or a project as
transmedia. Political transmedia campaigns rely heavily on civic participation and online
means of communication, apply similar strategies to accommodate participants of
varying willingness to engage with the campaign, and so on. The case study will
interpret Alexey Navalny mayoral bid of 2013 through the lens of transmedia theory to
highlight this relation between the campaign’s strategies and the typical transmedia
ways of building a grassroots campaign as outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Navalny’s
campaign being as transmedia as other transmedia campaigns and using the same
strategies justifies its choice as the object of the case study.
From the perspective of external factors, Alexey Navalny’s campaign unfolded
in the political space that shared similarities with other electoral authoritarian regimes
(Schulmann, 2014). Choosing the external opportunity structures of such a regime as the
context of the case study could help analyse political campaigns unfolding in the
countries of similar political nature. Overall, Alexey Navalny and his mayoral bid in
Moscow represented a highly interesting case that is very consequential in the scope of
the Russian politics. Importantly for the purposes of generalisation, Navalny’s campaign
belongs to the group of campaigns that demand democratic changes in authoritarian
regimes and use online media and digital solutions to advance their cause.

4.4 Use and scrutiny of sources
The proper use and the reasonable diversity of sources is essential when writing a case
study. This part of the chapter will discuss the key groups of sources the case study of
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Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow will build upon. It will also
discuss how the thesis scrutinises its key sources of data to maintain academic rigour.
In this thesis, the case study will be examined from a non-positivist perspective.
It is because the case study will draw upon qualitative data primarily. It will use the data
to describe and give critical interpretation to the transmedia aspects of Alexey Navalny
2013 mayoral campaign and how they contributed to agglomerating political resources
against the hostile political climate of modern Russia.
To collect data for the analysis, the case study will rely on a number of sources.
Those will include official campaign reports, open-source interviews, the video
recordings of Alexey Navalny’s rallies, the ‘auto retro-ethnographic’ information the
author obtained in his personal experience with the campaign, the archives of the
campaign’s platforms and other sources. Together, those sources will provide data to
take stock of the transmedia practices of the campaign and their role in reducing the cost
of political participation for Alexey Navalny’s supporters.
Because Alexey Navalny's mayoral campaign for Moscow unfolded in 2013,
most of the campaign’s online platforms had been taken down from the Internet by the
time this thesis was being written. To access them, the case study will use the Wayback
Machine digital archive available at https://archive.org/web/. The Wayback Machine
keeps copies, or snapshots, of websites. It will give the case study an opportunity to
examine the websites and web applications Navalny’s campaign used in 2013. Thanks to
that, it will be possible to compare their functionality with that declared by the partisan
official communication of the campaign, for instance. Among the platforms that the
thesis accessed with the Wayback Machine tool are Campaign in Moscow (2013),
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Mosvpiska (2013), Navalny to Every House (2013), Team.Navalny (2013) and
V.Navalny (2013).
Another important source of information about the campaign, especially its
message, will be the video recordings of Alexey Navalny’s rallies in Moscow, 2013. The
case study will make use of parts of Navalny’s speeches at rallies across Moscow
including those at Aviamotornaya (Boris Felikson, 2013), Varshavskaya (Mojaghed,
2013) and Kaluzhskaya (Kibirov, 2013) metro stations, and in Tyoply Stan (Tyoply
Stan, 2013) and Yasenevo (Krasnoelena, 2013) districts.
The post-campaign report of 80 pages (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013) Alexey
Navalny posted in September 2013 gives a rather thorough account of the campaign’s
media activities, get-out-the-vote initiatives, organisational structure, spendings and
other aspects. The case study will refer to this detailed report to learn about the
campaign and access the insider information that otherwise would not be available.
Another source of insider data about the campaign will be the course of video lectures
by Leonid Volkov, the campaign manager to Navalny (Volkov, 2013). The whole series
of lectures was dedicated to the 2013 mayoral bid of Alexey Navalny and positioned as
a crash course on how to run grassroots campaigns.
Some quantitative data will be collected from the official reports and Leonid
Volkov’s lectures, and then presented in the case study. That included participation
rates, media reach and the breakdown of costs. Importantly, there is no goal to calculate
the numeric contribution of the campaign’s transmedia practices to the overall campaign
results. The aim of the case study is to try the OSMR analytical approach. Quantitative
data will be presented in the case study to give a sense of the overall scale and
engagement priorities of the campaign.
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There is a question if the post-campaign report and the lectures by Navalny’s
campaign manager - which are partisan by definition - are trustworthy sources of
information for the case study. The case study will make sure the data it refers to is
accurate by double-checking the information using multiple sources. In particular, it was
possible to access and examine the functionality of the actual websites and web
application of the campaign.
The author of this thesis considers himself a key interpreter of the data used in
the case study of Navalny’s campaign. He sourced valuable auto retro-ethnographic
information from firsthand participant observation during the Alexey Navalny Moscow
campaign of 2013. He was studying in Moscow during the protests of 2011-2012 in the
capital of Russia and the 2013 mayoral elections in Moscow. In 2013, the author had a
chance to familiarise himself with the campaign communicating with its supporters both
in formal academic settings and the streets of Moscow.
In 2013, he participated as an interviewer and data interpreter in the 2013 Civic
Engagement in Moscow ethnographic study (Davydov, Logunova and Lytkina, 2016).
The study was sponsored by the Higher School of Economics, one of the leading
Russian universities, and centred around the aspects of civic participation in the 2013
Moscow mayoral election. The study included interviews with 33 poll watchers
including 9 people representing Alexey Navalny and shed light on the positive role some
of his web applications played in recruiting volunteers.
Together with Renira Gambarato of Jonkoping University, the author of this
thesis published a book chapter analysing the 2013 mayoral campaign of Alexey
Navalny in 2015 titled ‘Grassroots Political Campaign in Russia: Alexey Navalny and
Transmedia Strategies for Democratic Development’ (Gambarato and Medvedev,
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2015b, pp.165-192). The study applied the transmedia analytical model by Dr
Gambarato to discuss how Navalny’s use of information and communication
technologies contributed to the development of democratic practices in Russia and to
conceptualise his transmedia storytelling strategies in the context of participatory
politics.
This first-hand knowledge of Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign puts the
author in the position where he is well-informed about the campaign’s extensions and
key messages, can locate the gathered data in the Russian political scenario and ensure
that the most important aspects of Navalny’s campaign are addressed in the case study.

4.5 Limitations of the study
There may be some possible limitations in this case study. The primary limitation to the
generalisation of its results is that the proposed analytical approach has been tried in the
context of an authoritarian political space in the thesis. The Russian political space is
very restrictive to out-of-the-polity actors, which can be different for other societies.
Despite this, it is rather safe to say that the approach this thesis has outlined can be
useful to discuss transmedia grassroots campaigns whatever their political context is.
Historically, studies employed POS theory to take stock of the political climate of quite
different political systems including the US (McLaughlin and Khawaja, 2009), Taiwan
(Ho, 2015), South Africa (Loudon, 2010), Netherlands (Kriesi, 1989), China (Chan and
Zhou, 2014) and others. That demonstrates that our approach to the analysis of political
transmedia campaigns is applicable to different contexts too, including those where the
enabling potential of POSs is more pronounced than in the Russian case, like liberal
democracies of the West.
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Indeed, POS can pose not only a threat to grassroots political initiatives but offer
opportunities as well. For instance, Anthony Giddens (1984, p.25) argued that ‘structure
is not to be equated with constraint, but is always both constraining and enabling’. From
his perspective, there is a ‘dialectic of control in social systems’ so that ‘all forms of
dependence offer some resources’ (Giddens, 1984, pp.15-16). McAdams (1982, p.23)
also pinpointed that groups external to the movement structure both opportunities and
costs. That can seem less obvious when there is an illiberal political space under
scrutiny. But when applied to some other campaigns, the presented analytical approach
might have to dedicate more time to the other side of the opportunity structure in place.
One more shortcoming of this thesis is that the presented case study was done
retrospectively which limited the chances to do field work. Luckily, the main objective
of the thesis was to develop a new approach which would not be specific to any
campaign. Looking forward, further research could be a means of empirically
developing what the thesis has started here with the example of a historical campaign.
When applied to campaigns as they unfold, the proposed analytical approach could be
tested further.
Another possible limitation is that this thesis did not seek to develop any rigid
structure for the analysis of political transmedia campaigns. There are a few reasons it
did not, though. First, every grassroots campaign is unique and locally specific. As
demonstrated, its destiny depends on many external factors, political opportunity
structures of a given society, and so on. For instance, Navalny’s campaign unfolded in
an authoritarian political context. When analysing a transmedia grassroots campaign in
the context of a liberal democracy, one would inevitably adjust this approach to include
opportunities and threats of other kinds. On the other hand, such an aspect of Russian
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POS as the unique political and economic role of the country’s capital, for instance, is
specific to Russia and likely would not be applicable to most other countries.
Second, a structured model would require putting the interconnected aspects of
the campaign into separate boxes as if they worked independently, which is not the case.
Such aspects of the campaign as its platforms, structure, message, engagement strategies
and target audiences are dependent on each other to the extent that it becomes virtually
impossible to break the discussion into isolated blocks and talk about each of them
individually without invoking others.
There is another aspect of this study that can be seen as a limitation under some
circumstances. The proposed approach to the analysis of transmedia grassroots
campaigns does not claim to give an exhaustive account of the campaign. For instance,
some aspects of Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow were ignored in
the case study. The thesis left out the aesthetics of the campaign, did not give a thorough
description of its internal organisational structure and omitted the details on the
campaign’s spendings, for instance. The reason was that the analytical approach the
thesis was developing had a different goal. While all the facets of a political campaign
can be of interest and importance to political organisers, the objective of the thesis was
to point very specifically at those aspects of the campaign that contributed to its
transmedia experience. The study argued that experience allows a campaign to mobilise
resources and confront the negative characteristics of POSs.
When it comes to external opportunities and threats, the aspects of political
opportunity structures, the thesis also limited the scope of the analytical approach to
those factors of political space that made a difference to the goals of the campaign. In
our example, we took stock of the Russian media opportunity structure but did not pay
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much attention to the publicity Alexey Navalny received abroad in 2013. The audience
of the campaign were Russian citizens and an ability to reach out to them was of
importance to the candidate.

4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has described a methodological approach to address the primary research
problem of this thesis. In its previous chapters, this thesis developed a theoretical
foundation to examine political transmedia campaigns with the use of the opportunity
structures and the resource mobilisation theories. This thesis has called it the OSMR
analytical approach.
As the story of this methodological chapter told, the new analytical approach to
study political transmedia campaigns will be tried with a case study of a highly relevant
political campaign. The case study will adopt a holistic single case design (Yin, 2014)
with the single case being Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign in Moscow, 2013.
This grassroots campaign exemplified arguably the most prominent example of a
political transmedia campaign in Russia (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b,
pp.165-192). The lasting influence of Alexey Navalny as the Russian opposition leader
makes this campaign even more important in the context of modern Russian politics.
The case study approach that this thesis has taken will make ‘moderatum
generalization’ (Payne and Williams, 2005) possible. The OSMR analytical approach
examines the transmedia strategies a political campaign uses to reduce the costs of civic
participation for its supporters and navigate the opportunity structures in place. The
chosen campaign both followed the approach that falls into the category of transmedia
campaigning and used its transmedia characteristics to reduce the restrictive potential of
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the Russian opportunity structures. With that regard, Alexey Navalny’s grassroots
campaign in Moscow is well-suited to explore the potential of the OSMR analytical
approach to advance our understanding of political transmedia campaigns.
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Chapter 5. Case Study of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 Mayoral Campaign

5.1 Introduction
The primary goal of this thesis is to expand transmedia storytelling scholarship with a
more nuanced analytical approach to the study of transmedia grassroots campaigns in
politics. In previous chapters, the thesis outlined its theoretical framework and the
methodology behind the application of the OSMR analytical approach. This chapter will
apply this analytical approach in the case study of Alexey Navalny mayoral campaign,
2013.
The first part of this case study chapter will bring in the analysis of Russian
opportunity structures. The analysis of opportunity structures of a given society is a
distinctive part of the OSMR approach this thesis is outlining. As I argued in the
previous chapter, both the new analytical approach in general and the case study of
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow in particular have to include the
analysis of opportunity structures. That is because the transmedia strategies of political
campaigns are context-dependent. Transmedia strategies can both experience pressure
from the socio-political environment and make political campaigns less dependent on
the political space. That is the reason why the case study of Navalny’s campaign starts
with the discussion on Russian opportunity structures.
Following the OSMR analytical approach, the first part of this chapter will take
stock of those Russian opportunity structures that could have impacted the progress of
Navalny's campaign. Among those structures, the study distinguishes the legal
opportunity structure (LOS), the mediation opportunity structure (MOS), institutions of
representative democracy, grassroots traditions of civic participation in the society and
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the importance of Moscow as a place where Navalny's campaign unfolded mostly. This
discussion will help understand the context of Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign
for Moscow which is part of the OSMR analytical approach.
The second part of this case study chapter will give an account of Alexey
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign in Moscow. What the case study will be centred
around is the transmedia strategies of the campaign. In particular, the case study will
build upon the theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity structures to see what
valuable resources the campaign agglomerated thanks to its transmedia strategies in
2013. Also the case study will discuss how those resources dealt with the aspects of
Russian opportunity structures reducing the cost of civic participation for Navalny’s
supporters. Overall, the case study will analyse the dynamic relationships between
transmedia strategies, resource mobilisation practices and opportunity structures in the
context of Navalny’s campaign.
As a result, this chapter will give an example of how to apply the OSMR
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns. We will see if the
approach can provide valuable insights about the use of transmedia storytelling in
politics. Also, it is possible that some deficiencies of this approach will get themselves
revealed in the case study.

5.2 Russian opportunity structures
5.2.1 Institutions of representative democracy
The character of political opportunity structures in a given society depends on the state
of its institutions of political representation (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010, pp.299-300).
Vráblíková (2013, p.204) argues that ‘in addition to resources, motivations, and
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mobilization, institutional opportunities also facilitate individual participation in
nonelectoral politics’. Independent institutions of liberal democracy with the system of
checks and balances make political decision-makers listen to the public opinion on the
ground. There are more opportunities for nonelectoral participation (NEP) in liberal
democracies too. Thus, functional institutions are important in both ways: they allow
citizens to introduce change through elected representatives and make it harder for the
state to suppress nonelectoral participation as a means of bringing about political
change.
The political system of modern Russia can be described as a hybrid regime,
electoral authoritarianism or ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria, 2007). As one of the
characteristics of such regimes, the Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann
(2014) stresses the ‘decorative nature’ of their democratic institutions saying that
‘hybrid regimes hold elections, but the government doesn’t change’. Schedler (2006,
p.3) suggests that this type of regime violates the ‘liberal-democratic principles of
freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments
of authoritarian rule rather than instruments of democracy’.
The case of illiberal democracies highlights the idea that free elections cannot be
reduced to a mere right to cast a vote in general elections. In Rose and Mishler’s words,
an election is a ‘process, not an event’ (2009, p.120). Robert Dahl’s concept of a
polyarchy grasps the complexity of the concept of free elections. Among other things, in
polyarchy citizens ‘have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression,
particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials’, they have ‘access
to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any
other single group’ and they have ‘an effectively enforced right to form and join
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autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and
interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and
by other peaceful means’ (Dahl, 1956, p.84). According to Larry Diamond, elections are
free when:
The legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is
substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political
parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little
or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices. Freedom to
campaign requires some considerable freedom of speech, movement,
assembly, and association in political life, if not fully in civil society
(2015, p.154).

One of the features of the Russian electoral authoritarianism is a dominant party
controlled by the Kremlin. United Russia was founded in 2001 and became one of the
pillars of regime stability (Reutor, 2017, p.4). After the 2013 General Elections, United
Russia held 223 out of 450 seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament, State Duma. It
secured a majority when dozens of representatives from other parties changed their party
affiliation to increase the number of seats for United Russia to 304 (“Istorija
Vserossijskoj,” 2012). From 2007 until 2011, it enjoyed a supermajority of 315 seats.
The General elections of 2011 that led to mass street protests in Moscow showed that
the popularity of the party was falling. But still it received 238 seats after the elections.
In 2016, United Russia ended up with its best results in general elections so far, 343
seats (“Edinaja Rossija,” 2016).
The success of the party was partially attributed to many dark arts the regime
used to manipulate the outcome of elections (DeBardeleben, 2008; Kynev, 2017). The
fraudulent practices varied from ‘plain ballot stuffing to announcing of votes for
competitors of United Russia as votes for United Russia at the stage of ballot counting,

99

and to changing the final protocol in a computer system’ including vote-buying
(Enikolopov et al., 2012, p.3; Harvey, 2013). The reputation of Russian elections as
fraudulent was a factor of public distrust when United Russia won 2011 legislative
elections only narrowly and provoked a series of manifestations in Moscow and indeed
across the country.
In 2009, Alexey Navalny said in an interview that party-based politics became
irrelevant for the Russian opposition movement (Galustyan, 2014). Nevertheless, the
opposition leader and his associates made an attempt to register a political party
People’s Alliance o n April 10, 2013, just a few weeks before the 2013 mayoral race in
Moscow began. The Justice Ministry refused to register the party citing errors in the
legal documents the party submitted for registration (Nichol, 2014, p.66). In absence of
parliamentary means of affecting state policies, the Russia opposition and Alexey
Navalny as its informal leader tried to use other opportunities to make their voices heard
– with the Moscow Mayor elections of 2013 being one of them.
This part of Russian political opportunity structures has deeper roots. For
instance, the phenomenon of United Russia as a single dominant party and the legal
exclusion of competing political organisations can be traced back to the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the one-party system that the country lived with
in the Soviet period. As Igor Bunin puts it, ‘both United Russia and CPSU are
government-centred parties, they did not emerge from the ground like the Labour Party
in the UK, but were founded artificially from the top’ (“Politicheskie partii Rossii,”
2008). Although United Russia’s role in state governance and level of hierarchical
centralisation ‘pale in comparison to that of the CPSU’ (Reuter, 2010, p.295), they both
became the face of pseudo-parliamentarism in the country.
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As the dominant party becomes ‘a closed shop for political elites’ (Reuter and
Remington, 2009, p.508), its members trade their loyalty to the political regime for all
sorts of personal benefits (Reutor, 2017, p.5). Under such arrangements, the regime can
be confident that the representatives who have nominal power in the Parliament are
personally interested in keeping the regime stable. Thus, one of the roles of both United
Russia and CPSU was to stuff the party nomenclature with the people the regime could
trust.
Because the political establishment secures their position in the state staying
loyal to the Kremlin, not the voters, such a situation with party-politics in the country
limits the citizens’ opportunities to bring about political change through the mechanisms
of representative democracy. Dysfunctional institutions of political representation
discourage civil society from relying on institutional mechanisms of political action.
Abandoning party-politics suggests that the opposition gives up competing for
institutionalised power within the existing constitutional system. Their refusal to
participate in rigged elections means that the regime loses a legal and potentially
peaceful exit strategy for itself within the system of opportunities it imposes on
out-of-the-polity actors.
Semenova (2014, p.139) says that in Russian political system, the president de
facto has ‘superordinate power over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government’. The first Russian President Boris Yeltsin played a role in the destruction
of checks and balances between different branches of the government and the eventual
takeover of Russian politics by the executive branch. The super-presidential Russian
Constitution of 1993 was born in a power struggle between Yeltsin and the Parliament.
In 1993, after months of a conflict, the president disbanded the Parliament
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‘extraconstitutionally’ and put a new constitution to a referendum that would weaken the
role of the legislative branch significantly (Andrews, 2002, p.3).
The lack of credible institutions with their strict rules and playbooks that would
constrain state officials from making arbitrary actions make informal opportunity
structures a more important factor of the Russian political space than its formal legal
facade. Under those circumstances, Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign looked for
ways to overcome the obstacles of the opportunity structure in place and used
transmedia storytelling to mobilise citizens for participation in local Moscow elections
as a means to influence politics on the federal level.

5.2.2 Grassroots politics
Grassroots enthusiasm is essential to mobilise citizens for transmedia campaigns in
politics. Yet, the political climate in a given society can suppress the desire of ordinary
people to exercise active citizenship. That can be even more true for authoritarian
regimes like Russia. The poor state of the institutions of public representation makes
hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies or electoral authoritarian states ‘fear any type of
mobilization because they don't have the institutions to utilize active civilian
participation’, Ekaterina Schulmann (2014) claims. That is one of the key differences
between totalitarian and authoritarian states: while the former keeps their peoples ‘in a
permanent state of mobilisation’, the latter tends to demobilise society to lower its
resistance capacities (Sondrol, 1991, p.602).
In Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk’s words, the Kremlin reinforces the so-called
‘culture of non-participation’ in Russian society. This culture blocks the development of
a grassroots civil society through various repressive mechanisms: laws which target
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NGOs (non-government organisations) or potential disruptors, increasing control over
mass media, safeguarding the political scene from new actors, and ‘by creating an
‘official civil society’, in which a key role will be played by the Civic Chamber of the
Russian Federation’ (Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, p.198).
Despite such liabilities, the team of Alexey Navalny managed to mobilise an
unprecedented number of volunteers who participated in his mayoral run. To understand
the phenomenon of this campaign, one has to look at a greater social movement t hat
originated in Russia in 2011. Following the 2011 Parliamentary elections, massive street
protests shook Russian political life. On December 6, 2011, following the Russian State
Parliament elections, thousands of protesters gathered near Chistye Prudy Boulevard to
protest against the results of the elections which they believed were rigged (Zotova and
Feldman, 2011; Karpukhin, 2011). After the rally at Chistye Prudy, Alexey Navalny was
apprehended as he tried to lead hundreds of protesters to the Kremlin. This act of
defiance ultimately paid off for Alexey Navalny personally as it gave him a lot of
publicity and increased his popularity in the opposition movement. According to the
public polls conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), the
public perception of Navalny as the leader of the Russia opposition increased from 18
per cent in February 2012 to 46 per cent in June 2012 among protesters (“Personalny
portret,” 2012).
In the following months, hundreds of thousands took part in mass protest
manifestations on Sakharov prospect, Bolotnaya Square and elsewhere in Moscow and
across the country. Inspired by the success of the Chistye Prudy rally, people started
using social media to self-organise for the next one which eventually accommodated
over 50,000 people. That rally targeted then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, his United
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Russia ruling party and their policies, which was translated into chants ‘Putin is a thief!’,
‘No to police state!’, ‘Russia without Putin!’, ‘Freedom to political prisoners!’, and
‘This is our city!’ An even larger crowd of approximately 100,000 protested in the For
Fair Elections rally on December 24, 2011 (“The Economist,” 2011). The aggravated
citizens accused the federal government of rigging the elections and demanded the
restoration of civil liberties that had been shrinking since the election of Vladimir Putin
as the President in 2000. The movement was unprecedented for modern Russian history,
as it was for the first time in Putin’s era that thousands of people participated in an
anti-government demonstration. In terms of its results, the protests forced the Kremlin to
reintroduce the democratic elections of governors and Moscow mayor, which made
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow possible.
The 2011–2012 protests in Moscow gave citizens a chance to practice street
political action, gave the opposition some experience in using online technologies to
mobilise people for civic participation and made Alexey Navalny de facto the leader of
the Russia opposition (“Personalny portret,” 2012). Arguably, each of those factors
made Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow possible. Active
citizenship in the form of volunteering, sophisticated digital solutions to facilitate
political participation and Alexey Navalny as a candidate – all those features of
Navalny’s campaign were the logical extension of the movement of 2011-2012.
McAdam and Tarrow (2010) claimed there is a diffusion of resources from social
movements to institutional politics. Smith and Soboleva (2016, p.347) argue that Alexey
Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow implemented ‘a model of electoral
innovation based on ideational frames, resources, and tactics drawn from the protest
movement’. As the editorial of Republic counted, ‘most of the 15 thousand volunteers
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who campaigned with Navalny in 2013 were the participants of the 2011-2012 protests’
(“Kak pobedit,” 2017). The study of Navalny’s campaign by Smith and Soboleva (2016,
p.347) says, the campaign proved that ‘oppositions in authoritarian countries can
challenge the autocratic state on multiple fronts by transferring resources from street
protests to the electoral arena’. That is why one can say that Alexey Navalny transmedia
campaign, 2013, related to both the movement a nd campaign i nterpretations of
grassroots politics (Jacobsson, 2015, pp. 171-172).
The reaction from the Kremlin to the protests was to tighten the POS. In 2012,
before the Moscow mayoral election, the Kremlin-controlled Parliament passed several
bills designed to curb the enthusiasm of the Russian civil society. On June 8, 2012,
administrative fines for violating protest regulations were increased to the equivalent
US$ 30,000 from the previous US$ 30. The same law prohibited protesters from
covering their faces at rallies (“Rossiyskaya Gazeta,” 2012). In 2013, the Parliament: 1)
ordered Russian, internationally financed NGOs to register as ‘foreign agents’; 2)
introduced the anti-blasphemy law allowing prison sentences which has been used
multiple times since then against social media users; 3) authorized the government to
block websites believed to be extremist; and 4) banned the adoption of Russian orphans
by US citizens as a retaliatory measure against the Magnitsky Act that sanctioned the
corrupt members of the political elite (Barry, 2012).
The laws were the reaction of the Kremlin to an unprecedented surge in protest
activities the country experienced after the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections. The
new punitive legislation and the infamous Bolotnaya Square trial made the opposition
protest less popular. Also, many active citizens felt disheartened by the lack of quick and
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profound changes as the result of their protest activities in 2011-2012. Some of them
eventually chose to cut ties with the movement (Clément, 2015).
Despite those negative tendencies, the study of t he Center for Independent Social
Research in Moscow shows that the protest enthusiasm of 2011-2012 may not have
disappeared completely but rather morphed into other kinds of civic actions. For
instance, some of the activists decided to form local groups to solve problems in their
neighbourhoods – as a way to make their civic activities more practical. Those groups
were committed to monitoring municipal authorities, informing residents and improving
their cities and public spaces by ‘pushing projects through municipal governments,
defending threatened squares and parks, and combating road expansion’ (“Apoliticism
and Solidarity,” 2014).
As unprecedented as it was, the protest movement of 2011-2012 relied on a base
that was relatively small in the scope of the overall population, i.e. Moscow white collar
private sector workers, intelligentsia and studentship (Dmitriev, 2015, p.224). The
private-sector middle class was the backbone of the protest movement. As Bryn
Rosenfeld (2017, p.7) concludes in his statistical analysis of the protesters: office
professionals, managers and business owners added up to roughly 80 per cent of
Moscow protesters in December 2011. With that regard, Jensen (2013) says that ‘after
years of apathy, a new social force – the Russian middle class – seemed to be emerging,
with a message that included not only a political, but also a moral and emotional
rejection of the corrupt authoritarian state that developed during the Putin era’. Those
social strata are represented in Moscow in numbers bigger than in any other Russian
city. That gives a possible explanation to why generally more prosperous Moscow
became the centre of the protests.
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With that being said, overall protest enthusiasm in Moscow before the 2011
elections appeared to be lower than on average across the country. In the eve of the 2011
elections, only 15 per cent of Moscow and Saint Petersburg citizens said they would
participate in protests if those occurred (“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013). On the federal
level, 31 per cent were enthusiastic about the protests. Still, the opposition
manifestations took place mostly in the capital. This seems to constitute a paradox but
the explanation may lay in the demographics. According to a poll by VCIOM, the most
protest-oriented people were the supporters of left-wing parties and low-income citizens.
Their main concern was the economy and jobs while the Moscow protests centred
around the themes of democracy, fair elections, overall corruption in the state and so on
(“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013).
As a possible explanation, Russian periphery did not feel that enthusiastically
about the democratic thrust of the Moscow protests because it was less affluent and did
not experience what Dmitriev (2015, p.225) calls a ‘shift from a dominant
survival-oriented value setting, towards self-expression values and human development
priorities’. Thus, despite the Moscow protests, the overall political apathy of the Russian
majority, ‘passive acceptance of the policies of the ruling elite and a general
unwillingness to involve itself in the country’s socio-political affairs’, stayed intact
(Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2018, p.197). In the eve of 2011 legislative elections, 70 per
cent of the population said they would not participate in protests if those occurred
(“Protestnaya aktivnost,” 2013).
In the words of Francesca Polletta (1999, p.69), culture affects the process of
social mobilisation through ‘cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional
memories, and political taboos that create and limit political opportunities’. Not only the
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state of democratic institutions, but also Russian political culture does not leave a lot of
space for grassroots politics in the country. Regular mass rallies are unfamiliar to the
Russian electoral tradition as well as canvassing, roll-calling, the use of volunteers in
get-out-the-vote campaigns and other forms of interpersonal communication. Political
campaigns unfold predominantly in the media with minimal face-to-face interaction
between candidates and their electorate.
The 2012 ride of the re-elected President Vladimir Putin to his inauguration
ceremony in the Kremlin became notorious. Cameras showed him going through a
completely locked down Moscow city centre with no person in sight (Taffa, 2012,
p.126). In such regimes as modern Russia, there is always a demilitarised zone of empty
public space between the elites and the people. The political class makes it clear to the
people that the public space, streets and squares, is not a place where anything is going
to be negotiated with them. Any street manifestations are pointless, therefore.
In his 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow and beyond it, Navalny confronted
both the poor tradition of public gatherings and the poor tradition of face-to-face
interaction between the elite and the people. First, he bet on citizen participation as a
driving force of his campaign in both the online and the outdoor dimensions. For the
grassroots campaign of Alexey Navalny, the key objectives were to tap into the
persisting democratic enthusiasm of Moscow citizens, mobilise them around a common
cause, make them believe that their collective actions could make a difference and
engage them with the campaign as volunteers by means of transmedia platforms – a very
new thing for the Russian electoral tradition.
Second, Navalny actively engaged with the public personally on the campaign
trail and the Internet. Thus, one can suggest that the approach to political campaigning
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that Navalny’s campaign chose challenged the historic patterns of the Russian political
system when it decided to explore the opportunities of grassroots politics. With many
online tools the campaign designed for its supporters, it made an attempt to overcome
the public’s inertia and its distrust of collective actions.

5.2.3 Role of Moscow
Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign unfolded in the capital of Russia which has a
special political and economic status in the country. Importantly, Moscow is the centre
of power, the place where almost all the major government institutions are located. The
president and his administration occupy the Moscow Kremlin. The prime-minister and
the government reside in the White House on the bank of Moscow river. The Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation, ministries, the Federal Security Service (ex-KGB) and
the Investigative Committee are all situated in the capital.
Major Russian corporations are registered in and pay their taxes to the federal
budget even if their manufacturing facilities operate elsewhere. Almost four fifths of the
500 largest Russian enterprises are registered in Moscow (“Rating RBC,” 2020). The
federal centre collects most of the taxes and then redistributes the funds back to
provinces subject to their loyalty as one of the factors (Larionov, 2019b). The practice
can be a means of economic control over Russian territories by the federal government.
Wages in Moscow are two to three times those in the country’s periphery (Larionov,
2019a). That drains Russian territories out of the most talented people who use every
opportunity to move to the capital. But to get hired in Moscow, a Russian citizen has to
be in possession of real estate in Moscow or obtain a permanent residency registration
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from a landlord (not the same as a tenancy agreement). It effectively creates an internal
visa system which is set to limit internal migration to the capital.
The position of the Russian capital as an economic enclave is not new. For
instance, the system of registration at the place of residence was introduced by the first
Russian emperor Peter I to keep peasants attached to their owners. It was then upheld by
communists with the introduction of Soviet passports that made internal labour
migration a subject to household registration (Mikhailov, 2018). Even today, a Russian
citizen who comes to the capital cannot stay there for more than 90 days without
permanent registration in a local household.
The special status of the city and its political significance raised the stakes and
made the campaign important in the scope of top-level federal politics. That could be
one of the reasons why thousands of volunteers from Russian territories joined the
campaign (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). At the same time, limited opportunities to
come to the capital made it harder for Navalny’s supporters from other cities to
participate in the campaign. As we will see, this explains why Navalny's campaign
developed some of its digital solutions – such as a couchsurfing platform for
non-residents and tools for campaigning online – which could help overcome those
limitations.
Arguably, Moscow citizens benefited from the regime that prioritised the
development of the capital over other Russian territories. Nevertheless, in the 2013
Moscow mayoral election, like during the protests of 2011-2012, many Moscow citizens
decided to raise their voice against this system. Their demand was to end corruption,
reinstate self-governance on local levels and delegate more democratic power to the
people. One would argue that such policies, if implemented, would go against the
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practical interests of Moscow – at least in the short run. Nevertheless, Navalny's
message of democratisation resonated with some part of the Moscow population. One of
the reasons could be that Moscow citizens were affluent enough to think beyond pure
economic interests: the Moscow middle class ‘had been shifting towards a more modern
individualistic and development-oriented system of values’ (Dmitriev, 2015, p.232).

5.2.4 Legal opportunity structure
The legal opportunity structure (LOS) concept examines those aspects of political
climate that affect social movements and other grassroots initiatives from the judicial
perspective. Justifying why legal space should be considered as part of opportunity
structures, Andersen (2009, p.15) says that ‘litigation and legal decisions are best treated
as creating moments of opportunity bounded by the specific legal and political contexts
in which they occur’. In Vanhala’s words, LOS describes ‘stable and contingent factors
that influence whether social movements are able and willing to pursue their goals
through the court’ (2012, p.527). De Fazio (2012, p.6) specifies those factors of LOS as
accessibility to courts, availability of justiciable rights and ‘receptivity of the judiciary
toward a social movement’s claims’.
As the Russian case of electoral authoritarianism exemplifies, formal legal
opportunities do not always correspond to practical ones in the societies where law
enforcement is selective and the rule of law is far from being absolute. In particular,
Russian courts suffer from what became known in Russian political discourse as
‘telephone law’, the practice that goes back to the Soviet era when ‘Communist Party
officials communicated over the phone their preferences about the outcome of individual
cases’ (Popova, 2012, p.131; Ledeneva, 2008). In Handley’s words, ‘telephone law’ or
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‘telephone justice’ is a practice by which ‘outcomes of cases allegedly come from orders
issued over the phone by those with political power rather than through the application
of law’ (2009, p.1). For instance, the Russian constitution upholds freedoms of speech
and of the press but ‘government officials frequently use the country’s politicized and
corrupt court system to harass the few journalists and bloggers who expose abuses by
authorities’ (“Freedom of the Press,” 2017).
The legal prosecution of Alexey Navalny during his mayoral campaign in 2013
might be taken as an example of this. On July 18, 2013, when Navalny's campaign had
been underway, Navalny was sentenced to five years in prison (Clover and Weaver,
2013b). This was a part of the investigation against Alexey Navalny and his colleague
Pyotr Ofitserov. Both were accused of embezzlement of the corporate property of the
state-owned timber company Kirov Forests. Navalny denied the accusations, claiming
the whole process was an act of political repression against the opposition (Barry, 2012).
On April 10, 2012, the charges were dismissed as the prosecutor failed to provide
sufficient evidence that would prove any elements of crime. However, on May 29, 2012,
the case was reopened by the personal decision of the head of Russia’s Investigative
Committee, who was the subject of an anti-corruption investigation by Alexey Navalny
(Kramer, 2012). In that situation, the public outrage and mass protests in Moscow city
centre made a difference. On the next day after thousands of protesters gathered in front
of the Russian State Parliament near the Kremlin, Navalny was released on bail which
allowed him to resume his campaign.
Under such conditions, grassroots activists and unauthorised politicians cannot
rely on judicial independence to advance their causes. Moreover, the corruption of the
court system curbs the enthusiasm of activists as they can become an easy target of show
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trials as the infamous Bolotnaya Square case exemplifies. After the mass rally on
Bolotnaya Square on May 6, 2012, 37 protesters were charged with mass riots and later
sentenced to years in prison. That is despite the evidence that ‘violence and violations of
public order were mainly caused by the actions of the authorities, mainly the police, both
before and during the events’ (“May 6, 2012 events,” 2013, p.51). Georgy Satarov, a
political scientist and former aide to the first Russian President, described the Bolotnaya
case as ‘an attempt to use fear to stop the growth of the protest movement’ (Weiss, 2013,
p.78).
The Pussy Riot trial became one of the most talked-about events of the Moscow
protests of 2011-2012 both domestically and internationally (Herszenhorn, 2012). On
February 21, 2012, three members of the punk band performed a ‘punk prayer’ at Christ
the Savior Cathedral in Moscow. They sang and video-recorded Virgin Mary, Put Putin
Away song which became a sound protest stunt in the midst of protests in the capital.
The video of the gig went viral, the performers were arrested and sentenced to two years
in prison each (Steinholt, 2013, p.120).
The band’s performance resulted in the adoption of new anti-blasphemy
legislation in Russia. It made the Russian LOS even more prohibitive for non-authorised
voices. According to the report of Agora N
 GO, six people were found guilty of
blasphemy in 2016 in Russia, ten in 2017 and eight in 2018. More than three quarters of
them were

incriminated

posting blasphemous

pictures or comments online

(“Liberalizatsiya po-russki,” 2019, p.3).
After the wave of the mass protests of 2011-2012 new legislation on public
assembly was introduced in Russia. Among other things, the new law introduced heavy
fines on protesters (Bryanski, 2012). In 2014, a bill passed that set up the penalty of up
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to five years of forced labour or prison for attending unauthorised rallies (Demirjian,
2014). This is an example of how the state managed the political opportunity structure to
increase the cost of political participation for the people through changes to the system
of laws – instead of fighting every given public manifestation of unwanted opinions.
Another important aspect of the Russian LOS is the vulnerability of the Russian
Constitutional Court (RCC), the highest court in the country. Trochev and Solomon
(2018, p.201) argue that under President Putin RCC has ‘developed its own version of
‘authoritarian constitutionalism’, which may serve as a model for constitutional judicial
bodies in other authoritarian states’. In that ‘model’, RCC adapted to ‘satisfy the
demands for loyalty and resilience from [the regime], which has tended to prevail over
constitutionalism since the early 2000s’ (Trochev and Solomon, 2018, p.204), they
argue. For instance, the court concluded that the amendments to the Russian
Constitution that Vladimir Putin proposed in 2020 did not go against the supreme law of
the country. That is despite those amendments de facto abolishing term limits for Putin
as a President and being widely characterised as effectively a soft coup d’état
(Kara-Murza, 2020).
As a way out of this unfavourable LOS, Russian opposition, and many ordinary
citizens, often appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to seek justice.
Data shows that Russia’s share of complaints to ECHR is bigger than that of any other
country, which itself can be an indicator of the quality of Russian legal opportunity
structure. In 2019, Russia accounted for ‘15,050 out of a total of 59,800 pending cases in
the Strasbourg-based court, or one-quarter of all applications’ (“The Moscow Times,”
2020). However, even this rather narrow window of opportunity has been shrinking
recently. For example, in 2015 the State Duma granted Russia's Constitutional Court the
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power to ‘review international human rights rulings to decide if they violate the Russian
Constitution’ (Fleig-Goldstein, 2017, p.172). One of the amendments to the Constitution
I have just mentioned also captured the supremacy of the rulings of domestic courts over
international ones.

5.2.5 Mediation opportunity structure
Mediation opportunity structure refers to the opportunities and threats the media arena
can pose to grassroots movements and campaigns. Among other aspects, it includes
‘media opportunities’ provided by mainstream media and ‘networked opportunities’
facilitated by social media (Cammaerts, 2012, p.122). Potentially both of them can make
a big difference for a political change initiative becoming either a valuable resource to
promote its cause or a serious constraint.
In Putin’s Russia, media opportunity structure is characterised by pervasive state
control over legacy media outlets including TV channels, print media and radio stations.
For instance, there are three types of owners who control major TV networks in the
country. Vladimir Putin’s friend Yury Kovalchuk controls Channel 1, Ren TV Channel
and Channel 5 through his National Media Group. NTV Channel is a part of the
state-owned Gazprom Media holding. Russia 1 is under direct control of the state (“Kto
Vladeet SMI,” 2014).
The origins of the situation go back to the 1990s and the Presidential campaign
of 1996 (Simons, 2001). In the 1990s, two Russian oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and
Vladimir Gusinsky ‘controlled major television stations’ through their media empires
and often used them in their political games (Treisman, 2002, p.69). Although under the
first Russian President Russian television journalists were more autonomous from the
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state and their bosses than in Putin’s years, independent journalism in the country was
compromised in the 1990s. A major instance was the Presidential elections of 1996
when media oligarchs abused the neutrality of their media assets to re-elect increasingly
unpopular Yeltsin as Russian President and protect their businesses from a very probable
victory of a Communist Party candidate (Belin, 1997). Yeltsin’s eventual win might
have shown the Kremlin the power of the mass media and also the lack of principles on
their side. As Treisman (2002, p.70) puts it, ‘oligarchs’ brazen claims to have gotten
Yeltsin re-elected in 1996 by manipulating coverage and their demands to be rewarded
helped to discredit them in a way that simplified Putin’s task’ to take control of Russian
political television in the 2000s. Kazun (2019, p.313) goes further saying that it is the
legacy of the Soviet Union that has shaped ‘nondemocratic mass political media
systems’ in modern Russia.
In terms of ownership, many other legacy media also have direct or indirect
affiliation with the Kremlin these days. Most popular in Russia political talk radio Echo
of Moscow has been a part of Gazprom Media since 2001. Three out of Top-5 political
and business newspapers in the country have some level of affiliation with the Kremlin
as well. Putin’s old friend Yury Kovalchuk controls the most-read newspaper Izvestia
(Artemyeva, 2007). Alisher Usmanov, a loyal to the Kremlin oligarch and Britain's
wealthiest person, is the owner of Kommersant n ewspaper (Bryzgalova, 2015).
Rossiyskaya Gazeta is the official newspaper of the Government.
The independence of another influential newspaper Vedomosti was jeopardised
too when the Kremlin passed a law ‘barring foreign control of Russian media’ and
‘forced the FT and Dow Jones (the Wall Street Journal’s parent company) to sell their
stakes’ in the newspaper. As The Economist speculates, that may have happened because
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in 2013 Vedomosti published a letter from 35 businessmen who ‘openly supported
Alexei Navalny, the leader of the protests, as he ran to be mayor of Moscow’ (“The
Economist,” 2020).
Talking about The Economist, many popular American and European
publications such as Financial Times, The Telegraph, The New York Times and others
covered the mayoral bid of the opposition leader, the bogus trial of him and other
developments of the Moscow elections. One should not overestimate the importance of
that coverage to Navalny in terms of publicity. According to the studies by VCIOM and
MediaStandard Foundation, the general public in Russia barely reads newspapers in
English and only 1 to 3 per cent of Russians trust foreign media (“Inostranny yazyk,”
2019; “Obraz zhurnalista,” 2018, p.10). With that being said, Navalny was doing well
among the more affluent part of the population including businessmen to whom those
publications could be more relevant.
While the Russian segment of the Internet enjoys more freedom than legacy
media in general, it is far from being politically neutral. As of 2013, Alisher Usmanov
controlled major Russian internet resources such as Mail.ru search engine and its news
aggregator (“Alisher Usmanov,” 2013). In the early 2010s, Lenta.ru was the most cited
news website in Russia (Etling et al., 2010, p.29). In 2014, following the Kremlin’s
criticism of Lenta’s coverage of the Crimea crisis, Russian oligarch Alexander Mamut
fired the website’s Editor-in-Chief Galina Timchenko. As a result, 39 journalists of
Lenta.ru left the website as they called the move an act of censorship and an attempt to
turn the website into the propaganda tool of the Kremlin (“Dorogim chitateljam,” 2014).
Yandex, Russian-native search engine that has 55 per cent share of the market, is
an independently owned company (Brigham, 2019). However, it also has been under
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pressure from the government recently. To avoid complete governmental takeover, in
2019 the biggest tech company in Russia agreed to ‘create a new Public Interest
Foundation that will have the power to block transactions and temporarily remove
Yandex’s management if it deems it in the national interest’ (Seddon, 2019). As an
example of an increasing deterioration of the company’s positions as an independent
provider of search engine services, in April 2020 Yandex launched a beta widget that
showed only ‘overwhelmingly negative content when seeking information about
opposition politician Alexey Navalny’ (“Yandex says its experimental,” 2020). When
users noticed that, the company took down the widget and called the situation ‘an
experiment’ and ‘product error’.
Such a situation with the media opportunity structure made it harder for the
Russia opposition to reach out to ordinary people with their message and promote the
democratic cause. For instance, in his study of Russian media coverage of Alexey
Navalny, Kazun (2019, p.317) concluded that state-controlled media ‘are walking a
tightrope between trying to ignore Navalny and attempting to smear him as much as
possible’. This also creates an uneven playing field for state-supported and
out-of-the-system political actors. The former receive disproportionate and largely
positive publicity in the media while their rivals often get smeared, ridiculed or ignored
at best. For instance, in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election the Kremlin’s candidate
received virtually all free time on federal and local TV channels while the other
candidates, including Navalny, were ignored. The reach of the Sobyanin campaign on
TV exceeded 250 million views, while all the other candidates got only 1.5 million
views combined (“Analiz reklamnykh kampaniy,” 2013).
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Networked opportunity structure is the space of opportunities to use the
communication capacities of social media. Social media have a great proliferation in
Russia and Facebook played a particularly important role in Moscow protests of
2011-2012 as it helped protesters to self-organise (White and McAllister, 2013, p.78).
That was reasonable as most of the protesters were white collar workers and students
who are less likely to watch TV and more likely to be active internet users.
The most popular social media platform in Russia is VK with its 190 million
users (White and McAllister, 2013, p.77). The company did not survive for too long as
an independent start-up. Under pressure from the Kremlin, Pavel Durov, the founder of
the company, had to sell VK in 2013 and emigrate (Kiselyova, 2014). Since then,
Alisher Usmanov has been in control of the social media giant. He also owns
Odnoklassniki ( ‘Schoolmates’) popular social media platform (“Alisher Usmanov,”
2013). The change in ownership had political implications. For instance, VK actively
cooperates with the Investigative Committee to track ‘extremist’ speech including
blasphemy on the platform. In 2017, the Investigative Committee found extremism in
138 posts on VK which amounted to almost all the cases for the Russian segment of the
Internet (Zotova, 2018).
As important as they are for political change campaigns, traditional and social
media opportunities are only part of what the Internet has to offer to those who seek to
engage with online audiences. Transmedia projects often create platforms of their own
to tell their stories. With the discussion on transmedia storytelling we followed in
Chapter 2, we paid attention to some of the digital solutions and web applications
grassroots campaigns in politics made use of. In a similar manner, Navalny's campaign
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designed numerous websites and web applications to reach out to voters in
circumvention of the restrictive MOS.
Talking about the political opportunity structures of Russia as we know it today,
it seems fair to say there is great restrictive potential that makes it harder for
out-of-the-polity actors to exercise influence over political decision-making in the
country. In the absence of fair elections, the institutions of electoral democracy do not
serve their purposes to represent the people as the main concern of elected
representatives becomes staying loyal to the Kremlin. The judicial branch is only
formally independent from the government but in practice can be used to prosecute
political opponents of the regime including activists and random protesters. That is part
of the reason why Russian citizens – the audience of the campaign in Gambarato’s terms
– are cautious about taking political action and the traditions of grassroots politics in the
country stays rather weak as the Russian POSs suppress people’s political enthusiasm.
Another reason could be that the opposition in Russia is smeared and ridiculed in the
traditional media and the mediation opportunity structure reduces the chances to spread
unofficial narratives.

5.3 Alexey Navalny’s grassroots campaign
According to Smith and Soboleva (2016, p.364), Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign
for Moscow was an example of ‘an effective use of limited resources’ in politics. This
thesis argues that transmedia strategies helped Navalny’s campaign to agglomerate
resources for political action and encourage participation on the grassroots level. These
qualities of transmedia storytelling were particularly helpful in Russian context where
the tradition of grassroots politics is rather weak and the other parts of the POS – legal,
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institutional and so on – discourage active citizenship. Navalny's mayoral campaign of
2013 exploited the principles of grassroots politics and transmedia storytelling to
mobilise the base, organise volunteers in the mediated and offline spaces and overcome
the obstacles of Russian political opportunity structures. To that end, the campaign
implemented some of the key principles of transmedia storytelling by Henry Jenkins
(see Illustration 2), such as spreadability, continuity, immersion and extractability,
seriality, performance (2010).

Illustration 2. Core principles of transmedia storytelling by Henry Jenkins (2010).
Navalny’s mayoral bid emerged from the Moscow protest events of 2011-2012.
The difference was that it was a campaign-style grassroots initiative in the sense that it
unfolded within the boundaries of institutional politics (Navalny ran for a state office),
had clear time boundaries and relied on the organisational capacities of the candidate’s
team. What stayed intact was the great involvement of active citizens which was crucial
for both the movement and the campaign. The campaign’s organisational resources
made it possible for the candidate to provide citizens with an extensive network of
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participatory extensions including web applications and make most of the enthusiasm of
the 2011-2012 protest movement in Moscow.
In line with the resource mobilisation paradigm, the campaign sought to
accumulate resources of different kinds to reduce the costs of political participation for
citizens. In the terminology of Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale, Navalny's
campaign took on the archetype of a Helper or Donor w
 ho presents the Hero ( the
general population) with magic gifts (resources for political action) to help the Hero g et
through obstacles (Russian political space) and eventually win over the Villain
(detached and reluctant elites) (Propp, 1958).

5.3.1 Campaign message: Five issues. One story
According to Henry Jenkins (2006, p.95-96), transmedia projects disseminate a single
story, storyworld or ‘brandworld’ across many platforms. This idea is encapsulated in
such transmedia qualities as continuity and seriality, for instance (Jenkins, 2010). In
doing so, they ensure there is a consistent experience across platforms (Long, 2007,
p.164). That makes a message an essential part of a transmedia campaign, including in
the realm of politics. That also makes storytelling one of the resources available to
political organisers (Ganz, 2009; 2011). Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign for
Moscow is an example of how such a political resource can be used in a transmedia
campaign.
In a significant departure from the type of campaigning traditional to Russian
political culture, Navalny reached out to the people of Moscow with a series of local
rallies. The speeches were a chance for the candidate to expand on the key points of his
platform while speaking directly to the people.

122

Illustration 3. Map of local rallies of Alexey Navalny with turnout (“Alexey Navalny,”
2013, p.14).

Navalny’s internal polling showed that Moscow citizens were most concerned
with five social issues: labour migration to the city, affordable housing and the quality of
house services, public transport and heavy traffic, healthcare, and the overall cost of
living in the capital (“The platform of Alexey Navalny,” 2013). In line with the
transmedia idea of message consistency or ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), the political
platform and campaign communication of Alexey Navalny wrapped up those city issues
in a single story about corruption, political accountability and active citizenship. First,
the campaign portrayed Russian political elites as detached from, and unconcerned with,
the public interest. In particular, the campaign claimed that Navalny’s opponent, Acting
Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, and other members of the Kremlin circles, benefited
enormously from kickback schemes and budget misappropriation (Kibirov, 2013).
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Second, the candidate urged to increase the role of citizens in governance as a means of
ensuring the accountability of elites. The empowerment of local communities and
grassroots citizenship were the cross-cutting themes of Navalny’s mayoral platform, his
public speeches and communications. The overall strategy of Alexey Navalny was to
show that those in power in Russia and its capital put their personal interests over the
interests of the population and that the solution to that would be to give more power to
citizens (Kibirov, 2013; Krasnoelena, 2013).
Concerning healthcare, Navalny's platform promised to fight kickback schemes
that made public purchases more expensive for the city budget and ultimately for the
people. On housing services, Navalny proposed to introduce the mechanisms of citizen
control over overhaul works expenses. As a part of the anti-corruption campaign,
Navalny was going to bring utility providers under scrutiny to ensure pricing
transparency and quality control. It was also suggested that undue expenses could be
reduced if residents were empowered to make their own decision on what services they
wanted to receive (Boris Felikson, 2013).
The campaign portrayed illegal labour migration also as the problem of
corruption foremost. According to Navalny, some utility service providers, including
state-owned ones, hired illegal aliens to pay them less than their official wages and
embezzle the difference. Thus, in Navalny’s opinion, immigration policies in Russia
were deliberately designed to create opportunities for mass budget thefts. Navalny
promised to make information on wages in housing services open to the public so that
the citizens’ oversight could help end corrupt practices in that department (Tyoply Stan,
2013).
From Navalny’s perspective, the disproportionally high cost of living in the city
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was partially due to so-called ‘bribe tax’ that businesses had to pay to bureaucrats and
numerous controllers (Mojaghed, 2013). The campaign claimed that backhanders were
another component of the problem of unreasonably high prices, including on the real
estate market. Navalny’s methods of dealing with bribing would be to cut regulations for
businesses, make the government more transparent and accountable, and ensure
compliance with anti-bribery and anti-corruption requirements. With this approach, the
campaign portrayed the cost of living as part of the same story about corruption and the
accountability of political decision-makers.
Transport policies were a big part of the candidate’s platform. Moscow is
notorious for its bad traffic. It is not rare that people spend hours trying to get to the
place where they work and then back home every workday. That has a massive impact
on the quality of life in the capital of Russia. In their transport policies, the Moscow
government prioritised widening existing highways and building big new junctions.
From Navalny’s perspective, that was because big multimillion projects can be easily
corrupted. In 2013, the Moscow administration handed two thirds of its costly city
contracts on building highways, road junctions and bridges to Gennady Timchenko,
Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg, who were known to be the members of Putin's
inner circle (Lyauv, 2013). From Navalny’s point of view, the city administration
preferred massive construction projects to more flexible solutions to hand out all the
budget to a single management company (often affiliated with the Kremlin) and then
embezzle part of it. Navalny argued that this kind of cronyism made solving transport
problems impossible (Boris Felikson, 2013).
Addressing the issues of public transport and city traffic, Navalny proposed to
extend the networks of local roads instead (Tyoply Stan, 2013; Boris Felikson, 2013).
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This idea was in line with Navalny’s general reliance on horizontal links and networks
in social policies rather than vertical, unitarist and easy-to-control systems. Connecting
small neighbourhoods with each other through the networks of local roads would
strengthen horizontal links inside and between local communities. Such arrangements
would also help local economic centres to emerge. Surrounded by relatively small
populations, such centres would be easier for the people to control through their local
representatives. They would also make people more economically independent from the
city and more dependent on smaller economic areas that they could control as a
community.
With that regard, the problem of roads in Moscow was akin to a greater Russian
situation with both transport and the system of authoritarian control. Flight connections
in Russia are designed to lead traffic through the capital so that even large nearby cities
often do not have direct flight between them or they are prohibitively costly (Arakelyan,
2017). As a result, in 2013 the three Moscow airports had significantly more passengers
than all the other Russian airports combined (“Obyomy Perevozok,” 2014). In the
vicious circle, Moscow's special economic status hindered the economic developments
of Russian territories. The poor economic situation outside the capital suppressed
demand for flights between provinces and reinforced the all-roads-lead-to-Moscow
situation. That even further jeopardised economic and cultural cooperation between
territories and regional development. This could also be another federal mechanism of
divide and rule control over territories. Both Moscow with its lack of local roads and the
country at large with its aviation problems suffered from the unitarist approach of the
state.

126

The transport issues also pertained to the process of democratisation and
self-governance: transport routes and the intensity of movement between territories pull
the nation together, installing both the sense of unity and practical unity with the
networks of economic ties between provinces and neighbourhoods in circumvention of
the power centre. In its turn, the system of authoritarian rule perpetuated disunity and
unaccountability: deliberately through the politics of tax redistribution for instance and
as an incidental consequence of corruption – like in the case of the transport policies that
prioritised centralisation over horizontal links.
On the one hand, the campaign suffered from such a disparity between the
capital and the rest of the country. For instance, it was harder for the campaign to recruit
volunteers from across the country as it would make Navalny’s enthusiasts from outside
Moscow bear the costs which could be quite sizable to them. On the other hand, the
unique role of Moscow brought federal attention to its mayoral election and made those
outside Moscow more probable to participate. On the level of messaging, the
campaign’s key slogan ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ peddled this idea that the
campaign had federal consequences increasing its chances with supporters from other
Russian territories (Boris Felikson, 2013). The campaign also created a number of web
applications to make it easier for people across Russia to volunteer, which we will
discuss later.
Importantly, the consistency of Navalny’s message was in line with the
transmedia concepts such as continuity (Jenkins, 2010) and canon (Scolari, 2014) which
suggest that the message across transmedia extensions must stay coherent and
consistent. The key messages of civic control and accountability were the major talking
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points of Navalny’s communications. They brought the different parts of Navalny’s
platform together and made them easier to comprehend for the general public.
Henry Jenkins’ concept of drillability (2010) is also applicable to the
communications of Navalny’s mayoral campaign for Moscow. From simple slogans
across communications to five.navalny.ru website with five key points of the platform
presented in an accessible format to navalny.ru website with the full and detailed
platform, the campaign made it possible for those interested to dig deeper and learn
more about where Navalny stood politically.

5.3.2 Message of active citizenship
Navalny’s message of civic participation and active citizenship contributed to making
his mayoral campaign transmedia. That is because participation is indispensable to
transmedia projects (Jenkins, 2010; Pratten, 2015, p.2). The audiences of transmedia
campaigns are complex and include not only mere consumers of political messages but
also different sorts of ‘prosumers’ who contribute to the progress of the campaign
(Scolari et al., 2014, p.3). In line with this transmedia paradigm, Navalny’s campaign
created a network of extensions with varying opportunities for participation and also
promoted participation through its political platform and messages.
When Navalny praised self-governance on the campaign trail, he gave two
meanings to it: 1. self-governance as the empowerment of local government bodies,
downward delegation of power, including the redistribution of public budgets in favour
of local bodies, and 2. self-governance as active citizenship that includes voting and
volunteering (Krasnoelena, 2013; Mojaghed, 2013). Thus, the campaign proposed
networked solutions and active citizenship as an answer to key city issues.
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While calling self-governance a way to fight corruption and tackle key city
issues, the campaign called for local legislative representatives to be vested with more
power and budget to implement political decisions, to bring more decisions to the local
level where elected representatives could step in, to elect sheriffs and make the police
responsible before local authorities (Krasnoelena, 2013). This democratic message was
repeated across rallies. For instance, Navalny brought it up many times in his rallies that
the redistribution of city funds is a necessary measure to make the administrative system
effective and accountable in Moscow. At the Kaluzhskaya rally he complained that
people’s representatives lack resources to influence the situation on the local level:
‘Thousands of local representatives control only 1 per cent of the city budget. Those are
the people who deal with local problems directly on a daily basis… It will never work if
four or ten people control the whole Moscow budget. This centralisation only facilitates
corruption and ineffectiveness’ (Kibirov, 2013). In Yasenevo, he made this point again
that the local bodies of political representation manage only 1 per cent of the city
budget: ‘Do you know how much of the Moscow 16 trillion budget is controlled on the
local level by the representatives you elect who deal with local problems like hospitals
and housing services? 1 per cent. Thousands of local representatives in 184 districts
control just one per cent of the city budget and the rest is managed by some random
people who have not even been elected by anyone. We do not even know their names
and cannot keep them accountable’ (Krasnoelena, 2013).
In the discussion of Russian POSs, we talked about the special position of
Moscow in terms of the economy and power to compare with the other territories in the
country. In the same manner as the policies of the federal centre made it easier for them
to control territories from Moscow, on the scale of the capital the city administration
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agglomerated most of the resources leaving local communities with no resources to
self-govern. As a result, the local institutes of power that would be easier for the people
to control played a very limited role in the system, while the real influence was
concentrated on the higher levels of the state which are harder to keep accountable. In
Navalny’s words, ‘Russia by now has turned into a unitary state. We need to start
moving in the opposite direction – towards restoration of balance of authority between
federal and regional powers and a significant expansion of the role of local governance
as the basis of the entire system of popular rule’ (“Alexey Navalny’s Campaign
Platform,” 2018).
The campaign sought to increase the role of citizens from these three
perspectives: put formal state institutions and elites under people’s control, encourage
active citizenship in the realm of informal politics, and drive up political participation on
the scale of one particular election campaign. To empower the citizens, the campaign
designed a transmedia network of numerous online platforms and web applications to
turn supporters into volunteers and to reduce the cost of political participation for
Russian citizens (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b).
The idea of bringing elites under citizens’ control was encapsulated in the
platform’s catchy ‘People’s rule, not monarchy’ phrase and was in line with the
grassroots turn that the capital experienced in 2011-2012 – as discussed in the analysis
of Russian POSs. To bring about the needed change, the campaign urged Moscow
citizens to start exercising control in the form of political participation, including
volunteering and voting. The political change would require the people to engage in
politics more actively, including within the scope of Navalny's campaign.
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The active citizenship aspect of the message was to deal with the political
nihilism of voters, which is part of Russian political space as discussed in the first part
of this chapter. The message had to help recruit volunteers and encourage the people to
back Navalny with their vote. It had some success as, for instance, the interviews with
Navalny’s poll watchers show that the calls he made on social media to participate in the
Moscow mayoral elections incentivised some of them to become election observers
(Davydov, Loguniva and Lytkina, 2016, p.57). The democratic thrust of Navalny's
campaign’s message was also in line with the focus on participation being the engine of
transmedia projects. As we will discuss later, the methods of campaigning, the digital
solutions Navalny’s team implemented to simplify volunteering, self-organisation of
citizens and personal initiative were also consistent with this message.

Illustration 4. Official logo of Alexey Navalny’s mayoral campaign of 2013 (reads as
‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow. Navalny’) (“Official logo,” 2020).
The overall message of Navalny's mayoral campaign of 2013 in Moscow
demonstrated a great deal of consistency. The campaign managed to use the strength of
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Alexey Navalny as an anti-corruption activist to explain the city issues and the
candidate’s platform with a single overarching story following what transmedia
scholarship calls the ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), strengthening its transmedia
consistency and using storytelling as a resource of political mobilisation. The campaign
wrapped different city issues up with a story about corruption, accountability of elites
and active citizenship.
In line with the general reliance of transmedia projects on participation and
‘knowledge communities’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.20), Navalny’s campaign promoted active
citizenship as the means of bringing about political change and encouraged concerned
citizens to join the campaign as volunteers. And it was not only the message. Navalny’s
team chose to use the methods of campaigning related to that participation appeal which
the next part of this chapter will cover.

5.3.3 Confronting mediation opportunity structure
Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign was a rare example of a grassroots campaign
in modern Russian history. Not only the key messages of the campaign but also the
network of interactive extensions it created encouraged Navalny’s supporters to act on
behalf of the campaign. Normally political campaigns in Russia unfold almost
exclusively in the media arena where people become mere objects of political messages.
It was highly unusual when Navalny's campaign decided to make citizens its active
agents and created a transmedia network of web applications to encourage civic
participation.
As the discussion of Russian opportunity structures concluded, the traditional
media arena in Russia provided unauthorised voices with a very limited opportunity to
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reach out to voters (Azhgikhina, 2011). In the mediated space, the campaign had to
overcome the restraints of the Russian mediation opportunity structure, including
informational blackouts

and the campaigns

of disinformation

produced by

state-controlled legacy media – to spread word about the movement among potential
adherents (Jo Freeman, n.d.).
The first alternative to legacy media was social media and websites. Transmedia
storytelling, convergence culture and multi-screen consumption are defined by the ‘flow
of content across multiple media platforms’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.2). The campaign
launched a navalny.ru website with the candidate’s platform and regularly updated
campaign news. Five.navalny.ru w
 ebsite presented the platform in an accessible form of
five key issues. Navalny engaged with users on Facebook, VK, Twitter, Odnoklassniki
and Instagram s ocial media platforms and filmed 24 online videos and teasers for
Youtube. The campaign also used Youtube as an advertising tool to post commercials.
Weekly email sendouts contained campaign news and called for the subscribers to get
involved in the campaign as volunteers or donate to it.
More interesting was the second alternative. By following the transmedia
playbook, the campaign created a number of online applications to reduce the costs of
civic participation for the candidate’s supporters, to generate the flow of volunteers into
the campaign and to make sure they work efficiently (Gambarato and Medvedev,
2015b). Jo Freeman (n.d.) and others theorised that labour and all kinds of human
resources are the primary intangible resources grassroots campaigns can rely on.
According to Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s campaign manager, the campaign had
employed 14,000 volunteers by August 2013, about a month before the election day. By
the end of the campaign, more than 20,000 volunteers had joined Navalny's election

133

team (Bershidsky, 2013). To make those numbers possible, the campaign had to provide
Moscow citizens with practical tools to make their voice heard. It was especially
important to reduce the costs of participation for citizens as the Russian political climate
discouraged grassroots enthusiasm. Considering that, the campaign prioritised building
websites and web applications for bottom-up civic participation and volunteering. This
approach was consistent with the democratic message of the campaign: one can say that
empowering people was a key element of Navalny's platform and also the means of
achieving the platform’s goals.
To resist the unfavourable mediation opportunity structure, the campaign came
up with a network of web applications and websites of their own, transmedia in its
nature. Its repertoire of contention used a mix of digital and offline means of promotion
including social media, online games, websites and blogs, print press, radio and street
advertising, outdoor rallies, online videos. Most importantly, many of those media
extensions were not designed to simply teach about the candidate but to empower
grassroots enthusiasts to act on behalf of the campaign.

5.3.4 Recruiting volunteers
The campaign knew its biggest asset would be Navalny’s supporters. Bob Edwards and
John D. McCarthy (2007), Charles Tilly (1977a), Jo Freeman (n.d.), John D. McCarthy
and Mayer Zald (1977), all place labour or human resources among the main resources
of political mobilisation. Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7) also define modern participatory
culture as the one that has ‘relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic
engagement’ and ‘strong support for creating and sharing creations with others’.
Navalny’s campaign needed to become as ‘volunteer-friendly’ as it could to
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accommodate as many volunteers as possible. To that end, they had to reduce the cost of
participation for citizens to make it easier for them to voice their frustrations and
demands – as per the resource mobilisation theory. The solution was various web
applications that would help people self-organise and act together as the campaign’s
ambassadors.
Investing in volunteering could prove to be a risky strategy considering the poor
tradition of grassroots campaigning in the country. But the campaign was resolute to
challenge the pattern – besides, it did not have a lot of other means of promotion but its
enthusiastic supporters. As a result, relying on grassroots participation became the
campaign’s long-term strategy. From the very beginning, volunteers worked from the
headquarters in the call-centre reaching out to local representatives to ask if they were
ready to support the opposition candidate to overcome the so-called ‘municipal filter’
and register Navalny as a candidate (Katz, 2013).
Because of Moscow's special status, Alexey Navalny's mayoral campaign for
Moscow drew interest not only from Muscovites but from across the country. The
campaign’s slogan ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ suggested that the Moscow
mayoral election is more than a city issue. Left to their own devices, people from other
Russian territories could find it rather hard to participate in a grassroots campaign
because it often requires volunteers to be physically present on the ground. As the
discussion of the role of Moscow in the first part of this chapter highlighted, there were
factors that complicated such mobility.
Led by Volkov, the campaign designed a web application to recruit volunteers
from outside the capital helping them find free accommodation in Moscow for the
period of the campaign. They launched mosvpiska.navalny.ru website which was a
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couchsurfing application for volunteers (“Mosvpiska,” 2013). The website connected
Navalny’s supporters from outside Moscow with those Moscow residents who were
willing to host them in their Moscow homes for the period of the campaign. According
to Navalny’s post-campaign report, the website brought in 3,100 new volunteers from
other cities of Russia (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41). Volkov (2013) downplayed that
number saying that about 500-600 volunteers from other cities joined the campaign
through Mosvpiska couchsurfing platform – which is still a considerable number on a
scale of one city.
‘Experience, skills and expertise’ are among the resources political organisers
can provide grassroots activists with according to Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126).
Transmedia storytelling scholarship echoes this idea when Jenkins et al. (2006, p.7) say
that in participatory culture what is known by the most experienced is passed along to
novices. This was another aspect of promoting active citizenship that Navalny’s
campaign engaged with. The campaign started training citizens how to be effective in
volunteering. There were regular master classes on how to deliver the campaign
message effectively. They started on July 11th, 2013, the day after cube.navalny.ru
website for street promotion was launched and lasted until the end of the campaign.
Alexey Navalny's campaign also held 78 master classes for 800 volunteers who
conducted opinion polls for the campaign (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.64). In an
election protection effort, the campaign trained poll watchers and developed a web
application for election observers (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.68). Alexey Navalny held
regular meetings with volunteers, aimed to create horizontal connections (“Alexey
Navalny,” 2013, pp.53-54). Those who campaigned on social media were provided with
written instructions on how to communicate with people on behalf of the campaign. The
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instructions were available on moskva.navalny.ru website (“Campaign in Moscow,”
2013).
Another aspect of participatory culture as defined by Jenkins et al. is members
who believe that their contributions matter (2006, p.7). Leonid Volkov admitted that the
campaign tried to hire paid promoters to distribute leaflets but quickly came to the
conclusion that volunteers were much better motivated and effective – because they
were personally interested in the cause and valued the time they were investing in
promoting the candidate (Volkov, 2013). For the voters they communicated with, it
made a case for the campaign: if people worked for the candidate for free, it had to say
something positive about the candidate. This is an additional illustration to the
proposition that people who provide free labour (Terranova, 2000) in transmedia
projects find meaning in their engagement and have motivations other than material
compensation. This also adds to the findings of other studies that concluded that
grassroots canvassing can be more effective than the use of professional promoters in
political campaigns (Franke-Ruta, 2004).

5.3.5 Empowering volunteers
When thinking of maximising the productivity of volunteers, the first important factor to
consider is that different people are ready to invest different amounts of time to help the
cause. As Robert Pratten stresses in his ‘Getting Started in Transmedia Storytelling’, the
audience commitment depends on the intensity of participation (2015, p.183). Akin to a
sales funnel, a participation funnel suggests that the more demanding a platform is in
terms of participation the less people will be ready to get involved (Clow, 2013).
Therefore, the campaign needed to design online applications for different depths of
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involvement. Following Mr. Volkov’s account of their volunteer-oriented projects, the
following matrix can describe their approach:

Illustration 5. Some of the campaign’s extensions charted based on the
availability of volunteers.
The four extensions and web applications – Cubes, Navalny to Every House,
Mosvpiska a nd Campaign in Moscow – corresponded with varying needs and
capabilities of volunteers. Cubes w
 ere the best option for those who lived in the capital
and could spare a considerable amount of time for volunteering. They also required a
measure of initiative and independent work on the side of a volunteer. The target
audience of the Navalny to Every House web application were the Moscow residents
who had less time to invest in the campaign. The Campaign in Moscow social media app
enabled people from the whole country to act as the campaign’s ambassadors with very
little effort. As discussed earlier, the Mosvpiska c ouchsurfing application made it easier
for Navalny’s supporters from outside Moscow to take part in the campaign as full-time
volunteers.

138

Invented by the head of Navalny's Moscow office Nikolay Lyaskin (Kozenko,
2014), mobile outdoor cubes, square tents with campaign slogans printed on the sides,
became the primary points of campaigning in Moscow streets for Navalny's campaign
during the election period. They were the places where volunteers, mostly young people,
could talk to the Moscow citizens on behalf of the campaign. The cubes also were
starting points for promotion in metro and traffic, places to store and handout
newspapers. These activities at cubes provided the immersion transmedia experience for
both volunteers and Muscovites who the campaign targeted. The handouts aligned with
the extractability principle of transmedia storytelling as defined by Henry Jenkins
(2010). The latter suggests it is always beneficial for a transmedia project if its fans get
connected with the project through any physical or virtual items associated with it.

Illustration 6. Map of active cubes in Moscow (“Alexey Navalny,”
2013, p.19).
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The number of cubes active in the streets varied from 20 to 50 units from day to
day – it was up to the people to apply for and pick up a tent kit in the campaign office.
Another option was to go to cube.navalny.ru website where an up-to-date online map of
the currently operating cubes was available, and to join one of them. Overall, volunteers
organised 2,756 cubes f or the campaign. Volkov suggested that cubes p roduced 50,000
man-hours in total (Volkov, 2013).
For those who preferred volunteering from home, the campaign came up with
Navalny to Every House online interactive map on dom.navalny.ru, which was a
geo-targeted social network. On the website, citizens were asked to register their home
address in Moscow. Immediately, the address was displayed on the online map of the
website. As a result, the other users could see they had a lot of like-minded people in
their

neighbourhood and beyond it, they are part of a movement. This

community-building aspect of the web application was another reference to the
principles of participatory culture and transmedia storytelling which intersect in this
case. Henry Jenkins, for instance, argues that transmedia projects are dependent on the
active participation of fan communities or ‘knowledge communities’ (2006, pp.20-21) as
he calls them. The sense of belonging to a community encourages participation which is
always beneficial to a transmedia campaign.
Practically, the website assigned simple tasks to the registered users. For
instance, they could report if the campaign newsletters had been delivered to their
residential building (“Navalny to Every House,” 2013). The initial idea was to increase
the depth of participation step-by-step by giving the users more and more advanced
tasks every few days. But the production took too much time and eventually the project
offered a checklist of available involvement types instead of progression scenarios.
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Nevertheless, the result was 36,000 registered users in 20,000 apartment houses, half of
those in Moscow (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41).

Illustration 7. Navalny To Every House interactive map with registered
users (“Navalny to Every House,” 2013).
Campaign in Moscow web and mobile application was an online tool to make
political participation possible with minimum involvement. The app made it easier for
supporters, including those from outside Moscow, to volunteer online. Using a specially
designed application on VK, a popular Russian social media, any individual who had a
profile on VK c ould contact another random user with an automatically generated
message in support of the candidate. For a better appeal, the system was designed to
pick a user of approximately the same age as the volunteer who was contacting them. By
the end of the campaign, 9,500 users had sent more than 500,000 messages via the
application (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.41).
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5.3.6 Applying technical expertise
In his description of transmedia organisational frameworks, Robert Pratten highlights
the importance of the technological side to transmedia projects (2015, pp.40-41). From
the resource mobilisation perspective, technical knowledge falls into the column of
cultural resources available to political organisers – in the taxonomy of resources by
Edwards and McCarthy (2007, p.126). Charles Tilly (1977a, pp.1-12) also specified
technical expertise as one of the main resources of social mobilisation. The technical
expertise of Navalny’s team allowed the campaign to create its participatory component
by producing multiple web applications. Those applications empowered Russian citizens
to act on behalf of the campaign both online and offline. They made it possible to boost
the grassroots enthusiasm of Navalny’s supporters in circumvention of the oppressive
opportunity structure of the Russian politics.
This technical expertise did not come at once. The IT infrastructure of the
campaign benefited from the period of mass protest in 2011-2012 when the opposition
tested new technologies for political mobilisation. In a move to legitimise the leaders of
the protest movement, the Protest Committee decided to hold the Russian Opposition
Coordination Council elections in 2012. The Central Election Committee of the Russian
opposition was created specifically for that purpose. First, voters had to register on the
website of the Central Electoral Committee. Then they had to verify their identity with
an ID number or a small e-payment. Verified users received voter identification numbers
to their mobile phones. Those who could not vote online or preferred to see how the
process is organised offline, had an opportunity to cast their votes at one of several
locations in Moscow (Gessen, 2012). Leonid Volkov who was then invited by Navalny
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to lead his Moscow mayoral campaign was the head of the Central Electoral Committee
and creator of its online voting system.
In September 2019, Navalny’s data-driven system of Smart Voting caused havoc
in the Moscow City Parliamentary election. The online application gave its users advice
on what candidates to vote for in every district in order to prevent the Moscow
administration candidates from winning. Dozens of candidates supported by Smart
Voting won and made the parliamentary arithmetic more problematic for the Moscow
administration. Both Navalny's mayoral bid of 2013 and the Moscow City Parliamentary
election of 2019 showed that sophisticated technological solutions can make a difference
even in a relatively restrictive political space.

5.3.7 Navigating the campaign
Transmedia navigation is the term used by Jenkins et al. to describe ‘the ability to deal
with the flow of stories and information across multiple modalities’ (2006, p.46). As
Robert Pratten (2015, p.152) theorised, ‘frictions’, such as ‘increased cost, additional
keystrokes, diverted attention, low bandwidth’, impede a smooth movement of users
between platforms in transmedia projects. He also stresses that creating as many
platforms as possible without making sure people feel comfortable navigating them is a
bad transmedia strategy. This easily could become relevant to Navalny’s campaign
which unfolded across a lot of online and offline extensions if the candidate’s team
overlooked this important element.
To help citizens navigate the campaign, v.navalny.ru website provided
prospective and experienced volunteers with live information on day-to-day needs of the
campaign. For instance, the website showed if the campaign needed people to man
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cubes, campaign in Moscow metro or act as research interviewers for the campaign’s
internal opinion polls (“V.Navalny,” 2013). Registered users of v.navalny.ru were
granted access to their personal calendar planner which they could use to manage their
personal involvement in the campaign throughout the election period. While the people
used the digital calendar to plan their involvement, the campaign used the data to plan in
advance and allocate necessary resources on every given day. This was especially
important because the campaign depended on the volunteers’ self-initiative a great deal
and had to keep up with it.
Another example of how the campaign helped people to navigate across its many
websites and activities was team.navalny.ru website. It was an online hub for all the
forms of participation the campaign made available to their supporters. The campaign
designed it to help people of different interests and capabilities find their role in the
campaign. They could choose to host volunteers from outside Moscow, distribute
printed newspapers in the Moscow metro, change the Wi-Fi network name to Vote for
Navalny, campaign at cubes, pick up and drive a car with campaign slogans on it, collect
and put campaign stickers on their car or bicycle, distribute campaign newspapers in
traffic jams of which there are always plenty in Moscow, hang out a Navalny banner on
the balcony, try themselves as an interviewer, help organise a local rally, campaign on
social media through the online application, support the campaign with the campaign
sticker on the profile picture on social media, distribute newsletters, stickers and leaflets,
get involved in Navalny to every house web application, or donate to the campaign
(“Team.Navalny,” 2013). Also, the users could fill a questionnaire for the campaign to
determine individually how the team could use the person’s talents in the most efficient
manner.
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On election day, the most important thing was to make sure people show up at
the polling stations. Vote.navalny.ru website was a get-out-the-vote website with five
reasons to vote in the Moscow mayoral election and simple directions on how to find the
local polling station. That was the reasoning behind Navalny to Every House project
also. The get-out-the-vote campaign was to mobilise those who had indicated their
support of Alexey Navalny to come to the ballot box and cast their vote for the
candidate.

5.3.8 Gamification
As Gambarato and Dabagian (2016, p.4) show, ‘gamified applications along with games
are frequently incorporated in transmedia projects’. That was certainly the case with
team.navalny.ru website that employed elements of gamification t o encourage
volunteers to get more involved. The total contribution of an individual to the campaign
was illustrated with a progress bar on the website, which also incorporated a system of
symbolic awards. In Robert Pratten’s taxonomy of transmedia users, achievers
participate to level up and gain points, and killers e njoy competing with other users
(Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79). Both can find gamification elements helpful to satisfy their
needs. This gamification approach is also an example of Axel Bruns’ interpretation of
produsage as a situation where ‘participants gain status within the community on the
basis of their contributions’ (Bruns, 2016, p.3). The rankings and progress bars on
team.navalny.ru website granted volunteers with an inside-group status allowing them to
progress in the hierarchy of campaign contributors publicly.
In another example of gamification, Navalny's campaign tried to make it fun to
learn about the candidate’s platform. For that purpose, Alexey Navalny’s team designed
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a simple online game on popilili.com w
 ebsite (translated from Russian, popilili means
‘they embezzled’). On the graphic interface of the game, players were asked to find
items associated with the city spending programs which, as Navalny’s Anti-corruption
Foundation concluded, led to substantial budget misappropriation. While playing, users
were learning more about Navalny’s platform and the problem of corruption in the city
(Nik Berezovskiy, 2015).

5.3.9 Crowdfunding
Budget is the key resource that a political campaign starts with, as believed by Volkov
(2013). At the end of the day, it was paid staff who developed all the web applications
for volunteers. The primary way to fund Navalny’s transmedia campaign was its
crowdfunding initiatives. Robert Pratten believes crowdfunding is a natural part of the
transmedia revenue model (2015, pp.191-196). Renira Gambarato also argues that
crowdfunding is one of the legitimate business models for transmedia projects (2013,
p.93). Crowdfunding and Transmedia Storytelling by Carlos Scolari and Antoni Roig
Telo (2015) gives an account of the transmedia initiatives that incorporated
crowdfunding into their business plans. One example is the get-out-the-vote effort of the
Harry Potter Alliance in Wizard Rock the Vote 2016 campaign (“Wizard Rock,” 2016)
when $52,000 was raised from 1,500 online users.
Navalny's election campaign was the first of its kind in Russia to rely heavily on
crowdfunding which was its main source of financing. More than that, the campaign
broke a record for the amount of money raised for a political cause in Russia. To
crowdfund the campaign, Navalny's team launched pd4.navalny.ru website. It attracted
16,700 people who donated about $3,100,000 to the campaign (“Alexey Navalny,”
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2013, p.76). It set up a new record for political fundraising in the country (“Alexey
Navalny,” 2013, p.71). That is even more significant considering that small donations
dominated: the median transaction in Moscow was $60 and it was $30 in the country
overall. About 35 per cent of the donations came from outside the capital – another sign
of the federal profile of the campaign (Volkov, 2013). Along with pd4.navalny.ru
website, Navalny used the capacities of his social media platforms to promote
fundraising. As Navalny's campaign report showed, donations jumped up every time
Navalny called to support him with donations in his blog (Volkov, 2013).
After the election, the campaign stayed true to its transparency and democratic
communication style with the people and produced a report on campaign spending.
According to the report, 40 per cent of the budget was spent to produce promotional
items such as free newspapers, leaflets, stickers and cube stands for the campaign. About
27 per cent was spent on paid advertising including online ads (13.55 per cent) and radio
adverts (12.48 per cent). Another 26 per cent was spent on street campaigning, including
rallies, advert distribution, logistics, and so on. Among other expenses, there were
internal polling (about 0.5 per cent) and office-related expenses (just above 2 per cent)
(“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.75).
The $3,100,000 that Navalny managed to raise was just under the budget of the
rival Sobyanin campaign. The incumbent Mayor spent $3,240,000. To translate it into
votes, Navalny spent $4.9 per vote (632,697 votes all together), and Sobyanin spent
much less, only $2.7 per vote (1,193,178 votes in total) (“Rezultaty Vyborov,” 2013).
These numbers seem not to be in favour of Navalny. But to look at this from a different
perspective, Navalny entered the race in July 2013 with popularity well below 10 points
according to all the pollsters. Over the course of his campaign, he managed to increase
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that number to 27 per cent when the votes were counted on September 9. On the other
hand, about 45-50 per cent were ready to vote for Sobyanin at the start of the election
campaign and he won the election with only 51.5 per cent. Thus, Sobyanin’s campaign
only yielded a negligible increase in support. That makes Navalny's campaign
significantly more effective in transforming investments into new supporters. The other
parameter that also has to be taken into account is the free time that the ruling party
candidate received from the major government-controlled news outlets during the three
months of the campaign. Its effect on the total votes Sobyanin got is hard to compute,
but to put it into perspective, the reach of the Sobyanin campaign on TV exceeded 250
million interactions with citizens, while all the other candidates got only 1.5 million
contacts combined (“Analiz reklamnykh kampaniy,” 2013).
From the Western point of view, political fundraising is a routine way of
bringing money into candidates’ campaigns. From the smallest individual donations, to
fundraising dinners with selected invitees, to large Super-PACs (political action
committees), as they are known in the United States, money for election campaigns is
raised from the public. In the Russian context, this was not common and promised to be
problematic for various reasons. As we highlighted before, the Russian political space is
not particularly open to collective actions. And fundraising, of course, is a collective
endeavour set to fight for a common cause. On top of that, the legal opportunity
structure practices selective repressions against those who support the opposition. Under
such circumstances, it might not be easy for a politician, even the one in opposition, to
convince people to donate their money for his or her campaign. Despite the liability of
‘Russia’s pervasive political cynicism’ (Lipman, 2013), Navalny managed to lead the
first major political campaign paid for by ordinary people.
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While crowdfunding was the way transmedia strategies helped the campaign
mobilise material resources, there was a legal opportunity structure opposing this. The
crowdfunding operations of the campaign experienced resistance from the bureaucracy
and law enforcement offices. In May 2014, the Moscow City Elections Commission
launched an investigation into Yandex c ompany, which is one of the largest IT
companies in the country. The campaign used Yandex.Money to collect donations. The
campaign was accused of using Yandex.Money ‘to receive illegal funds from abroad’
(Brennan, 2014). No irregularities were proven later. The year following the election,
the Yandex offices and the homes of the members of the opposition were searched. They
were suspected of ‘pocketing funds designated for opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s
Mayoral campaign last year’ (Brennan, 2014). Navalny suggested these activities were
run to make it harder for independent political figures to raise money on the Internet and
to discredit the opposition in the eyes of their supporters.

5.3.10 Results of the campaign
On September 14, 2013, after 3 months of intense campaigning, Navalny got 27 per cent
of the votes. His rival candidate Sergey Sobyanin won the first ballot round with 51.5
per cent. On election night, Sobyanin’s numbers stayed just shy of the 50 per cent
threshold necessary to win outright in the first round. The second round would give a
huge blow to the official candidate and cause a major crack in the super-controlling
system of the Russian electoral authoritarianism, which never allows independent
candidates to come so close to a success. The surprise outcome could energise a protest
vote and, if it was big enough for Navalny to win, the key federal institutions, Kremlin
and the Russian Parliament, could find themselves in the city managed by the enemy of
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the regime. Eventually, Sobyanin somehow managed to close just above the 50 per cent
he needed. But considering the government’s bad reputation and past electoral frauds,
nobody could say for sure now if it was due to the votes varying in different
constituencies or it was the fear of the second round that forced the Mayor to rig the
same very election he tried hard to make look legitimate. If the snap election was called
to find legitimacy (Waller, 2013, p.6), arguably that goal was not achieved that night.
The immediate goal of the campaign was to elect Navalny as mayor of Moscow.
It was clear, however, that it would be an uphill battle and there were very little chances
the candidate would achieve that goal in the scope of one campaign considering the
super-controlling nature of the Russian regime. Besides, Navalny never positioned
himself as a Moscow politician, his ambitions have always been to influence federal
politics and ‘Change Russia. Begin with Moscow’ slogan of his mayoral campaign
proves that. One can say that a more realistic goal of Navalny's mayoral bid was to 1.
strengthen the position of Navalny as a sole leader of the opposition with a strong
election result, 2. spread a word about Navalny and widen his base with new supporters,
3. keep up with and reinforce the protest enthusiasm of the 2011-2012, 4. give citizens a
lesson of active citizenship and train volunteers for future campaigns, and 5. hurt the
regime as much as possible within the very limited opportunities the opposition had.
Arguably, the campaign made gains on all those fronts, bigger or smaller. The
less impressive than expected performance of the ruling party candidate on the election
day was attributed to a low turnout among his base, while Navalny supporters showed
up in big numbers, bigger than anyone projected. In the closing week of the campaign,
major pollsters gave Navalny 18-20 per cent of support (against actual 27 per cent) and
58-60 per cent to Sobyanin (Makutina, 2013). The overall turnout was expected to be
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just above 50 per cent while in fact it was only 33 per cent on the day of election.
Apparently, Navalny outperformed in getting out the vote and Sobyanin underperformed
which made a difference for the final results and almost cost Sobyanin the first-round
win (Clover and Weaver, 2013a).
Navalny did show a strong result, definitely much stronger than was expected.
The ambiguous result of the first ballot demonstrated there are opportunities to make a
difference even when elections are rigged and proved that the regime is not all
invincible. Navalny also had a chance to reach out to thousands of new voters with
dozens of rallies in residential areas and mobilise thousands of volunteers for the first of
its kind massive grassroots campaign in Russia.
The declared mission of the campaign was to bring political decision-makers
under citizens’ control and empower local communities. Citizens’ oversight over public
spendings, elected sheriffs, redistribution of budgets in favour of local authorities,
connecting neighbourhoods through the networks of local roads, those policies were
among the main points of Navalny’s platform and communications.
Active citizenship was not only a declared goal of the campaign but also the
means of achieving it. The campaign practiced what it preached. With thousands of
volunteers campaigning offline and online and the greatest in the history of Russia
politics crowdfunding organisation, Navalny's campaign of 2013 relied on civic
engagement and grassroots enthusiasm in its methods. To reduce the costs of
participation for the citizens of Moscow and beyond it, the campaign turned itself into a
transmedia network of digital solutions with a range of engagement mechanics. The
campaign was structured to accommodate as many volunteers as possible. There were
websites for the engagement of varying intensity.
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Illustration 8. The diagram of Alexey Navalny’s campaign in Moscow.

Navalny’s campaign applied many of the transmedia principles of running
campaigns. Spreadability and drillability by Henry Jenkins (2010), consistent experience
across platforms or ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), the use of transmedia storytelling as a
leadership practice (Ganz, 2009; 2011), helping supporters navigate the complicated
transmedia structure of extensions, web applications and so on (Jenkins et al., 2006,
p.46; Pratten, 2015, p.152), gamification (Gambarato and Dabagian, 2016, p.4), focus on
participation (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7; Pratten, 2015, p.2), making sure there are
opportunities for participation of varying intensities to accommodate different people
(Pratten, 2015, p.183), employing the principles of participatory culture including
community-building and collaborative support (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7), technological
sophistication (Pratten, 2015, pp.40-41), crowdfunding (Scolari and Telo, 2015;
Gambarato, 2013, p.93) and other transmedia strategies all found reflection in Alexey
Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow.
To conceptualise the participatory nature of Navalny's campaign, the chapter
employed resource mobilisation theory and moved on from the idea of citizens’ agency
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to the concept of SMOs and political organisers to understand better how to facilitate
grassroots initiatives. On the one hand, the campaign leveraged the resources it
mobilised from the protest movement. The case study made a point that Navalny's
mayoral bid of 2013 as a campaign-style grassroots initiative was a logical extension of
the opposition movement of 2011-2012 in Moscow. The protests in the capital made
Navalny's transmedia grassroots campaign more probable at least in three ways. First,
they gave citizens a chance to practice grassroots political action which had not been a
big part of Russian political tradition. That experience will be of use for those who
would volunteer for Alexey Navalny’s campaign in 2013. The persistent protest
enthusiasm made it easier for the campaign to mobilise volunteers of which the
campaign recruited thousands. Many if not most of them (“Kak pobedit,” 2017) came
from the protests. Second, similarly to the movements of the Arab Spring, the Russia
opposition learnt to use social media to mobilise people for civic action and even
developed some software for political participation of their own. The online elections to
the Russian Opposition Coordination Council in 2012 was an example of the latter.
Third, the protests solidified the perception of Alexey Navalny as effectively the leader
of the Russia opposition which helped him mobilise citizens for his Moscow campaign
in less than a year after the protests (“Personalny portret,” 2012).
On the other hand, the campaign gave citizens something they did not have
during the Free and Fair Elections protest of 2011-2012. Considering that one of the
goals of the campaign was to revitalise the protest movement, it created the kind of an
organisational structure that provided the movement with valuable resources for more
efficient political action with some real results. Thus, the protests of 2011-2012 and
Navalny's campaign of 2013 demonstrated there can be a diffusion of resources between
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movements and electoral politics which McAdam and Tarrow (2010) claimed to be true.
The internal polling showed that by the end of the campaign 60 per cent of
Muscovites saw cubes a nd leaflets, 35 per cent of them knew of local meetings in their
neighbourhood, 30 per cent had newspapers in their post boxes, 30 per cent listened to
the advertisement on the radio, 17 per cent of Moscow residents saw Navalny’s adverts
on the Internet (Volkov, 2013). True to Leonid Volkov (2013), the campaign found
correlation between simple exposure to the candidate’s ads and a positive opinion about
him. In numbers, those who had ever come across with anything produced by the
campaign were 12-15 per cent more likely to vote for Navalny.
Over 40,000 voters in total attended 89 local meetings according to the campaign
post-election report (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013, p.13). The meetings with the candidate
usually attracted from 100 to 700 people (“Pri Luzhkove takogo ne bylo,” 2013). The
most populous rally had 1600 people and the average turnout was 400 people (Volkov,
2013). There were three meetings a day to accommodate different audiences: three local
rallies a day Monday-Friday and five rallies a day on weekends. After every meeting,
the campaign published a newspaper with highlights from the rally and other
information about the candidate to distribute them locally (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013,
pp.15-16). Volkov (2013) suggested that the rallies gave the campaign 30,000 new
contacts with people and resulted in 60,000 new votes.
The results of the campaign in numbers were (“Alexey Navalny,” 2013) 2,756
cubes with 4-5,000 volunteers in total, 18-20,000 volunteers including those who
volunteered on the Internet, 90 rallies held by Alexey Navalny, 20 press briefings, 10
meetings with professional communities, 30 videos and 10 audio clips for the Internet,
60 million interactions with people on the Internet overall, 6 million views on Youtube,
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40,000 new followers on social media, 500,000 direct messages sent on social media by
volunteers on behalf of the candidate, 40,000 people from 18,000 houses registered on
Navalny to Every House website, 23 million printed papers (14 issues), leaflets (4
issues) and local newspapers (4 issues), 700 volunteers who did opinion polls, 8,000 exit
polls with 8,000 poll watchers.
The websites and web applications the campaign designed encouraged
collaboration among Russian citizens, made them feel part of a movement united by
shared interests and made it easier for Navalny’s supporters to act together for the sake
of a common good. This approach was an attempt to tap into the grassroots enthusiasm
that the capital showed in 2011-2012. The campaign’s couchsurfing platform
empowered people to collaborate across the country. Navalny to Every House web app
allowed citizens to comprehend themselves as part of a bigger movement – the sense
that the regime was trying to suppress through media blackouts and the campaigns of
ridiculing Navalny’s supporters as marginals. The same effect had cubes that allowed an
average Moscow citizen to see the real face of Navalny’s supporters. Despite being the
first grassroots transmedia campaign of its kind in the country, Navalny's mayoral bid
came up with many innovative ideas on how to overcome the negative aspects of the
Russian political opportunity structure and let people exercise their political agency
through cooperation. That required a change in a paradigm of political campaigning
which included a new role of a candidate as the one who leads a live dialogue with
voters. Importantly, the pluralist mechanics of the campaign corresponded nicely with
the platform of the candidate which placed utmost importance on decentralisation of the
Russian state and active citizenship as the most effective form of governing capable of
bringing elites under people’s control.
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Volunteering with fellow citizens is important for building and strengthening ties
between people and learning to take responsibility for the country. Alexis de Toqueville
even argued that volunteering was critical for democracy to succeed in the United States
in the first place (Tocqueville, 2012, pp.895-897). From that point of view, the practice
of civil cooperation that the transmedia approach of Navalny's campaign offered to the
people of Russia arguably contributed to preparing the society for democratic changes.

5.4 Conclusion
The case study of Alexey Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign applied the OSMR
analytical approach. With this approach, it took stock of the transmedia strategies of
Navalny’s campaign. In particular, it discussed how those transmedia strategies allowed
to recruit more volunteers and reduce the efforts needed to volunteer on behalf of the
campaign. The campaign became an extensive network of web applications, websites,
legacy media formats and offline points of promotion. Those platforms offered a great
deal of participation opportunities to Navalny’s supporters. Storytelling as a resource of
political leadership was also a factor in this campaign. The message of political
accountability through civic engagement aligned nicely with the participatory
transmedia approach the campaign practiced.
The transmedia strategies of the campaign made labour/human, material and
production resources more easily available to Navalny’s campaign. Technical expertise
was important to develop the many applications the campaign took advantage of. It
became easier to recruit volunteers and do fundraising because of the web applications
the campaign developed. The transmedia structure of the campaign formed a diverse
repertoire of contention to promote the cause.
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Navalny’s transmedia strategies helped mobilise resources and mitigate some
negative aspects of Russian opportunity structures for the campaign. The mediated
opportunity structure of Russia was rather hostile to Navalny’s campaign, especially
with regard to the legacy media largely controlled by the government and affiliated
individuals. The repertoire of contention the transmedia approach activated made use of
the media, communication and IT opportunities still open to the opposition movement in
Russia. The special role of Moscow in the economic and political realities of the country
made it harder for those living outside Moscow to participate but increased their interest
in the election which had federal implications. Navalny’s campaign tapped into that
enthusiasm and made it easier for supporters across the country to raise their voice. For
example, the campaign developed a couchsurfing web application to bring those people
to the capital and a web application to send messages on behalf of the campaign on
social media. With those and other transmedia strategies, Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral
campaign found ways around the political space of Russia to promote the cause more
effectively and ultimately made the candidate the most successful opposition figure in
the country.
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Chapter 6. Critical Interpretation of the OSMR Analytical Approach

6.1 Introduction
The OSMR analytical approach is a valuable contribution to transmedia scholarship. It
allows taking stock of political transmedia campaigns with focus on those transmedia
strategies that make a difference for the campaign in a given political context. In the
previous chapter, the case study of Alexey Navalny 2013 mayoral campaign
demonstrated that valuable insights about a political transmedia campaign can be
generated using this analytical approach.
This chapter will discuss the OSMR analytical approach apart from the case
study of Navalny's campaign of 2013. In particular, the chapter will give theoretical
instructions about how to apply this analytical approach. The chapter will include
diagrams with taxonomies identified in previous chapters and schemas outlining
essential elements of the OSMR analytical approach. Once more, the chapter will
explore the key parts of the resources-mobilisation analytical approach, i.e. transmedia
scholarship, resource mobilisations and opportunity structure theories, to highlight their
role in the analysis of political transmedia campaigns.

6.2 New analytical approach
6.2.1 Reinterpreting transmedia strategies
There are many transmedia taxonomies and analytical approaches helpful to interpret
political transmedia campaigns. They take stock of a wide range of transmedia features
such as spreadability, continuity, immersion and other qualities of transmedia content
(Jenkins, 2010), psychographics of transmedia users (Pratten, 2015, pp.78-79), users’
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consumption strategies (Murray, 1997), premise and purpose, narrative, media platforms
and the audience of transmedia projects (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015b) and others I
have had a chance to discuss in the thesis.
Those classifications describe transmedia projects and campaigns from different
angles but were not designed to take stock of political transmedia campaigns specifically
and do not consider the complexity of the political realm transmedia grassroots
campaigns interact with or those powerful local factors affecting them. To introduce the
analytical approach that would welcome local factors to the discussion on transmedia
campaigns in politics, the thesis married transmedia storytelling theory with social
movement and grassroots campaigning scholarships in the OSMR analytical approach.
Particularly, it employed the theories of political opportunity structures and resource
mobilisation to understand the role political decision-makers and political organisers can
play in the progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns.
The reasoning behind incorporating both resource mobilisation and political
opportunity theories in the analysis of transmedia grassroots campaigns is as follows.
The OSMR analytical approach suggests that there must be a dynamic process going on
between opportunity structures of a given society and resource mobilisation strategies of
political organisers. A political space produces challenges and opportunities for
transmedia grassroots campaigns. Consequently, political organisers either mobilise
resources to overcome the obstacles created by POSs or use the external opportunities to
agglomerate more political resources. In both scenarios, the ultimate goal is to reduce
the cost of political participation for citizens – regardless of how welcoming or hostile a
given political space is to out-of-the-polity actors. The analytical approach this thesis
has developed investigates the ability of transmedia strategies to reduce the cost of
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grassroots participation and make it more efficient.
The advantage of the new approach is that now we can interpret the many
aspects of transmedia grassroots campaigns in terms of their direct contribution to the
political goals of a campaign. In doing so, we take a step forward from talking about the
campaign’s platforms, engagement strategies and messages formally and descriptively.
Instead, the facets of the campaign get conceptualised to demonstrate how each of them
contributed specifically to mobilise political resources and produce better results in
given POSs. The OSMR analytical approach suggests that all the aspects of the
campaign can serve one goal which is to reduce the costs of participation for citizens
and that is the perspective which the approach examines them from. The following
diagram outlines the relationships among the three key parts of the OSMR analytical
approach:

Illustration 9. Graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach.
According to the analytical approach, the transmedia strategies of a political
campaign are interrelated with the opportunity structures of a given society. For
instance, a local political space can affect the campaign communication strategy in a

160

positive or negative way. At the same time, transmedia strategies become resources to
affect opportunity structures by reducing the cost of civic participation for its supporters
in a given political space.

6.2.2 Resource mobilisation
Resource mobilisation theory is another critical part of the analytical approach this thesis
chose to follow. The thesis has brought together the many classifications of political
resources produced by different researchers to see if transmedia grassroots campaigns
can contribute to mobilising at least some of them. Consequently, we made use of
Navalny's campaign case study to draw parallels between the transmedia characteristics
of the campaign and mobilising resources such as the repertoire of contention, technical
expertise, monetary resources, labour and others. The analysis of Navalny's campaign
has shown that transmedia strategies can facilitate the resource mobilisation efforts of
political organisers and reduce the cost of non-electoral political participation.

Illustration 10. Transmedia strategies as a resource mobilisation tool.
The model grasps the complexity behind political campaigns abandoning the
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media effects orthodoxy. Morozov famously wrote a book in which he made a
compelling argument about the media having a limited effect on the process of
democratisation in East Germany, for instance (2011, p.63). As another example,
Facebook facilitated the Arab Spring uprisings but the so-called ‘youth bulge’ in the
Middle East and North Africa and the high levels of unemployment made a difference
for the ultimate outcome of the protest movements in the region as well (Hamanaka,
2017; Jagietto and Van der Heijden, 2011). In other words, social and economic
characteristics of a given society along with all sorts of demographics can be a factor of
great importance which a media-centred analytical approach would not take into
account.
The thesis tried to mitigate this original bias of a media-centred analysis of
political transmedia campaigns by incorporating ideas from other disciplines. It did not
just argue that transmedia strategies can make a difference when it comes to grassroots
campaigning but also sought to take stock of the political space transmedia campaigns
interact with and introduce new ideas to the transmedia scholarship. The approach this
thesis has developed allowed it to explore the political dimension of transmedia
grassroots campaigns with the toolkits of relevant political theories. With the application
of POS and resource mobilisation theories, transmedia practices started making sense as
serving specific political goals of reducing the cost of participation for active citizens
and resisting negative aspects of a given political space.
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Illustration 11. Classifications of mobilising resources.
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The OSMR analytical approach is non-rigid. It does not recommend studying all
the political transmedia campaigns against the same set of mobilising resources, or
opportunity structures for that matter. One has to acknowledge that every campaign is
unique as unique is the political context of a given campaign. Instead, the analytical
approach this thesis has developed offers a menu of possible resources to choose from.
In doing so, it makes it possible to relate transmedia strategies to particular aspects of
opportunity structures those strategies were designed to overcome or benefit from.
Illustration 11 summarises some of the taxonomies describing the resources of
political mobilisation particularly those proposed by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo
Freeman (1975), Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2007) and Michael Ganz (2009;
2011). Although the list is hardly exhaustive, it does cover the wide range of most
probable resources of mobilisation such as technical know-how, human resources,
monetary resources, land, solidarity, sympathetic support, repertoires of contention,
storytelling, equipment, supplies and others.
While bringing in new ideas from resource mobilisation and opportunity
structures scholarships, the new approach stayed true to its transmedia roots and drew
insights from them to reinterpret phenomena from the realm of political communication.
In particular, this thesis applied the key concepts of the transmedia studies to make sense
of the many political activities of Navalny's campaign. For instance, the ideas of ‘free
labour’, transmedia crowdfunding, transmedia messaging and others were brought in to
take stock of the candidate’s political campaign.
It is important to stipulate that the OSMR analytical approach does not claim to
connect transmedia practices with the greater effectiveness of grassroots campaigns in
achieving their political goals. Instead, it takes stock of the ability of transmedia
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campaigns to empower people in their non-electoral political actions. While the thesis
examines the ability of transmedia campaigns to provide active citizens with tools or
resources to make their political participation easier, it must be acknowledged that there
are many other factors in play – some are easier some are harder to predict – which
determine to which extent a particular grassroots transmedia campaign will be effective.

6.2.3 Opportunity structures
POS theory is another pillar of the OSMR analytical approach. The thesis suggested that
the analysis of political transmedia campaigns has to take stock of relevant opportunity
structures.

Illustration 12. Dynamic relationships between transmedia strategies and opportunity
structures.
Mediation opportunity structure refers to all the ways in which grassroots
campaigns can use the power of mediated communication in a given political space and
how the mediated sphere affects the campaign. The opportunities of the mediated space
take the central stage in the repertoire of contention of modern political campaigns and,
therefore, are of crucial importance to grassroots campaigns of nowadays. Media
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opportunity structure reflects ‘mainstream media representations of protest and
movements’ (Cammaerts, 2012, p.117). Discursive opportunities are produced through
the movement’s own media and designed to make its story more resonating with the
audience (McCammon, 2013). Networked opportunities are facilitated by social media
(Cammaerts, 2012, p.122).

Illustration 13. Classifications of opportunity structures.
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Other structures of opportunity, e.g. legal opportunity structure, the traditions of
grassroots participation and the situation with representative democracy, can affect
citizens’ political enthusiasm, something that transmedia grassroots campaigns rely on
to achieve their objectives. Illustration 13 has some of the classifications of opportunity
structures which this thesis identified and which can be of use for the analysis of other
political transmedia campaigns.
While this thesis has highlighted some of the structures of opportunity and took
stock of them in relation to the Russian context, the thesis has to acknowledge that it
would be up to a particular case study to decide what kinds of political opportunities are
most relevant to it. That should not constitute a problem since the flexibility of the
OSMR analytical approach makes it possible to take into account very different aspects
of the political space. By no means they are limited to those that this thesis has referred
to in the case study of Navalny's campaign. For instance, various cultural phenomena or
the psychological dimension could prove to be revealing for the analysis of certain
campaigns.
The example of Navalny's campaign has demonstrated that the structures of
opportunity is a workable way to conceptualise the factors affecting the resource
mobilisation practices of political organisers and the destinies of grassroots campaigns.
That is because at any given time there are formal or informal arrangements about
different aspects of a given society that put their mark on the probability and the
direction of political change. They are not just isolated factors of political, cultural, legal
and other nature but structural arrangements. They are interconnected and have some
power to sustain themselves over time affecting the arrangements of tomorrow.
The thesis argues that the theories of POS and mobilising resources are the
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supreme theoretical foundation to understand the mechanisms that guide political change
– to compare with the theories that contemplate direct political agency. One of the
reasons is that the acts of voluntary agency are hard to predict and they are prone to
many possible influences such as a group interest, an immediate personal interest, the
individual psychology of a political actor and so on. Even though the structures of
opportunity are not set in stone for a given political space, the concept is still capable of
producing results and helping to draw insights about possible destinies of grassroots
campaigns. That was the reason why the thesis started discussing the scholarship on
politics and political communication with the analysis of the agency of elites and the
greater population and then moved on to introduce the theories of political opportunity
structures and resource mobilisation in political campaigning as a step forward from
talking about political change as solely the product of competing agents.

6.2.4 Synergy of the scholarships
There are two sides to the analysis of the political aspects of transmedia campaigns in
the approach this thesis has proposed – the analytical approach appreciated the dynamic
relationships between the internal capacities of political organisations to recruit
resources (resource mobilisation theory) and the external locally-specific factors that
affect grassroots campaigns (POS theory). The character of the political space has an
impact on the assortment of resources available to political transmedia campaigns. In
their turn, political organisers can use transmedia tools as resources reacting to and
trying to mitigate very specific obstacles of a particular political space.
POS and resource mobilisation are the two theories to analyse the political
meaning of transmedia strategies. They help the OSMR analytical approach make sense
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of the communication practices of transmedia campaigns, to understand why and to
what purpose political grassroots campaigns come up with this or that transmedia
extension. In its turn, the theory of transmedia storytelling helps conceptualise and bring
together the diverse political activities of grassroots campaigns, describing them as
systems of interrelated messages, extensions and platforms.
The idea to analyse political transmedia campaigns from the standpoint of
resource mobilisation and political opportunities was inspired by SWOT (Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis, a business technique that takes into
account internal strengths and weaknesses of an organisation and external opportunities
and threats (Pickton and Wright, 1998). The SWOT technique takes stock of internal
strengths and weaknesses of an enterprise and external opportunities and threats that
affect its performance. Likewise, resource mobilisation theory focuses on internal
capacities of political organisations to mobilise political resources of different kinds and
provide them to grassroots activists. The theory of POS deals with external factors that
are in a position to improve or hinder the prospects of transmedia grassroots campaigns
in politics. Thus, the outlined analytical approach, on the one hand, is innovative and
new to transmedia studies but, on the other hand, is well-known and has proven to be
workable in the scope of some other disciplines.
With the political science theories of resource mobilisation and opportunity
structures used as a basis for the OSMR analytical approach, this political
communication thesis made an important contribution to transmedia storytelling
scholarship. First and foremost, the thesis has developed and tried a new approach to the
analysis of political transmedia campaigns drawing insights from other branches of
science, which made possible a more nuanced analysis of political transmedia
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campaigns. Besides, the thesis has introduced the theory of transmedia storytelling to a
wider realm of political scholarship which is of importance since transmedia storytelling
has suffered from being a niche theory. The thesis also opened the door for more
borrowings and interpretations in the future.

6.3 Conclusion
The OSMR analytical approach makes a valuable contribution to transmedia storytelling
scholarship. It draws insights from the theories of resource mobilisations and
opportunity structures to make sense of transmedia strategies in political campaigning.
In particular, the analytical approach that this thesis has developed conducts the analysis
of the dynamic relationships between transmedia strategies, mobilising resources and
opportunity structures. The OSMR approach juxtaposes the elements of transmedia
strategies, mobilising resources and opportunity structures to see how transmedia
strategies become valuable political resources for campaigns and how those resources
correspond to the aspects of opportunity structures.
The OSMR analytical approach makes use of many classifications available in
literature. This chapter summarised some of those classifications and taxonomies in
diagrams to make the OSMR analytical approach easier to apply in the future. The
diagram of mobilising resources included multiple classifications from the works of
Charles Tilly, Jo Freeman, Michael Ganz, Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy to show
the resources transmedia strategies can mobilise. The opportunity structures diagram
listed the aspects of political, mediation and legal opportunity structure. To make the
application of the OSMR analytical approach more straightforward, one can use those
classifications to examine the internal capacities of political campaigns and their
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political contexts. With that being said, every campaign is unique in the same way as
there are no two identical political contexts. That is why the OSMR analytical approach
was designed to be flexible and able to incorporate the taxonomies not listed in the
theoretical part of this thesis.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion

7.1 The OSMR analytical approach
The main research problem of this political communication thesis was to develop an
analytical approach to studying political transmedia campaigns as locally-specific. The
analytical approach this thesis has developed, the OSMR analytical approach, examines
the opportunities and threats of a given political space to see how local specificities
affect the destinies of transmedia grassroots initiatives. With the example of Russia, the
thesis discussed the implications of mediation and legal opportunity structures, the
situation with the institutions of representative democracy, the traditions of grassroots
participation in the society and other aspects of the Russian political space.
The thesis also brought in the theory of resource mobilisation. It served as part of
the OSMR approach to show how political organisers can mobilise grassroots supporters
and reduce the costs of political participation for them. The resources that political
campaigns agglomerate are technical expertise, labour, monetary resources, space and
tactical repertoires, among others. The classifications of mobilising resources helped
take stock of Navalny's grassroots campaign.
The thesis has demonstrated that transmedia storytelling can be instrumental in
mobilising political resources, reducing the cost of political participation for active
citizens and mitigating some negative aspects of opportunity structures. It was done with
the case study of Alexey Navalny's 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow. Among other
things, the campaign relied on its technological expertise to develop a transmedia
network of websites and web services that simplified political action for thousands of
volunteers. For instance, a couchsurfing web service made it easier for the residents
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from outside Moscow to come and campaign in the capital of Russia defying economic
and legal restrictions. A crowdfunding initiative allowed to collect monetary resources
in the situation where the LOS tried to prevent citizens from donating to Navalny's
campaign.
That ability of transmedia campaigns to confront the negatives of POSs is of
special importance in the context of electoral authoritarian regimes like modern Russia
where grassroots enthusiasm of citizens is being suppressed through a range of
opportunity structures in the mediation, legal, political and other realms. A thorough
discussion on the structures of political opportunity in modern Russia portrayed a picture
of many restrictions that civil society and the opposition face when pursuing the cause of
democracy.
What was not part of the initial plan, the thesis also found support for the
proposition that there can be a diffusion of resources between social movements and
political campaigns. As the study concluded, Alexey Navalny's 2013 grassroots
campaign in Moscow was a part of a greater protest movement that overtook the capital
of Russia in 2011-2012. On the one hand, Navalny's campaign drew grassroots
enthusiasm from the protest base for its electoral purposes. On the other hand, it gave
the social movement something it was missing during the protests, i.e. political
organisation with its technical expertise and a network of websites and web applications
to make their voices louder.
The job done in the thesis is of importance to transmedia storytelling scholarship.
The problem that the thesis identified at the very beginning is the deficit of analytical
considerations on the study of transmedia campaigns in politics. Political campaigns are
very context-dependent and require a special approach to their analysis. The study has
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contributed to filling that gap. It referred to the scholarship on political mobilisation to
better understand the factors that affect the progress of transmedia grassroots campaigns
in politics.
The next diagram outlines the relationships between the three key parts of the
OSMR analytical approach:

Illustration 14. Graphical schema representation of the OSMR analytical approach.
The OSMR analytical approach reinterpreted the whole transmedia experience
through the lens of resource mobilisation and political opportunities but also
incorporated the findings of known transmedia analytical approaches and taxonomies.
The thesis has connected Henry Jenkins’ (2010) principles of transmedia storytelling,
such as spreadability, drillability, immersion and others, to resource mobilisation
practices of political transmedia campaigns. In the same manner, the thesis made use of
the transmedia ideas of ‘canon’ (Long, 2007, p.164), storytelling as a leadership practice
(Ganz, 2009; 2011), navigational transparency (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.46; Pratten, 2015,
p.152), gamification (Gambarato and Dabagian, 2016, p.4), participatory culture
(Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7; Pratten, 2015, p.2), many degrees of participation (Pratten,
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2015, p.183), community-building and collaborative support (Jenkins et al., 2006, p.7),
technological sophistication (Pratten, 2015, pp.40-41), crowdfunding (Scolari and Telo,
2015; Gambarato, 2013, p.93) and other transmedia strategies. In doing so, the thesis
both expanded the transmedia storytelling scholarship with insights from other
disciplines and came to a very specific result in the form of a new approach to the
analysis of transmedia grassroots campaigns in politics.
The OSMR analytical approach is non-rigid. It does not advise studying all the
political transmedia campaigns against the same set of mobilising resources, or
opportunity structures for that matter. Instead, the analytical approach offers a menu of
possible resources to choose from. In doing so, it makes it possible to relate transmedia
strategies to particular aspects of opportunity structures those strategies were designed to
overcome or benefit from. For instance, this thesis discussed the resource mobilisation
taxonomies by Charles Tilly (2004; 2008), Jo Freeman (1975), Bob Edwards and John
D. McCarthy (2007) and Michael Ganz (2009; 2011) citing the most common resources
of mobilisation such as technical know-how, human resources, monetary resources,
land, solidarity, sympathetic support, repertoires of contention, storytelling, equipment,
supplies, among others. As the case study of Alexey Navalany’s 2013 mayoral campaign
for Moscow demonstrated, transmedia strategies can be converted to those mobilising
resources and therefore help political campaigns adapt to particular political contexts.
The thesis also gave an account of possible opportunity structures to make it
easier to interpret different aspects of a given political context with the OSMR analytical
approach. Among other things, there was a discussion about mediation, legal and
political opportunity structures. The case study of Navalny's campaign also took stock of
some cultural factors such as the traditions of grassroots politics in the country, the
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special position of Moscow in Russian economic and political life, and the situation with
the institutions of political representation. The example of Navalny's campaign
demonstrated that the structures of opportunity is a workable way to conceptualise the
factors affecting the resource mobilisation practices of political organisers and the
destinies of grassroots campaigns.
The OSMR analytical approach is flexible. While it made sense in the scope of
this thesis to take stock of the most common opportunity structures, the thesis
acknowledges that it would be up to a particular case study to decide what kinds of
political opportunities are most relevant to it. There is no need for them to be limited to
those that the case study of Navalny's campaign referred to.
All in all, this political communication thesis made an important contribution to
transmedia storytelling scholarship with the political science theories of resource
mobilisation and opportunity structures used as a basis for the OSMR analytical
approach. First and foremost, the thesis has developed and tried a new approach to
analysing political transmedia campaigns. Besides, the thesis has introduced the theory
of transmedia storytelling to a wider realm of political scholarship and opened the door
for more borrowings and interpretations in the future.

7.2 Further developments
There are possible developments of this thesis that have fallen beyond the framework of
the current project. The presented analytical approach could be tested further to discuss
political transmedia campaigns. As one of potential follow ups, there is a space to see
how the outlined analytical and theoretical approach works in more liberal political
settings. This analytical approach that employs the theory of political opportunities and
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resources to discuss political transmedia campaigns is flexible enough to accommodate
different campaigns and a variety of political contexts. But it is also probable that the
approach would benefit from some modifications when applied to the campaigns
expanding in less restrictive political space. That would be one of the routes to progress
on the findings of this thesis.
Indeed, under curtain political contexts, opportunity structures can be more open
to out-of-the-polity actors than what the example of Alexey Navalny shows. When
applied to some other campaigns, the presented analytical approach might have to
dedicate more time to the enabling side of the opportunity structure in place. It would
add another dimension to the OSMR analytical approach and explore another side to the
application of transmedia strategies in politics.
On a different note, one can argue that transmedia scholarship as a field would
benefit from taking stock of local specificity even when it comes to non-political
campaigns. Although it may seem less likely that transmedia projects in entertainment
and marketing would suffer from the limitations of external political opportunity
structures, it does not mean they are context-independent. Indeed, cultural frames affect
transmedia advertising campaigns and entertainment production. The legal opportunity
structure is also very much relevant to what transmedia projects in marketing and
entertainment can or cannot do in a given social context. Although those effects could be
less consequential than the impact of POSs on political grassroots campaigns they are
worth paying attention to.
Coming back to the case of Alexey Navalny, the story of his 2013 campaign still
reverberates through Russian politics. At the time of writing, the leading figure of
Russian democratic opposition stays imprisoned following the same bogus charges he
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faced during his mayoral run in 2013. Yet, even with Navalny under arrest, his
foundation has managed to produce ‘Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe’ a
very thorough investigation into Vladimir Putin’s secret palace. It has a multimedia
website of its own at palace.navalny.com, been viewed more than 112 million times on
YouTube as of February 2021 and provoked a series of protest manifestations across the
country. Navalny’s Smart Voting data-driven recommendation system which caused
havoc in the Moscow City Parliamentary election in 2019 and spoiled Kremlin’s game
to advance its most loyal candidates is getting ready to have the same effect over the
parliamentary election in September 2021. While the long-term consequences of Alexey
Navalny’s work remain to be seen, his more recent tactics are something to take a closer
look at.
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